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Within the philosophy of mind, a ‘hermeneutical’ tradition sees psychology as 
discontinuous with natural-scientific domains.  A characteristic ingredient of this 
tendency is ‘normativism’, which makes obedience to ra ional norms an a priori 
condition on agency.  In this thesis, I advance an argument against normativism 
which trades on the notion of a psychological module.  Specifically, I show how 
modules can be envisioned which, because of their high degree of irrationality, 
challenge the normativist’s principle of charity.  As an illustration, I describe such a 
module that incorporates key features of the Freudian ‘id’, and I suggest that Freudian 
theory generally puts pressure on charity constraints.  In sum, I seek to substantially 
undermine the hermeneutical view of the mind by attacking one of its central pillars.  
In Chapter 1, after setting out the essential featur s of hermeneuticism, I sketch the 
historical background of recent normativism by considering Quine’s employment of 
charity in his theory of meaning and mind.  Most centrally, I reject pragmatic and 
heuristic readings of Quinean charity in favor of one that sees it as a constitutive 
  
constraint on attribution.  In Chapter 2, I begin to clarify the content of Davidsonian 
charity, against which—in the first instance—my argument levels.  I identify 
Maximization and Threshold Principles in Davidson’s early papers, contrast 
Davidsonian charity with Richard Grandy’s Principle of Humanity, and rebut typical 
arguments for charity principles.  In Chapter 3, after identifying two additional 
Davidsonian charity principles (a Competence and a Compartment Principle) and 
describing the conception of a module figuring in my argument, I present my 
argument in schematic form.  Then I critique attempts to rebut my argument through 
excluding modular processes from the scope of normativism (notably, via a personal-
subpersonal distinction).  In Chapter 4, I develop my argument in detail by describing 
a module that embodies basic forms of Freudian wish-fulfilment and demonstrating 
how it violates charity principles.  Further, I rebut possible objections to my use of 
Freudian theory.  In Chapter 5, I canvass various models of Freudian phenomena 
more generally and suggest that a version of my argument can be run with respect to 
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Chapter One: The Historical Background of 
Normativism 
Introduction 
That minds—at least human minds—are largely rational has long been a 
methodological presupposition of the social sciences, s eming to offer a foundation 
on which the social sciences might be grounded as genuinely explanatory and 
predictive disciplines.  But a question can be raised as to the status of this 
presupposition.  Within the philosophy of mind, an influential tradition—numbering 
among its adherents such philosophers as W. V. O. Quine, Donald Davidson, Daniel 
Dennett, Marcia Cavell, and Jennifer Hornsby—has viewed the rationality of (human) 
minds not merely as an empirically warranted generalization.  Rather, philosophers 
within this tradition have championed the much stronger view, called ‘normativism’, 
according to which a large measure of obedience to the norms of rationality is a 
logically necessary, a priori condition for the possession of propositional attitudes by 
an agent.1  It is this position against which I argue in this thesis. 
More specifically, I shall advance an argument which trades on a notion 
which has enjoyed considerable and fruitful currency within psychological theory in 
recent years, namely, that of a ‘module’.  A module, as contemporary psychological 
theory understands the notion, is—roughly—any isolable functional component of the 
mind.  Although this terminology is fairly new, the concept itself is not.  In fact, I 
wish to suggest, Sigmund Freud’s conception of the part of the personality which he 
labels the ‘id’ is, in all essentials, that of such a module.  Indeed, it is the conception 
                                                
1 The correlative injunction to interpret agents as obeying such norms, in turn, is widely referred to as 




of a module which does not hew to the rational norms adherence to which 
normativism regards as a condition for the possession of a mind.  But given such a 
clash with normativism, the scientific possibility of Freud’s conception of the id, I 
suggest, gives reason to call into question normativism’s insistence on such a 
condition.2  Thus, the example of Freud’s id illustrates a tendency of modular theory 
to subvert normativism.  In fact, the sort of argument I make by drawing on Freudian 
theory could plausibly be made by bringing to bear other bodies of psychological 
theory.3   
In broad outline, my plan is the following:  I first treat the origins of 
normativism in Quinean philosophy then present a det iled picture of more recent 
normativism, especially, the—in some measure—canonical form of it championed by 
Davidson, which, in large measure, represents the targe  of my attack.  After 
clarifying the conception of modules that figures in my argument, I describe a module 
embodying processes of Freudian infantile wish-fulfilment and indicate how its 
irrationality presents a challenge to normativism.  Last, I consider whether an 
analogue of my argument can be made relying on the wid r range of phenomena 
described by Freudian theory. 
 In this first chapter, more particularly, I shall sketch the philosophical-
historical background of recent normativism by considering Quine’s employment of a 
principle of charity.  For although Quine credits Neil Wilson with coining the term, 
Quine’s use of the concept actually antedates Wilson’s.  Certainly, it is in the context 
                                                
2 It should be emphasized that my argument does not rely on the actual truth of Freudian theory.  
Rather, it depends merely on the bare scientific possibility of important elements of it. 
3 See the conclusion of this thesis for one suggestion as to an alternate version of the argument using 




of Quinean philosophy of language and mind that charity begins to assume its 
characteristic shape.  Moreover, it is Quine’s use of the concept that directly (and 
decisively) influences the views of latter-day normativists such as Davidson and 
Dennett. 
However, since there exists no consensus among commentators about the 
proper interpretation of Quinean charity, I shall cnvass the various interpretations on 
offer and—somewhat tentatively—defend that which strikes me as most plausible.  
Despite the tentativeness of my conclusions in this regard, the process of sifting 
through the various interpretations of Quinean charity will allow me to clarify the 
role(s) which charity plays within Quine’s philosophy and, by extension, those of his 
successors.  Most importantly, the resulting interpr tation of Quinean charity will, in 
later chapters, serve as a foil against which the distinctive features of more recent 
normativism may be thrown into sharper relief.  Fordespite its kinship with Quinean 
normativism, it will be seen to differ from it in important respects as well. 
But to gain a proper appreciation of normativism, both Quinean and recent, it 
will be instructive first briefly to consider the rlation of normativism to a broader 
tendency within the philosophy of mind which, in a sense I shall presently explain, 
may be characterized as hermeneutical.  For normativism goes hand-in-hand with a 
certain general standpoint about the status of the mental.  Moreover, seeing 
normativism against the backdrop of this broader philosophical stance clarifies the 
significance of the argument against normativism which I shall develop in later 




assault on this hermeneutical view of the mind via an assault on one of its 
characteristic expressions, namely, normativism.  
Hermeneuticism 
 In philosophic connections, the word ‘hermeneutical’ (and its cognates) has its 
home in the first instance within the Continental tr dition, where it is closely 
associated with the philosophies of figures such as Heidegger and Gadamer.  But it is 
Wilhelm Dilthey who first formulates the central hermeneutical doctrines.  Foremost 
among them is the view that Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften (that is, natural and 
human sciences) demand distinctive methods, respectively.  The method proper to the 
human sciences Dilthey dubs ‘verstehen’ (‘understanding’), which contrasts with the 
method of the natural sciences, which he designates ‘erklaren’ (‘explanation’). 
Significantly, this hermeneutical dichotomizing of natural- and human-
scientific methods, though particularly prevalent within Continental philosophy, has 
counterparts within Anglo-American philosophy, and specifically philosophy of 
mind.  As Rey (2001) makes clear, there is no shortage of prominent analytic 
philosophers who have held that intentional states do not submit to natural-scientific 
methods.  Among those whom Rey cites are Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle, Thomas 
Nagel, Jennifer Hornsby, John McDowell, Colin McGinn, Jaegwon Kim, David 
Lewis, Donald Davidson, and Daniel Dennett.  It is thi  general view of the mind, 
then, regardless of whether its proponents are Continental or analytic, that I designate 
as ‘hermeneutical’ in the following; and, notably, as will become clear subsequently, 




To get a proper appreciation of this view of the mind, it will be helpful to 
examine Rey’s discussion in the article cited of what e terms the ‘insularity of folk 
psychology’.  Rey quotes there the following passage of Jennifer Hornsby’s, wherein 
she advocates a conception of folk psychology of this sort: 
If ‘folk psychology’ is construed by analogy with ‘folk physics’ or ‘folk 
linguistics’, then it carries the implication that folk psychology is the perhaps 
defective version of a subject matter that others (physicists, linguisticians 
[sic]) study with more appropriate methods than the folk.  The implication is 
to be shunned: we ought not to assume at the outset that the basis of our 
everyday understanding of one another is susceptibl of correction and 
refinement by experts in some specialist field where empirical considerations 
of some non-commonsensical kind can be brought to bear.  (Hornsby 1997c, 
3-4, as quoted in Rey 2001, 104) 
 
The view of folk psychology as insular, then, amounts to the claim that scientific 
methods have nothing even potentially to contribute either to the emendation or 
amendment of our folk psychology.  It is an autonomous domain unto itself, hewing 
to its own methods and answerable only to its own (narrow) evidential bases.4 
 It will be helpful briefly to consider how this conception of the insularity of 
folk-psychology relates to what I am calling the herm neutical conception of 
psychology.  First, the two conceptions seem to differ in that, whereas insularity 
posits a contrast between science and non-science (folk psychology), hermeneuticism 
distinguishes, rather, between two kinds of science, atural and human.  Granted, one 
can perhaps conceive of drawing a threefold distinctio  between non-scientific, 
                                                
4 Cf. (Cherniak 1986, 3-5) where Cherniak uses the phrase “the autonomy of the mental” to describe 
the view of folk psychology as insular.  The metaphor may differ but the conception expressed is the 
same.  This sense of autonomy, however, should be contrasted with a sense that arises in discussions of 
how psychology relates to more basic fields such as neurobiology and physics.  The view that 
psychology is autonomous vis-à-vis such fields is the view that it is not reducible to them.  The 
“autonomy of the mental” in the sense of insularity, b  contrast, although entailing non-reducibility, s 
a broader doctrine, denying the relevance of natural-science methods to the mental (or at least to folk 
psychology) altogether.  Many adherents of non-reducibility, Rey included, emphatically reject 




natural-scientific, and human-scientific approaches to the mind.  But, in fact, as will 
emerge subsequently, hermeneuticists tend to see the geisteswissenschaftliche method 
as largely continuous with folk method.  The human sciences are at most seen as 
somehow refining or extending commonsense approaches to their subject matter 
rather than as truly distinctive.  So the bruited contrast between insularity and 
hermeneuticism is more apparent than real. 
A second apparent difference between insularity and hermeneuticism is that, 
whereas the former merely concerns folk-psychological states, the latter is ostensibly 
a doctrine about all psychological states.  In fact, s Rey points out, some insularists 
appear to countenance the possibility of a cognitive science, proceeding according to 
natural-scientific methods, so long as this is understood to address a distinctive 
domain of psychological states isolated taxonomically and causally from the domain 
of familiar folk-psychological states.  Accordingly, it may make sense to distinguish a 
wide hermeneutical view, which excludes all intentional st tes from the purview of 
natural-scientific methods, from a narrow hermeneuticism, which does so only for 
folk-psychological states, implying no commitment wi h respect to other 
psychological states, if any.  Strictly, then, insularity amounts to the latter view.  In 
fact, however, aside from some more recent adherents of hermeneutical views, 
adherents of hermeneutical views generally seem either not to have considered the 
possibility of a separate cognitive psychology, or to have disallowed its possibility—a 
fact which tends to diminish the import of the distinc ion between wide and narrow 
varieties of hermeneuticism.  So the notion of insularity corresponds quite closely to 




 But more needs to be said by way of clarifying the hermeneuticist’s main 
contention: What does it mean to say that intentional states are not amenable to study 
by natural-scientific methods, and what might lead one to adopt such a view?  In 
order to bring the essence of hermeneuticism into focus, it will be instructive to 
consider the main features of Dilthey’s (and Max Weber’s) early hermeneuticism. 
Early Hermeneuticism 
Dilthey and Weber posit a mode of understanding human activities which 
differs from that in which non-human, natural phenomena are to be explained.  First, 
one understands an individual or groups’ behavior in terms of their subjective states 
(or “meanings” in hermeneutical jargon) (Nagel 1979, 480-81) rather than in terms of 
physical or biological states lacking content.  Moreover, the human-sciences’ 
distinctive subject-matter dictates, in Dilthey and Weber’s view, a distinctive method.  
On the standard deductive-nomological model (cf. Hemp l 1966), the natural sciences 
paradigmatically explain a phenomenon by citing oner more laws which, together 
with statements of attendant circumstances, deductively entail a statement describing 
the phenomenon’s occurrence. Thus, explanation in the natural sciences requires the 
antecedent formulation and confirmation of reasonably strict general laws which 
subsume the phenomenon to be explained. 
In understanding human activity, however, in Dilthey’s view, one is able to 
short-circuit the laborious appeal to laws which characterizes explanation in the 
natural sciences.  For Dilthey posits a distinctive cognitive faculty of “empathy” 
which affords one an intuitive understanding of others’ activity.  This faculty allows 




process of imaginatively “reliving” (nacherleben) their mental states.  In this way, I 
come to a grasp of the springs of their behavior through imaginative access to what 
would lead me to behave so if I were “in their shoes,” that is, similarly situated.5 
Further, on Dilthey’s classical hermeneuticist conception, the physical and 
human sciences differ in the additional respect that whereas the former seek to 
explain phenomena in terms of their causes, the latt r cite subjective states which are 
non-causal as the grounds for human beings’ behavior.  On this view, the knowledge 
of “the inner life of another person” is “not a knowledge of causal connections but 
rather of a network of meanings, analogous to the network of meanings by which I 
understand myself” (Phillips 1996, 62).  Dilthey’s hermeneuticism, then, contains 
several features which are characteristic of hermeneutical views of the mind: It 
understands human beings’ activity by ascribing intentional states to them; it employs 
a non-natural-scientific method (“reliving” through a faculty of “empathy”) by which 
such understanding is acquired; it yields explanatio s of behavior which lack the 
covering-law form typical of the natural sciences; and it regards the intentional states 
through which it interprets human activity as non-causal grounds of the latter. But not 
every feature of Dilthey’s hermeneuticism is essential to that philosophical tendency 
as I understand it.  To see this, it will be useful to consider some of these features in a 
bit more detail. 
Features of Hermeneuticism 
First, as I have said, hermeneuticism is at bottom he view that the human- and 
natural-sciences have distinctive methods.  But some delicacy is required with respect 
                                                
5 The modern view that our understanding of others proceeds by way of simulation rather than on the 




to the word ‘method’.  There is a sense in which it is trivial that the human and 
natural sciences have different methods.  For example, the peculiar subject-matter of 
the former (attitudes, beliefs, etc.) permits the us of survey-techniques which have 
no application in the natural sciences.  In fact, a more careful formulation of the 
definition of hermeneuticism puts it in terms, not of ‘method’ but of ‘methodology’: 
hermeneuticism is the view that the human- and natural-sciences have distinctive 
methodologies.  That is, on the hermeneutical view, there are distinctive standards by 
which human-scientific hypotheses are to be confirmed or disconfirmed.  As Nagel 
puts it, “The crucial question . . . is whether” ascriptions of subjective states in the 
human sciences “involve the use of logical canons which are different from those 
employed in connection with the imputation of ‘objective’ traits to things in other 
areas of inquiry” (1979, 481).  This is what I take to be essential to hermeneuticism. 
Accordingly, it is not the employment of ‘reliving’ or ‘empathy’ per se which 
makes Dilthey’s view of the human sciences hermeneuticist.  Indeed, such processes 
may very well have a heuristic role to play in the discovery of human-scientific 
explanatory hypotheses (Nagel 1979, 484), without thereby possessing a properly 
methodological significance.  What makes Dilthey’s view hermeneuticist is that he 
apparently does assign ‘reliving’ and ‘empathy’ this significance: the origin of an 
explanatory hypothesis through this cognitive channel is confirmatory of it.  That is 
not to say, however, that all hermeneuticist views locate the methodological 
peculiarity of the human sciences precisely where Dilthey does, in a faculty of 




consists in.6  But what unites hermeneutical views is the epistemological point that 
they take the human sciences to be methodologically distinctive in one or another 
respect.     
This means that other features often associated with hermeneuticism—such as 
Dilthey’s metaphysical view of intentional states as non-causal—are merely 
secondary, contingent ones.  The view that mental states are non-causal has 
traditionally been widely held among proponents of hermeneuticism.  This view 
typically takes the form of maintaining that mental states are reasons rather than 
causes, that the relations that exist among mental states are logical rather than causal.  
But under the pressure of Donald Davidson’s forceful argumentation (Davidson 
1980a), most have abandoned the view that reasons can ot be causes.  So latter-day 
hermeneuticists are less inclined to share Dilthey’s view of intentional states as non-
causal.  Indeed, as will emerge later, Davidson’s view of the mental is itself 
hermeneuticist despite his holding that mental state  re causal.  So it is not essential 
to hermeneuticism to see mental states as non-causal.7 
As I have indicated, Dilthey holds that the human sciences dispense with strict 
laws and explanations based on them.  The hermeneuticist’s stress on intentional 
states as reasons lends a certain initial plausibility to this conception.  For as 
Davidson points out, reason-explanations of the sort with which our everyday folk-
psychological explanatory practices are replete do in fact lack the covering-law form 
typical of the natural sciences (1980a).  In fact, if the human sciences relied only on 
                                                
6 For a valuable survey of several different such proposals see (Erwin 1996, 8-41). 
7 I intend this as a prima facie claim.  It may be that, in ways that are not immediately apparent, a well-
considered hermeneuticism would commit one to the view that mental states are non-causal.  Indeed, 
several commentators on Davidson’s philosophy of mind argue that his hermeneutical outlook ill 




such explanations and eschewed covering-law explanations altogether, then that 
would seem sufficient to guarantee the irrelevance of natural-scientific methodology 
to them.  For natural-science hypotheses are either themselves laws or are tested by 
drawing out their entailments in conjunction with laws and observing whether they 
obtain.  Strict laws and the predictions and explanatio s based on them appear to be 
part and parcel of natural-scientific method.  So it does appear necessary for the 
hermeneuticist to deny their relevance to the human sciences if he is to maintain their 
methodological autonomy. 
Aside from the above features of Dilthey’s hermeneuticism, there is some 
temptation to see a close connection between hermeneuticism and an anti-realism or 
instrumentalism with respect to the mind.  Certainly, some prominent Anglo-
American adherents of hermeneutical views—notably Daniel Dennett (see Rey 1994), 
Colin McGinn8, and, as we will see, Quine—have assigned the minda secondary 
ontological status.  But there is no indication that Dilthey was an anti-realist; and 
Davidson explicitly characterizes his theory as realist.  So pending compelling 
argument, one should avoid concluding that hermeneuticists are necessarily 
committed to something less than a realism with respect to the mind.9 
Hermeneuticism’s Appeal 
 Early figures like Dilthey and Weber aside, one might wonder why so many 
prominent contemporary philosophers of mind have been attracted to 
hermeneuticism.  Rey (2001) discusses some considerations which, he suggests, have 
                                                
8 Rey (2001, 106) cites Colin McGinn (1991), where McGinn claims “our mental concepts are happily 
superficial.” 
9 It should also be pointed out that in denying the applicability of natural-scientific methods to the 
study of the mind, the hermeneuticist is not thereby committing himself to a denial of physicalism, the 




tempted philosophers within the Analytic tradition t  the view that folk psychology is 
insular, that is, in effect (cf. p. 5 above), the hermeneutical conception of psychology.  
First, there is a functionalism of the sort advocated by David Lewis (1972).  On this 
view, sometimes referred to as “folk functionalism” (cf. Rey 1997, 185), mental 
vocabulary is defined by Ramsifying over the set of “platitudes” concerning mental 
states “which are common knowledge among us” (Lewis 1972, 212).  Now, as Rey 
notes (2001, 105), such an approach has the effect of insulating folk psychology from 
scientific inquiry at least to this extent: it views mental concepts as terra cognita, 
whose essences are patent, and not as natural kinds whose essences, as on a Kripkean 
scientific-essentialist conception, are to be illuminated by empirical investigation.  So 
natural-scientific methods have no role to play for Lewis in defining our mental 
concepts. 
But it should be noted that such folk functionalism falls short of altogether 
entailing insularity.  For suppose that mental concepts are defined along the lines 
Lewis suggests.  That would mean that mental states would be picked out by our 
commonsensical knowledge of such states, but it need ot be the case that that 
knowledge was exhaustive: there could be additional facts concerning those mental 
states discoverable by natural-scientific methods.  So even if those methods would 
not on Lewis’s account play a role in defining mental concepts, they could still in 
principle serve to expand our knowledge concerning those mental states.  Hence, folk 
functionalism does not entail the complete insularity of folk psychology. 
A second source for the insularity view discussed by Rey (2001, 107) is the 




These are “explanations in which things are made intelligible by being revealed to be, 
or to approximate being, as they rationally ought to be” in contrast to covering-law 
explanations where things are shown to be instances of “how things generally tend to 
happen” (McDowell 1985, 389, quoted in Rey 2001, 107).  Since the rational norms 
governing these states are presumably  priori, no role remains for an empirical 
psychology. 
This view, if correct, does have the implication that folk psychology would be 
insulated from scientific investigation, for the latter, as I have suggested (see p. 11 
above), stands or falls with the existence of laws nd explanations couched in terms 
of them.  But though an important role of mental concepts is undoubtedly the one 
highlighted by this line of argument—their role in rationalizing explanations—one 
justifiably seeks reason why one should accept that mental states play only that role.  
Why should one accept that there are no laws involving mental states and, therefore, 
no explanations in terms of them? 
A third route to insularity discussed by Rey—one very pertinent to my 
project—tackles this question head-on.  This route is Davidson’s appeal to 
normativism in arguing the “anomalousness of the mental,” the doctrine that there are 
no strict psychophysical laws.  The locus classicus for Davidson’s argument is his 
“Mental Events” (1970).  The proper interpretation and assessment of the argument 
are matters concerning which there has been considerable debate.  But if the argument 
carries, then it would indeed seem to have the consequence of undermining the 
scientific pretensions of psychology.  For as Jaegwon Kim points out, “Science is 




science and . . . we have no business pretending to be d ing science” (Kim 1993e, 
194-96, quoted in Rey 2001, 111).  So, in this way, normativism may entail a 
hermeneutical conception of the mind and, therefore, the project of refuting 
normativism acquires significance as part of a defense of the possibility of a scientific 
approach to the mind. 
Quine as Normativist 
With this sketch of the broader philosophic context of normativism in place, I 
now turn to Quine as the immediate precursor of much contemporary normativist 
thought.  I begin with a discussion of Quine’s general conception of language and the 
mind before turning specifically to the role of the principle of charity in his thought.  
The relevance of the hermeneutical conception of the mind in his philosophy will be 
apparent at several points. 
Quine’s Interpretationism 
Quine’s general approach to language and to mind, I think, can be 
characterized as interpretationist.  Although it is Davidson and Dennett whose views 
are more commonly described as such, the designation seems to fit Quine as well, 
who in this—as in other respects—is their forerunner.  With respect to the mind, 
“Interpretationists regard an agent’s being endowed ith a mind as a matter not of 
that agent’s possessing a particular material make-up . . . or a particular kind of 
internal organization” (Heil 2004, 10), but as a result of the agent’s being so 
interpretable on the basis of their behavior.  “The int rpretationist thought is that we 
can give an account of the circumstances under which it s true that S believes that p 




p, on the basis of what she says and does” (Child 1994, 3).  But a view which grounds 
an account of the meaning of an individual or group’s language in how they can be 
interpreted on the basis of their behavior will count as interpretationist as well.10  And 
Quine indisputably provides an account of language of this general sort.11 
Quine’s account of linguistic meaning, which he develops in Word and Object 
(1960), is based on the concept of radical translation.12  Quine gives an account of 
meaning by describing the constraints which, he holds, govern the translation of the 
sentences of “the language of a hitherto untouched people” into the sentences of an 
interpreter’s language.13  Such translation is “radical” because it proceeds without 
prior knowledge of the language or assistance from third parties in possession of this 
knowledge.  The translator is forced to rely on whatever evidence is provided by the 
behavior of his or her “informants.”  Specifically, it is the “stimulus conditions” of 
utterances, in effect, the circumstances in which they are elicited that are to guide the 
translator in their translation. 
If the interpreter can discover the expressions for assent and dissent in the 
informants’ language, he will find that some sentences are such that informants’ 
assent and dissent to them follows a uniform pattern: ach informant assents (or 
dissents) to a given such sentence in precisely the same circumstances, where 
                                                
10 In fact, as William Child notes (1994, 13), Davidson—the arch-interpretationist—actually reserves 
the designation ‘interpretation theory’ to the ascription of meaning to language.  He uses ‘decision 
theory’ to denote the project of making sense of an individual’s propositional attitudes.   
11 I consider below to what extent Quine can be reckoned an interpretationist with respect to the mind 
as well. 
12 My summary of Quine’s views on language is heavily indebted to Hookway (1998). 
13 Quine describes the interpreter as compiling a “manual” which will allow translation of the natives’ 
utterances into his own language.  However, Quine is vague about what such a manual would look like 
in detail.  He does write (1960, 68) that the linguist in compiling a manual will segment natives’ 
utterances into words and phrases, which he will match with words and phrases of his own language to 
serve as “analytical hypotheses.”   So a manual, it ppears, will rather resemble a dictionary.  As will 





sameness of circumstances is a matter of the sameness of the sensory stimulation to 
which they are exposed.  These sentences Quine refers to as “observation sentences,” 
and the ordered pair consisting of the set of stimuli that elicit an affirmative response 
to such a sentence and the set of stimuli that evoke a negative response to it Quine 
calls the observation sentence’s “stimulus meaning.” 
It is these observation sentences which offer the linguist entrée into the 
natives’ language and represent a key constraint on translation for Quine.  For an 
acceptable manual of translation, Quine holds, must correlate with each observation 
sentence of  the natives’ language an observation sentence of the linguist’s language, 
and, in fact, one which is “stimulus synonymous” with it, in the sense that it possesses 
the same stimulus meaning.  
Quine’s classic illustration involves the word (or sentence) ‘Gavagai’, which 
an English-speaking linguist observes natives to utter frequently in the presence of 
rabbits.  Moreover, when he asks natives “Gavagai?,” he observes that they assent 
(and dissent) in precisely those stimulus conditions in which English speakers do to 
the sentence “‘Rabbit’ (or ‘Lo, a rabbit’)” (1960, 29).    That is to say, the native’s 
“Gavagai” and linguist’s ‘Rabbit’ are stimulus synonymous. 
Two points should be noted about stimulus meaning and stimulus synonymy, 
respectively.  First, the notion of stimulus meaning cannot be taken as providing some 
sort of gloss on the ordinary notion of meaning.  For only a small subset of sentences 
will possess a stimulus meaning at all, inasmuch as mo t sentences will not record 
observations of one’s immediate environment, and so one’s assent or dissent to them 




not enough to ensure that ‘Gavagai’ is correctly translated as ‘Rabbit’ that the two 
sentences be stimulus synonymous.  Rather, the corrctness of such a translation is 
vouchsafed only in virtue of its being dictated by a complete translation manual that 
yields that translation—and there are other constraints on the correctness of such a 
manual in addition to preservation of stimulus meaning across languages. 
Quine notes that it should be possible to identify those expressions of the 
natives’ language that function as logical connectiv s.  So, e.g., a negation-operator 
can be identified as any expression which “turns any short sentence to which one will 
assent into a sentence from which one will dissent, and vice versa” (1960, 57).14  
Quine requires that a translation manual reflect this in that native expressions which 
correspond in this way to truth-functional operators a e to be so rendered.  Quine 
notes, further, that it is possible to identify “intrasubjective stimulus synonymy of 
sentences” (1960, 68) by a native’s assenting and dissenting to each in precisely the 
same circumstances.   Quine stipulates that the analytic hypotheses constituting a 
translation manual should yield translations of sentences which are stimulus-
synonymous for natives with English sentences that are stimulus-synonymous for 
English speakers.  Again, some sentences, which Quine labels “stimulus-analytic 
(-contradictory),” are assented (dissented) to by natives regardless of stimulus.  Quine 
requires that a translation manual yield translations f them that are stimulus-analytic 
(-contradictory) for English speakers.15 
 Such are the lineaments of Quine’s interpretationist theory of linguistic 
meaning.  It is a theory from which Quine draws far-reaching implications.  For 
                                                
14 Quine’s view of the role of logical connectives is bound up with his views about charity, which I 
discuss below. 




Quine maintains that even when all possible evidence is taken into account, there will 
be multiple manuals that fulfill the above four constraints which differ substantively 
among themselves in that they map particular native sentences onto English sentences 
which are not stimulus-synonymous for English speakers.  So, e.g., the term 
‘gavagai’, which in virtue of its stimulus-meaning when used as a sentence, seemed 
appropriately translated as ‘rabbit’, might—so far as stimulus-meaning is 
concerned—just as well be rendered ‘rabbit stage’ or ‘undetached rabbit part’, since 
the stimulus-meaning of these expressions is the sam .  But ‘Lo, there is a rabbit 
stage’ is not stimulus-synonymous with ‘Lo, there is a rabbit’.  Quine asserts that 
these various translations “could doubtless be accomm dated by compensatory 
variations in analytical hypotheses concerning other locutions, so as to conform 
equally to . . . all speech dispositions of all speakers concerned” (1960, 72).  Quine’s 
point is that though one might hope to discriminate between, say, ‘rabbit’ and 
‘undetached rabbit part’ as a rendering of ‘gavagai’ by natives’ readiness to assent in 
the presence of a rabbit when the word appears in a context naturally translated 
‘There is only one X present’, one can preserve the rendering as ‘undetached rabbit 
part’ by preferring an alternative rendering of that context.  The upshot is that the 
sources of evidence for translation expressed in the four constraints “woefully under-
determine the analytical hypotheses” (1960, 72).  Thus, Quine holds, there are 
multiple adequate but incompatible translations, none f which can lay claim to 
greater correctness than its fellows.  This is Quine’s famous doctrine of the 
indeterminacy of translation.16 
                                                
16 For critical discussion of whether such indeterminacy really follows from Quine’s account of 




Underpinnings of Quine’s Theory of Meaning 
 Before I address the implications Quine draws from that doctrine, I want to 
examine its theoretical underpinnings.  For those implications will only be as strong 
as the foundations of the theory of meaning which entails them.  Quine’s views about 
language are usefully seen against the backdrop of his epistemological and 
ontological orientation.  Quine is an empiricist, al hough he represents an empiricism 
which differs in important ways from that of his logical positivist predecessors.  In 
particular, in (1980) he both challenges the orthodox istinction of truths into analytic 
and synthetic as well as the verificationist theory f meaning, dubbed ‘translationism’ 
by Quine, which holds that the meaning of a sentence is the set of observations which 
confirm it.  This conception of meaning founders on the Duhemian confirmation-
holism to which Quine ascribes.  Moreover, empiricist that he is, Quine will have no 
truck with the Fregean view of meanings as abstract enti ies.  A tenable theory of 
meaning for Quine needs to comport with the ontological austerity that empiricism 
imposes. 
 But it is the sciences, and especially physics, which for Quine are the 
exemplars of empiricist epistemological canons.  Thus, Quine is led on the basis of 
his empiricism to a physicalist ontology.  As Hookway points out (1998, 71-72), 
Quine subscribe to a ‘determinationist’ doctrine according to which physics is the 
fundamental science, inasmuch as all facts superven on physical ones.  Moreover, 
Quine views this as warrant for concluding that only physical objects genuinely exist, 
that only physics represents a genuinely factual discourse.  Since, he thinks, non-basic 




biology and chemistry) are not reducible to physics, they are not strictly factual.  Only 
claims that can be cashed in rigorously physical terms can count as factual.17 
 Not surprisingly, then, Quine eschews mentalist psychology, preferring a 
behavioristic and physiological psychology which more closely toes the line of his 
austere physicalism.18  And this behaviorism is much in evidence in Quine’s theory of 
radical translation.  For the only evidence to which the interpreter can appeal in 
constructing a translation manual is behavioral.  So translatability is constituted in 
behavioral terms.  Indeed, Quine’s central notion of stimulus meaning is itself 
intended as something of a respectable behavioristic ersatz for what he regards as a 
hopelessly vague pre-theoretic notion of meaning.19     
                                                
17 Hookway observes (1998, 50-54) that Quine’s physicali t realism is more characteristic of his later 
writings.  In his earlier works, by contrast, he sems by and large to espouse an anti-realist pluralism or 
relativism on which no scheme is fundamental or can lay claim to strict factuality. 
Moreover, as Hookway notes (1998, 76-77), Quine’s inference of physics’ exclusive factuality on the 
basis of his determinationism may be too quick.  For th ugh physics may describe the fine structure of 
reality, there may be broader structural features of reality that only the special sciences reveal (cf. 
Fodor 1974).   
18 In some respects, however, the appeal of behaviorism for Quine is puzzling.  After all, Quine’s 
confirmation holism negates one of the main motivations for behaviorism.  For methodological 
behaviorism in psychology is based on the view “that only what is publicly observable is a fit subject 
for science” (Heil 2004, 65).  Confirmational holism loosens the connection between entities and the 
observational evidence which confirms their existence, thereby accommodating unobservable 
theoretical entities—rightly—within the purview of science.   As Heil astutely observes (2004, 52), 
“Philosophers impressed by behaviorism in psychology sometimes failed to appreciate the extent to 
which the behaviorist conception of mind was the product of a contentious philosophical conception of 
scientific method.  Ironically, the roots of that conception lay in a positivist tradition that many of these 
same philosophers would have found unappealing.”  This applies par excellence to Quine.  Indeed, 
Quine is himself one of the chief demolition-experts of that very positivist tradition that undergirds 
psychological behaviorism.  
19 Quine’s reference to “the conceptual slough of meaning” (1960, 43) vividly betrays his attitude to 




Implications for Meaning and Mind 
 Now as noted, the theory based on such stimulus meaning seems to leave 
translation indeterminate.20  Quine grants that some manuals will be preferable for 
pragmatic reasons.  For example, choosing to translate natives in such a way that the 
statements they make are rendered by statements w  would make in similar 
circumstances may make mutual cooperation easier.  Again, the relative simplicity of 
the translations a manual yields may recommend it.21  But such pragmatic 
considerations are not substantive constraints; they do not reduce the range of 
factually correct translations.  The indeterminacy remains unabated. 
This indeterminacy Quine takes to warrant skepticism about meaning.22  As 
Hookway observes, by contrast with the translationism that Quine subverts in (1980), 
Quine’s account of meaning may appear to be a form of semantic holism, a view in 
which the whole language is in some sense the unit of meaning.  Sentences (and 
words) carry what meaning they have only via the rendering they receive along with 
all other sentences of the language in the context of radical translation.  But, in fact, 
Quine’s view seems to be that once the positivist, translationist conception of 
meaning is undermined, there is not “much to say about meaning at all” (Hookway 
                                                
20 Indeed, the renderings of the same word in alterna tr nslation manuals can even fail of co-
referentiality (e.g., ‘rabbit’ and ‘rabbit-stage’ for ‘gavagai’).  Quine refers to this consequence of his 
scheme of radical translation as ‘the inscrutability of reference’.   
21 Indeed, pure aesthetic reasons may lead one to favor one manual over others.  (In fact, simplicity 
may be one relevant aesthetic value.)  One can even nvision emotional reasons: Choosing to render 
the bulk of natives’ statements as about objects rathe  than object-stages or undetached parts of them
(cf. ‘gavagai’) might mitigate a sense of alienation t wards the natives. 
More seriously, on Hookway’s view, charity for Quine is merely one pragmatic consideration among 
others bearing on the choice of manuals.  It is not a constitutive constraint on translation.  I return to 
this reading of Quinean charity below.  
22 I.e., a constitutive skepticism about the very existence of meaning, not an epistemological skepticism 
concerning whether meaning is knowable (cf. Miller 1998, 132). 
As will emerge later, Davidson by contrast does not take indeterminacy of his radical interpretation t 





1988, 166).   The indeterminacy of translation spell  doom for the last best hope for a 
respectably empiricist account of meaning. 
But more than this, Quine draws equally radical impl cations from his doctrine 
for the mind.  In our everyday practice, we explain human behavior through 
propositional attitudes such as belief and desire.  Such states are identified largely 
through their content, which we identify through that-clauses (‘Ptolemy believed that 
the sun revolved around the earth’).  But given the ind terminacy of translation, such 
attributions of propositional attitude seem to ascribe no definite content.  The native’s 
assent to ‘Gavagai’, e.g., is equally well interpreted as an expression of his belief that 
there is a rabbit before him, or the belief that there is an undetached rabbit-part before 
him.  There is no fact-of-the-matter which is the native’s true belief, Quine concludes.  
Thus, the indeterminacy of translation comes to infect intentional psychology as well 
as language.23 
Quine observes that Franz Brentano had argued for the thesis that “there is no 
breaking out of the intentional vocabulary by explaining its members in other terms” 
(1960, 220).  That is, Brentano had argued that it is impossible to give an account of 
intentional psychology (and other intentional domains) in purely physicalist terms, 
and infers on this basis that the mind is an autonomous realm.  Quine himself accepts 
Brentano’s premise (the indeterminacy of translation establishes as much) but draws a 
different conclusion from it: 
One may accept the Brentano thesis either as showing the indispensability of 
the intentional idioms and the importance of an autonomous science of 
intention, or as showing the baselessness of intentonal idioms and the 
                                                
23 “Evidently, then, the relativity to non-unique systems of analytical hypotheses invests not only 




emptiness of a science of intention.  My attitude, unlike Brentano’s, is the 
second.  (1960, 221) 
 
Given Quine’s prior commitment to physicalism, which for him involves the notion 
that only what can actually be cashed in physical terms can lay claim to factuality,24 
he feels entitled to infer that psychology is “basele s.”  He emphasizes, however, that 
he is not urging the abandonment of intentional idioms; he acknowledges their 
practical utility.  But he insists, “If we are limning the true and ultimate structure of 
reality, the canonical scheme for us is the austere sch me that knows . . . no 
propositional attitudes but only the physical constitution and behavior of organisms” 
(1960, 221).  So Quine appears to infer a quite thoroughgoing anti-realism with 
respect to the mind on the basis of the indeterminacy of translation. 
Criticisms of Quine’s Argument 
 Naturally, Quine’s doctrine of the indeterminacy of translation has not sat well 
with many, and, as Hookway notes (1998, 144-45), it is tempting to see Quine’s 
argument for it rather as a reductio ad absurdum of one or more of its premises.  In 
particular, Quine’s behavioristic restriction of the possible evidence for translation 
largely to the facts about observation sentences’ stimulus-meaning has seemed 
vulnerable.  Noam Chomsky observes that it is not surprising that incompatible 
translations are obtainable when evidence is restricted so, but “It is less obvious that 
there are incompatible hypotheses such that no imaginable evidence can bear on the 
choice between them” (Chomsky and Katz 1974, n7).  In fact, as Hookway notes, 
there would appear to be a wealth of other sorts of evidence bearing on the selection 
                                                
24 Essentially, i.e., he regards physicalism as entaili g that there are no genuine (no factual) 




of translation manuals, for example, facts about human perception, desire, and 
reasoning (1998, 158). 
Hookway stresses that Quine’s restriction of the rel vant evidence is not 
unmotivated.  Quine regards ordinary psychology talk as not strictly factual, and 
holds that for scientific purposes it should yield to a suitable regimentation which will 
be behavioristic or physiological in character (1998, 160-62).  But, I submit, though it 
is open to Quine to appeal to the non-factuality of mentalist psychology in justifying 
his limitation of evidence for the indeterminacy of translation to the behavioral, the 
problem this poses for his attempt to draw consequences of that indeterminacy for the 
mind is readily apparent.  Quine wishes to argue from the indeterminacy of 
translation to the factual illegitimacy of intentional psychology.  But his reliance on 
exclusively behavioristic evidence and repudiation of such evidence as could be 
afforded by intentional psychology can be justified only by the prior rejection of 
intentional psychology.  That is, in attempting to infer the non-factuality of 
intentional psychology from the indeterminacy of translation Quine simply begs the 
question in a rather crass fashion. 
A Rejoinder Foreclosed 
 Precisely at this point a rejoinder that would be op n to a thoroughgoing 
interpretationist such as Davidson seems closed off to Quine.  In the case of 
Davidson, it is clear that he intends to give an interpretationist account of both 
meaning and psychology.  In fact, he insists that tis requires giving a unitary account 
wherein facts of meaning and of psychology are attributed all at once in an 
interconnected fashion.  On such a view, there would be clear motivation for 




radical translation.  For inasmuch as such an interpretationism proposes to be a 
constitutive account of psychology as well as meaning, it cannot advert to 
psychological evidence without circularity.  The rest iction to purely behavioristic 
evidence that Quine insists on, then, would be justified by its allowing one to avoid 
such circularity.25  But it is far from clear that this maneuver is available to Quine.  
For there seems no definitive indication that Quine is an interpretionist with respect to 
psychology.  At least on its face, Quine’s account of radical translation is an account 
of meaning alone, and, unlike Davidson’s account, is not obviously embedded in a 
general account of intentionality.  Nor does Quine give anything that could be 
construed as a separate interpretationist account of mental states.  Granted, Quine 
shares Dennett’s instrumentalist outlook with respect to the mind—and Dennett is an 
interpretationist with respect to that domain—but instrumentalism does not appear to 
entail interpretationism with respect to psychology. 
Quine as Hermeneuticist 
Perhaps enough has been said to give color to Quine’s general view of 
meaning and psychology.  Before turning to the roleof charity in Quine, however, I 
would like to briefly comment on the extent to which Quine’s view of the meaning 
and mind is aptly characterized as hermeneutical.  The issue is in what degree for 
Quine these domains float free of natural-scientific methodology and sources of 
evidence.  As the quote from Word and Object above indicates (see p. 22), Quine 
diverges from Brentano in denying the importance of an “autonomous science of 
intention.”  His view seems to be that mind and language are not properly scientific 
                                                
25 But to exclude other sorts of non-intentional evidnce, especially neurophysiological evidence, as do 




domains at all.  Moreover, in the case of the latter, his restriction of the sources of 
evidence for radical translation (essentially, to stimulus-meaning) runs counter to the 
confirmation holism which Quine—rightly—takes to govern methodology in the 
sciences.  With respect to psychology, Quine is les explicit about what methods he 
takes to govern the attribution of intentional states.  But if Quine is a normativist (see 
the next section), and if Davidson is correct in arguing that normative constraints on 
the propositional attitudes entail that there are no strict psychophysical laws (see p. 13 
above), then his normativism would itself seem to commit him to the inapplicability 
of natural-scientific methods to intentional states.  So there appears ample reason to 
regard Quine’s view of psychology (and language) as hermeneutical or insularist. 
Quinean Charity 
In the present section, I shall rough out a portrait of Quinean charity.  But 
there exist competing interpretations of Quine’s charity doctrine and the role which it 
plays within his views of language and mind.  So I shall first set out what appear to be 
the main interpretative options.  Then I shall examine some of the chief sources for 
Quine’s charity doctrine in his writings with a view towards adjudicating among the 
alternative interpretations as well as pinning down other matters of interpretation on 
which the major readings are silent.  My conclusion in this regard will be somewhat 
tentative, but perhaps I can excuse this by noting that my consideration of Quinean 
charity is largely meant to prepare for and illuminate the sorts of issues that will arise 





The Pragmatic Interpetation 
Christopher Hookway develops a pragmatic interpretation of Quinean charity.  
As mentioned above, Quine holds that radical translation is indeterminate: the sum of 
evidence relevant to the translation of a native’s language into an interpreter’s 
language substantively underdetermines how it is tobe translated.  But Quine appears 
to acknowledge a category of “supplementary canons” which, he suggests, linguists 
use to narrow the range of possible translations of words and phrases.  So, for 
example, they will translate ‘gavagai’ as ‘rabbit’ rather than ‘rabbit part’, Quine 
states, because they will assume that “the more conspicuously segregated wholes are 
likelier to bear the simpler terms” (1960, 74).  Hookway interprets Quine here as 
acknowledging a class of purely pragmatic criteria which, though their employment is 
justifiable by their utility, do not in any way support the truth of the analytical 
hypotheses they favor (1988, 135). 
Moreover, Hookway reckons Quine’s principle of charity to this class.  We 
prefer translations that maximize our agreement with others, so “the best translation 
will be one that minimizes inexplicable error”.  This “makes it easier for us to learn 
from their testimony, and helps us to co-operate wih them” (1988, 136).  But, again, 
such a principle does not diminish indeterminacy.  It is merely a useful device for 
living with that indeterminacy. 
The Constitutive Interpretation 
Hookway contrasts Quine with Davidson in this regard.  Whereas for Quine 
charity is a mere pragmatic expedient, for Davidson it is “constitutive of correctness.”  
An adequate translation must show that natives’ beliefs are mostly true (1988, 170).  




to translate natives in a way that sees them as obeying our logical principles, but 
suggests that “his views on this matter are not clear” (1988, 136).  So, by and large, 
Hookway minimizes any role of charity as a constitutive constraint on translation for 
Quine.  Moreover, if he is right, then at bottom charity is not a constitutive constraint 
on psychology either.  For if it were, it would perforce constrain translation as well. 
A constitutive reading of Quinean charity, however, cannot be casually 
dismissed.  As Ed Stein points out, Quine’s discussion of “prelogical mentality” 
(1960, 58) gives the impression that “our logic should be imposed on the people we 
translate” (Stein 1996, 113).   Stein observes that this might suggest that Quine 
adheres to a “strong principle of charity” according to which “people should always 
be interpreted as rational” (1996, 24).  Such a principle would, in effect, make 
(theoretical) rationality a necessary condition for the possession of mentality or 
language; that is, it would render charity a constitutive constraint on psychology and 
language. 
The Heuristic (or ‘Weak’) Interpretation    
  Stein notes, however, that there is also textual evidence that seems to undercut 
such a strong reading of Quinean charity (1996, 113).  Quine’s statement that “one’s 
interlocutor’s silliness, beyond a certain point, is less likely than bad translation” 
(1960, 59) strongly suggests at least the possibility of an agent’s illogicality, which 
runs counter to Stein’s strong reading of charity.  Accordingly, Stein mentions an 
alternative “weak version” of Quine’s principle of charity on which charity is 
“defeasible (it says that people should be interpreted as rational unless there is strong 




Hans-Johann Glock explicitly advocates a reading of Quinean charity more or 
less along these lines.26  He states that, for Quine, charity is merely a “heuristic” 
device that “enhances the prospects of interpretation” (Glock 2003, 184; cf. 238).  
What Glock seems to mean is that our interpretations are more likely to be correct to 
the extent that they are charitable.  Thus, he appears to attribute Stein’s weak charity 
to Quine.  He maintains, further, that in contrast to Davidson, “charity” for Quine “is 
not constitutive of the concepts of translation or interpretation” (2003, 238; cf. 33).  
So the heuristic/weak reading of charity represents a second non-constitutive reading 
of Quinean charity, alongside Hookway’s pragmatic reading. 
The Interpretations Compared 
It is important, however, not to be misled by the terms in which the 
interpretative controversy surrounding Quinean charity is cast.  The contrast between 
the terms ‘constitutive’ and ‘pragmatic’, in particular, may suggest that the 
interpretative issue somehow turns on whether Quine views language and mind as 
factual or non-factual domains.  But, in truth, themajor proponents of each of the 
three interpretative options described—constitutive, pragmatic, and heuristic—take 
for granted that Quine regards meaning and mind as non-factual.  Rather, the bone of 
contention among the readings, in the first instance, is simply whether for Quine 
charity is an obligatory demand on interpretation.  This will be so if on Quine’s 
account interpretations cannot even be generated unl ss charity is applied.  The 
constitutive reading takes this to be the case, whereas the pragmatic and heuristic 
readings do not.  The latter two readings hold instead that Quine’s account generates 
                                                
26 Apparently, he does so on the basis of the textual evidence just discussed.  Cf., e.g., (Glock 2003, 




interpretations independently of charity.  On the pragmatic reading, charity enters in 
only as a device for winnowing down in useful ways the range of acceptable, 
independently generated interpretations.  On the heuristic reading, it merely serves to 
increase an interpreter’s likelihood of correctly latching onto one of the range of 
acceptable, independently generated interpretations.  Both pragmatic and heuristic 
readings, then, agree in assigning charity a somewhat marginal place in Quine’s 
account of meaning and mind. 
There are important differences between the heuristic and pragmatic readings, 
however.  A salient difference between the two is perhaps best approached by 
considering the implications of Quine’s famous rejection of the traditional distinction 
between analytic and synthetic truths (1980).  Once this distinction is rejected, so is 
the—in some measure—correlative distinction between a posteriori and a priori 
knowledge.  Perhaps it is apt to say that for Quine all truths are synthetic and all 
genuine knowledge a posteriori. 
Now the heuristic reading seems to accord charity an a posteriori status.  The 
heuristic interpretation of charity seems to regard it as an empirical truth that agents 
generally tend to be logical, etc.27  Glock at least seems to see to the matter so, for he 
cites “Quine’s naturalism” as a reason that Quine cannot share Davidson’s 
constitutive approach to charity (2003, 33).28  The heuristic interpretation asserts a 
presumption of logicality, etc.: one shouldn’t attribute obvious error without 
                                                
27 Some qualification is in order here: In light of Quine’s ultimate denial of factuality to the intentional 
idiom, the heuristic reading cannot strictly be said to regard it as an aposteriori or empirical truth that 
agents tend to be logical, etc.  Nonetheless, it regards the provenance of the principle of charity as 
empirical to the extent that it is based on something like experiential ‘evidence’.  
28 Whether Glock is correct in thinking that Quine’s naturalism rules out his taking a constitutive view 




(empirical) evidence that overrides that presumption.  Presumably, that is because 
there is taken to be overwhelming (empirical) evidence that people are generally 
logical, etc.  Things stand quite differently with respect to the pragmatic reading.  In 
contrast to the heuristic reading, the pragmatic reading is decidedly non-empirical.  
Nonetheless, it might be misleading to characterize the principle of charity on this 
reading as a priori.  Charity on this reading is seen as a purely optional, instrumental 
expedient.  So the notion of the a priori, which is bound up with that of necessity, 
does not get a foothold.29 
Both the heuristic and pragmatic readings, though, raise the possibility that 
charity for Quine is not a constitutive constraint o  intentional attitudes, which is 
significant for two reasons.  First, if either interpretation is correct, then the status 
Quine assigns the principle of charity differs markedly from that assigned it by latter-
day proponents of charity such as Davidson and Dennett, who clearly assign it a 
constitutive role.30 Moreover, if charity is non-constitutive for Quine, this raises an 
issue whether Quine is even genuinely to be classed a  a normativist. 
Usage of the phrase ‘principle of charity’ suggests that it is neutral with 
respect to its status as  posteriori or a priori, constitutive or non-constitutive31.   
However, usage of the term ‘normativism’—such as it i —seems to reserve it for 
                                                
29 If charity is constitutive for Quine, by contrast, there is still, however, some problem in describing it 
as a priori.  The problem is that Quine ultimately denies factuality to the intentional idiom and thereby 
renders notions of truth and knowledge inapplicable to it.  Cf. above p. 30, n. 27.  However, I take th
necessary, non-empirical character of charity on the constitutive reading to justify the use, in a rough-
and-ready way, of the designation ‘a priori’. 
30 Actually, the situation with respect to Dennett is a bit complex.  Dennett seems to be an 
instrumentalist with respect to the mind (cf. Rey [1994]), which may initially suggest the pragmatic 
reading of charity.  But the principle is mandatory with respect to psychological attribution in a way it 
would not be for Quine.  So charity, I think, is best seen as constitutive for Dennett.   
31 The usage of Hookway, Stein, and Glock with respect to the interpretation of Quinean charity which 




views which regard charity as an  priori constitutive constraint for the possession of 
propositional attitudes.   In any case, that is how I am using the term in this 
dissertation.  This provides me with a ready designatio  for the view which at which I 
am leveling in this project.  For it is no part of my plan to argue against charity per se, 
where there is no implication that the principle is accorded a priori constitutive status.  
It is the view that sees rationality as an a priori condition on possession of 
propositional attitudes which I take as my specific target.  I am concessive with 
respect to the possibility that the best account of pr positional content may turn out to 
place normative constraints on the possession of (at least some) concepts.  Such 
would be the case if an inferential-role or so-called ‘two-factor’ theory of content 
proved to be the correct one.32  But the truth of such a theory, I am inclined to 
believe, would be one that could be discovered onlya posteriori.33  At all events, in 
my usage, such theories will not be reckoned ‘normativist’. 
With the term’s usage fixed as I have done, on either t e heuristic or 
pragmatic reading, Quine decidedly does not count as a normativist, since either 
reading renders Quinean charity non-constitutive.  One issue, then, as I proceed to 
examine the chief sources in Quine’s writing for his views on charity, will be whether 
the bulk of the evidence supports a constitutive (normativist) or non-constitutive 
reading.  At stake is the extent of continuity betwen Quine and his clearly 
normativist successors. 
                                                
32 See, e.g., Rey (1997, 237-63) for characterizations of theories of these types. 
33 Of course, one possible outcome is that despite the xistence of a posteriori normative constraints on 
propositional attitudes, they could fall far short f the rather severe ones which normativists typically 




Quine’s Pronouncements Concerning Charity 
One of the loci classici for Quine’s charity doctrine is his Word and Object, 
sect. 13, “Translating Logical Connectives” (1960, 57-61).  In the context of his 
account of radical translation, Quine here proposes a method for identifying and 
translating those locutions of a language that express truth functions.  Quine states 
“semantic criteria” for various truth functions in terms of natives’ assent or dissent to 
sentences.  So, for example, “The semantic criterion for negation,” Quine writes, “is 
that it turns any short sentence to which one will assent into a sentence from which 
one will dissent, and vice versa” (1960, 57).  Again, the criterion for conjunction is 
that an expression turns two short sentences into a sentence to which one will assent 
just in case one will assent to both of its component-s ntences.  The restriction to 
short sentences is meant to rule out the possibility of a native’s diverging from criteria 
simply as a result of the confusion which, Quine thinks, long sentences can engender.  
Once an expression is identified as expressing a truth function in this way it may be 
straightforwardly translated with the corresponding English expression (e.g., ‘not’ for 
negation). 
Quine observes that his approach to the translation of connectives conflicts 
with the doctrine of “prelogical mentality,” which he attributes to the anthropologist 
Lucien Levy-Bruhl (1960, 58n1).  Ignoring niceties of Levy-Bruhl’s original doctrine, 
Quine focuses on a “caricature” of the view, according to which “there are pre-logical 
peoples who accept certain simple self-contradictions as true” (1976, 109), that is, 
“sentences translatable in the form ‘p and not p’” (1960, 58).  Quine rightly notes that 




the criterion for conjunction, a native will assent to ‘p and not p’ 34 just in case they 
will both assent to ‘p’ and assent to ‘not p’.  But by the criterion for negation, they 
will assent to ‘not p’ just in case they will dissent to ‘p’.  That is, the supposition that 
a native accepts a sentence translatable as ‘p nd not p’ entails the absurdity that they 
both assent to and dissent to ‘p’ and, therefore, must be rejected.  Accordingly, on 
Quine’s account, pre-logical mentality is impossible.  Prelogicality is ruled out 
because, Quine maintains, “better translation imposes ur logic” on natives: “fair 
translation preserves logical laws” (1960, 58-59).  So much so, Quine holds, that even 
when someone seems to espouse a logic in which a logica  law like non-contradiction 
is rejected, we are led to reinterpret their English statements rather than attribute to 
them a contradictory logic (though this means overriding the usual homophonic 
translations). 
Such a practice rests, Quine asserts, on “The maxim of translation . . . that 
assertions startlingly false on the face of them are likely to turn on hidden differences 
of language.”  He notes further, “The common sense behind the maxim is that one’s 
interlocutor’s silliness, beyond a certain point, is less likely than bad translation . . .” 
(1960, 59); and in a footnote, he suggests an affinity between this idea and N. L. 
Wilson’s “principle of charity” (1960, 59n2).  In eff ct, then, Quine here states his 
own principle of charity.35 
                                                
34 Or, more precisely, the corresponding native sentence (similarly for ‘p’ and for ‘not p’).  Also, it is 
assumed here that sentence ‘p’ is sufficiently short. 
35 Quine does not at this point refer to the principle which he enunciates here as a ‘principle of charity’.  
But a bit later (1960, 69n1), he identifies the principle of charity as having been a focus of sect. 13.  





Aside from the appeal Quine makes to charity to ground his views about the 
role of logic in translation, charity seems to enter Quine’s account of translation in 
Word and Object at a second point.  As I noted above (p. 17), Quine identifies as a 
constraint on translation that a manual should map sentences which are stimulus-
analytic (-contradictory) for natives onto English sentences that are so for English 
speakers.  Quine remarks, however (1960, 69), that this injunction is not to be taken 
altogether strictly.  He says that a manual may permit a few native sentences which 
are stimulus-analytic to be translated by English ones that are not if the manual has 
the merit of being markedly simpler than alternative manuals.  Nonetheless, stimulus-
analyticity is generally to be preserved in translation, and Quine underwrites this by 
an appeal to charity.  He writes, “the more absurd or exotic the beliefs imputed to a 
people, the more suspicious we are entitled to be of the translations” (1960, 69); and 
in this connection he refers back to his earlier discussion of charity in sect. 13. 
Such are Quine’s pronouncements about charity in Word and Object.  Leaving 
aside Quine’s remarks about stimulus-analyticity for the moment and focusing on 
sect. 13, there are essentially four elements in Qui e’s account of charity requiring 
coordination: (1) Quine’s semantic criteria for theranslation of truth-functional 
connectives, (2) his claim that “fair translation preserves logical laws” (1960, 59), (3) 
the phenomena such as prelogicality and deviant logic that Quine wishes to rule out, 
and (4) the bedrock principles, namely, the “maxim” that assertions startlingly false 
on the face of them are likely to turn on hidden differences of language” and “the 
common sense behind the maxim . . . that one’s interlocutor’s silliness, beyond a 




A few comments about the relations among these elements are in order.  First, 
although Quine appeals to (1) the semantic criteria fo  the truth-functional 
connectives  to rule out natives’ accepting a sentence of the form ‘p and not p’ (cf. 3), 
these criteria do not rule out illogical phenomena o  the part of natives in general.  
They do not rule out natives’ acceptance of sentences (e.g., of the form ‘all P are not 
P’) whose logical falsehood is not a matter of their truth-functional structure.36  
Rather, it is (2) Quine’s insistence that translation preserve logical laws that is 
responsible for ruling out the illogical phenomena.  Further, it is (4) the bedrock 
principles that for Quine are supposed to provide the ultimate grounding for his view 
about logic encapsulated in (2). 
The Scope of Quinean Charity 
This, however, raises a slight interpretative difficulty.  To see how this is so, it 
will be useful to set out a distinction, owing to Dnald Davidson, between two sorts 
of charity principles, namely, Principles of Correspondence and Principles of 
Coherence.  Roughly, whereas the former concern the truth of an agent’s statements 
or beliefs, the latter concern the degree of rationl consistency among an agent’s 
statements, beliefs, or other propositional attitudes (cf. Glock 2003, 194-95).  An 
issue with respect to the interpretation of Quinean charity, then, is whether he 
advances a Principle of Coherence in addition to a Principle of Correspondence. 
Now the bedrock principles (4), whatever their import in detail, seem to 
preclude an agent’s making “startingly false” assertions or having beliefs of that sort.  
So they pretty clearly amount to a Principle of Correspondence.  Things are less 
                                                
36 Moreover, Quine emphasizes that semantic criteria comparable to those for the truth-functional 
connectives cannot be formulated for the non-truth-f nctional elements of language such as 




straightforward, however, with respect to Coherence.  Quine’s insistence (2) that 
translation preserve logical laws may suggest a Principle of Coherence inasmuch as 
logic formulates principles which bear on the consistency of sets of propositions and, 
therefore, beliefs.  Indeed, any valid sequent p, q/r is tantamount to a consistency 
constraint on beliefs, namely, one requiring that one not simultaneously entertain the 
beliefs p, q, and not r.  But Quine’s examples of translations which are unacceptable 
because they would violate the injunction to preserve logical laws all involve the 
attribution of single contradictory beliefs, not inconsistent sets of beliefs (e.g., the 
belief that p and not p).37  In fact, the “logical laws” Quine seems to have in mind in 
the first instance are the “tautologies” and other “logical truths” (1960, 60).  
Moreover, Correspondence Principles like the bedrock principles of (4) imply nothing 
about coherence among propositional attitudes.  
But Quine’s semantic criteria (1) for translating the truth-functional 
connectives entail a degree of consistency among an age t’s beliefs.  For example, 
the criterion for negation rules out an agent’s simultaneously believing p and not p.  
In fact, Quine’s semantic criteria rule out an agent’s having any inconsistent set of 
beliefs whose inconsistency is a matter of the sentences’ truth-functional structure.  
But, of course, there is a very close relation betwe n logical falsehood and 
inconsistency: a set of sentences p, q, r is inconsistent just in case their conjunction 
p&q& r is a logical falsehood.  In light of this fact, then, Quine’s account of charity 
seems to preclude an agent’s having at least someinconsistent sets of beliefs whose 
inconsistency is not a matter of truth-functional structure.  For if there is any such set 
                                                
37 This statement requires the obvious qualification hat a single contradictory belief itself virtually 





p, q, r whose corresponding conjunction is “startingly false” for an agent, then by (4) 
the bedrock principles it apparently should not be ascribed to the agent.  But then it 
follows from Quine’s semantic criterion for conjunction that the agent does not hold 
the inconsistent set of beliefs p, q, r either.  The upshot, then, is that even though 
Quine’s account seems to emphasize Correspondence charity, nonetheless, it includes 
elements of Coherence charity as well. 
Nonetheless, there are fairly severe limits to the scope it grants to Coherence, 
that is, rationality-charity.  For, since Quine’s account of charity applies only to 
beliefs, its scope is restricted to theoretical rationality.  The whole domain of 
practical rationality, inasmuch as it concerns desires, intentions, and actions in 
addition to beliefs, is excluded from its sphere of application.38  But even within 
theoretical rationality, its scope is quite narrow.  This can be seen by considering its 
significance for the part of theoretical rationality that is procedural, which concerns 
the processes one follows in forming beliefs, as opposed to the part that is statal, 
which concerns the relations among the products of such processes.  The applicability 
of Quinean charity to processes of belief-formation is limited.  It restricts inferences 
whose invalidity would introduce a logical inconsistency into an agent’s belief set.  
But it is less clear that it restricts inferences whose conclusions, though not entailed 
by the premises of the inference, introduce no such in onsistency.  So many—in fact, 
most—deductively invalid inferences slip by Quine’s charity principles.  Indeed, they 
fail to constrain most non-deductive (i.e., inductive and abductive) inferences for the 
same reason.  Quine’s charity principles also fail to constrain cases of procedural 
                                                
38 As is any other sort of rationality—such as emotional rationality—that does not exclusively concern 
beliefs (though on a cognitive theory of emotion, where emotions are understood as kinds of beliefs, 




theoretical irrationality that are not a matter of logical inference at all, such as cases 
of self-deception.  The scope of Coherence charity in Quine, then, is quite narrow.39   
Other Interpretative Issues 
Issues of scope aside, other points with respect to the interpretation of the 
content of Quinean charity demand consideration.  First, there is an issue of its 
strength even within its sphere of application.  Now, n their face, the bedrock 
principles suggest a certain moderation in Quinean charity.  The impression they 
impart is that it is only “startingly false” beliefs that one needs to be wary of ascribing 
to agents, that the epistemic impropriety of holding false beliefs admits of degrees, 
and only “beyond a certain point”, only when the error involved in holding a false 
belief would rise to a certain level of egregiousness, must one avoid attributing it.  
This is quite clear, moreover, from Quine’s formulation of charity in his Philosophy 
of Logic as the principle to “‘Save the obvious’” (1986, 82): it is only obviously false 
beliefs that one must not ascribe to an agent. 
But, at least with respect to logic, this impression of moderation is belied by 
other statements that Quine makes in the same place(1986, 82-83).  He gives the 
impression that logic constrains translation quite strictly: “If a native is prepared to 
assent to some compound sentence but not to a constitue t, this is a reason not to 
construe the construction as conjunction.”  In effect, “we build logic into our manual 
of translation” (1986, 82).  Moreover, Quine states that “every logical truth is 
obvious, actually or potentially.”  Consequently, “The canon ‘Save the obvious’ bans 
any manual of translation that would represent the for igners as contradicting our 
                                                
39 Issues of the scope of various charity principles will be something of a leitmotif in subsequent 
chapters, for aside from purely interpretative question , such issues have a bearing on the success of 




logic” (1986, 82-83).  So Quine evidently holds that charity with respect to logic is 
ideal: it rules out all logical falsehoods (and inco sistency)40.   
Christopher Cherniak, however, observes that Quine’s vi w here is quite 
problematic.  “Such a translation principle,” Cherniak writes, “excludes an agent from 
accepting even the most obscure inconsistencies,” and “implies triviality of 
significant portions of the deductive sciences” (Cherniak 1986, 96).     Quine writes, 
“every logical truth is obvious, actually or potentially.  Each, that is to say, is either 
obvious as it stands or can be reached from obvious truths by a sequence of 
individually obvious steps” (Quine 1986, 82-83).  So, as Cherniak notes, Quine here 
distinguishes between the actual obviousness which attaches to the axioms of a 
logistic from the mere potential obvious which attaches to the theorems of the system.  
But in holding that logical falsehoods must not be ascribed to agents, Quine illicitly 
(and implausibly) treats all logical truths as if they were actually obvious. 
Finding such ideal charity with respect to logic far-fetched, Cherniak prefers 
to consider the implications of a more moderate principle: “‘Better translation favors 
the subject’s not accepting the more obvious inconsistencies’” (1986, 96).  But he 
stops short of attributing this principle to Quine.  In fact, he earlier writes that 
“Quine’s translation methodology . . . presupposes an ideal consistency condition” 
                                                
40 A qualification, however, may immediately suggest itself.  Quine writes that “corrigible confusions 
in complex sentences” are possibly exempted from charity constraints on logic (1986, 83).  Cf. his 
formulations of the semantic criteria for the truth-functional connectives in Word and Object, which 
are qualified so as to apply only to short sentences (1960, 57-58).  This may seem to greatly limit the 
strength of Quinean logic-charity.  But such restrictions based on sentence-length seem to be 
allowances for failures to parse long sentences, that is, for confusions about the meanings of sentences, 
rather than for an agent’s actually entertaining a logical falsehood (or inconsistent beliefs).  Thus, e.g., 
a native may assent to a long conjunction but dissent to one of its shorter constituents when queried 
simply because they are (temporarily) confused about the meaning of the conjunction as a whole.  
Such linguistic confusion does not constitute epistmic or rational error. 
 




(1986, 18).  So Cherniak apparently attributes a very strong charity to principle to 
Quine as far as logic is concerned.  I follow Cherniak in this assessment and shall 
proceed on the assumption that Quinean logic-charity is deal. 
 That Quine regards logic-charity as ideal makes th question what 
demarcation ‘obvious falsehood’ represents for Quine moot with respect to this sort 
of charity.  However, Quine’s principle to ‘Save the obvious’ takes in more than 
logic.  Quine writes, “Being thus built into translation is not an exclusive trait of 
logic.  If the natives are not prepared to assent to a certain sentence in the rain, 
then . . . we have reason not to translate the sentence as ‘It is raining’” (1986, 82).  
His point is that to render the sentence as ‘It is raining’ would mean attributing to 
them what in the circumstances is an obviously false belief and, therefore, violating 
his charity principle.  But, of course, not all false beliefs are in any intuitive sense 
obviously so.  As Quine puts it, “the incidence of obviousness” in most domains is 
less than that of logic.  So application of Quine’s maxim beyond logic requires clarity 
as to what constitutes obvious falsity.        
 Quine, in line with the general behavioristic orientation of his account of 
translation (cf. p. 20 above), insists that he is “u ing the word ‘obvious’ in an ordinary 
behavioral sense, with no epistemological overtones.”  The standard that he applies is 
based on the pattern of assent queried sentences receive: “When I call ‘1 + 1 = 2’ 
obvious to a community I mean only that everyone, nearly enough, will 
unhesitatingly assent to it . . .; and when I call ‘It is raining’ obvious in particular 




82).41  Presumably, then, obvious falsity for a community is to be assessed similarly, 
except on the basis of universal dissent rather assent.  As Cherniak notes, however, 
there is a question whether it is with reference to the translator or to the natives that 
obviousness is to be judged for purposes of charity (1986, 96).  Cherniak observes, 
further, that Quine’s discussion of charity in Word and Object suggests the former.  In 
fact, the criterion of obvious falsity just mentioned could not sensibly be employed in 
a charity principle couched in terms of obvious fality for natives.42  So the operative 
standard for Quine appears to be obvious falsity for the translator’s community.43  In 
interpreting speakers, the translator is to avoid ascribing beliefs which are obviously 
false in his own community. 
Holistic and Non-Holistic Charity  
In further characterizing Quinean charity, a useful distinction can be made 
between holistic and non-holistic versions of charity (cf. Stein 1996, 124-27).  
Whereas non-holistic versions constrain beliefs, inferences, actions, etc., individually, 
holistic versions constrain an agent’s whole system of beliefs, etc.  Thus, for example, 
a principle to attribute to an agent only rational i ferences counts as non-holistic, 
                                                
41 Quine formulates this criterion of obviousness in the context of stating, as a constraint on translation, 
the principle that in rendering a language we should “make the obvious sentences go over into English 
sentences that are true and, preferably, also obvious” (1986, 82).  Essentially, this is the principle, 
discussed above (p. 17) that stimulus-analytic sentences should be rendered with stimulus-analytic 
sentences, broadened to include sentences where there is universal assent relative to particular 
circumstances.  Presumably, Quine takes this definition of ‘obvious’ to apply to its use in his charity 
principles as well. 
42 The problem is that, to take the simplest case, the principle would enjoin one not to attribute to a 
native beliefs that all natives dissent from.  But any such belief is one that the native in question also
dissents from!  That fact alone should deter one from attributing the belief to the native.  So charity 
would be empty.  This problem is avoided when the sandard is taken to be obviousness for the 
translator’s community.  
43 Cherniak notes that such a principle is implausible: “we cannot egocentrically assume that what is 
startingly false for the observer must be startlingly false for the subject” (1986, 96-97).  Therefore, 
Cherniak concludes that charity should be couched in terms of obviousness for natives.  But Cherniak 
stops short of maintaining that such is Quine’s intention, and, in fact, the textual evidence seems to 




since it amounts to a test which individual inferenc s can be judged to pass or fail 
without reference to the (ir)rationality of other inferences.  A principle, by contrast, to 
ensure that one attribute a preponderance of rational nferences to an agent is plainly 
holistic, since it constitutes a test applying to an agent’s inferences not individually 
but en masse.       
 I think it can be safely concluded that Quine’s charity principle is non-holistic 
in the sense defined.  For Quine’s injunction not to attribute obviously false beliefs to 
an agent functions as a filter on beliefs individually.  By way of comparison, a 
principle that tolerates some obviously false beliefs provided, say, they represent a 
small proportion of an agent’s overall system of beliefs would be clearly holistic—but 
pretty clearly not Quinean.  Granted, Quine’s statement that “one’s interlocutor’s 
silliness, beyond a certain point, is less likely than bad translation” (1960, 59) might 
seem to permit a holistic construal where the “certain point” is taken to be a matter of 
a tipping point of the aggregate “silliness” (i.e., obvious falsity) of an agent’s ascribed 
system of beliefs.  But Quine nowhere enunciates this thought, and when he discusses 
charity his focus always appears to be on the (un-)acceptability of individual 
ascriptions, uncompromisingly ruling them out when they are what he takes to be 
obvious falsehoods. 
Wilson’s Principle of Charity  
 Other facets of Quinean charity can, I think, be illuminated by a comparison 
with the principle of charity enunciated by N. L. Wilson (Wilson 1959).  Moreover, 
such a comparison seems in order inasmuch as Quine himself suggests that an affinity 




a principle of charity in the context of a consideration of the question “How does a 
name in use get its significance?” (1959, 529), that is, in the context of formulating a 
theory of the reference of proper names in an indivdual’s idiolect.44  On Wilson’s 
account,  we determine the reference of, say, the name ‘Julius Caesar’ in Charles’ 
language (to use Wilson’s example) by examining the s atements he asserts 
containing the name.  More particularly, we apply what Wilson dubs “the Principle of 
Charity” which enjoins us to “select as designatum hat individual which will make 
the largest number of Charles’ statements [containing the name] true” (1959, 532).   
 As a theory of reference, Wilson’s account appears a version of Fregean 
descriptive theory since, in effect, it makes refernce a matter of an item’s satisfaction 
of predicates, that is, of descriptions being true of it.  It has particular affinities, 
however, with John Searle’s roughly contemporaneous cluster theory of names 
(Searle 1958) inasmuch as it does not make reference depend on the satisfaction of 
some single predicate (or conjunction of predicates).  It differs from it in some 
particulars, however.  First, Searle’s formulation is more social, concerned with the 
reference of names in a community.45  Also, Wilson’s formulation is comparative 
whereas Searle’s is not.  Whereas for Wilson, the ref rent of a name is whatever 
satisfies more of the predicates asserted of a name than other items, for Searle the 
                                                
44 With respect to the issue of priority in formulating a charity principle: In (1976, 109), Quine 
expresses views about the translation of logical particles and the impossibility of prelogicality whic 
amount to implicit charity constraints.  Moreover, he states “there can be . . . no stronger evidence of 
bad translation than that it translates earnest affirmations into obvious falsehoods” (1976, 113), which 
is extremely close to his reasonably explicit statement of charity in Word and Object (1960, 59).  So 
perhaps credit should be accorded Wilson merely for coining the term ‘principle of charity’. 
45 The version of the cluster theory which Saul Kripke formulates in Naming and Necessity for critical 
purposes, however, resembles Wilson’s theory in beig formulated in terms of an individual’s idiolect 




referent is whatever, if anything, satisfies most of them.  But, nonetheless, their 
theories are largely of a piece.   
 Wilson’s account, further, does in fact impose a ch rity constraint, though of a 
distinctive sort, and only within a somewhat circumscribed sphere.  As a principle of 
interpretation, it has the effect of maximizing theruthfulness of an individual’s 
beliefs such as are expressed in assertions involving proper names.  Maximization 
principles like this, which enjoin that one maximize an agent’s truthfulness or 
rationality, represent an important species of charity p inciple.  They are inherently 
holistic in nature, constraining not the ascription of individual propositional attitudes 
but rather whole sets of them at once.46  Moreover, they are inherently comparative in 
the sense that whether an interpretation meets the constraint they lay down cannot be 
determined by considering the interpretation in isolati n but, rather, only by 
considering how it stacks up against other candidate interpretations. 
 As mentioned, Quine cites Wilson’s principle at the point that he enunciates 
his bedrock principles.  So he clearly sees an affiity between his own charity 
principle and Wilson’s.  But their similarity seems confined to the fact that they are 
both Correspondence principles, that is, principles constraining the truthfulness of an 
agent’s beliefs.  For Wilson’s charity principle is maximizing and, therefore, holistic 
                                                
46 In Wilson’s case, the holism is quite moderate, since it is only beliefs (indeed, only a subset of them) 
that are jointly constrained by his charity principle in any particular application of it. 
It merits noting, however, that though Wilson’s principle is holistic in its implications for charity, it is 
non-holistic with respect to semantics.  For it staes conditions which determine the reference of prope  
names in isolation from the question how other parts of speech gain their reference.  Indeed, so 
pronounced is Wilson’s semantic non-holism that he is seduced into a vicious circularity: his account 
of the reference of individual proper names takes for granted that other proper names have already 
acquired a reference (cf. 1959, 530: “Let us suppose . . . that we know the significance which Charles 




and comparative, whereas Quine’s is none of these things.47  Granted, as I mentioned, 
it is not impossible to construe Quine’s statement of the bedrock principles as holistic.  
But even then his principle would differ significantly from Wilson’s in character.  
For, on a holistic reading, Quine’s statement that “one’s interlocutor’s silliness, 
beyond a certain point, is less likely than bad transl tion” (1960, 59) would amount to 
the claim that the number or proportion of obviously false beliefs in an agent’s belief-
set cannot surpass a certain threshold.  Threshold Principles like this one represent an 
important type of charity principle.48  But they lack the maximizing, comparative 
character of Wilson’s principle.  So even on the—implausible—holistic reading 
Quine’s principle would differ markedly from Wilson’s.    
The Cultural Historian’s Principle of Charity 
It is instructive, further, to compare Quine’s (and Wilson’s) principles of 
charity to the less technical notions of charity often appealed to by intellectual 
historians (such as historians of philosophy) as justification for their interpretative 
practice.  First, the scope of the latter notions seems to be narrower in one respect, for 
these less technical charity principles are typically intended to apply only to people, 
such as famous philosophers, who can safely be presumed to be smart!  The 
intellectual historian’s charity is in this regard markedly undemocratic.  Second, 
though charity of this sort resembles Quine’s non-hlistic charity in that it typically 
aims to avoid ascribing obvious falsehoods (egregiously invalid inferences, etc.), this 
                                                
47 Moreover, even though both principles ostensibly constrain the truthfulness of beliefs, in fact 
Quine’s principle concerns the degree of acceptance of b liefs in a native’s community.  Wilson’s 
principle, by contrast, seems to concern the literal truthfulness of an individual’s assertions involving a 
proper name. 
48 Of course, Threshold Principles can concern rationl ty as well as truth—a fact that will loom large 




is typically tempered by a readiness to ascribe some such lapses if the interpretation 
that yields them at least—among available interpretations—maximizes the overall 
truth, coherence, etc. of an author’s claims.  So at bottom such charity—in contrast to 
Quine’s (and like Wilson’s)—seems to have a holistic, maximizing character.49  Last, 
it is unlikely that the wielders of such principles regard them as possessing anything 
other than a heuristic status: greater truth-preservation, coherence, etc., constitute a 
presumption in favor of an interpretation, but such a presumption can be overcome.50 
Adjudicating Among the Interpretations of Quinean C harity 
It is time now to consider what status Quine assigns his principle of charity—
pragmatic, heuristic, or constitutive.  Of the three interpretations, the claims of the 
pragmatic reading seem most precarious.  As Hookway points out, Quine does seem 
to acknowledge a category of purely pragmatic “supplementary canons” for the 
construction of translation manuals whose employment is justified solely by their 
utility (Quine 1960, 74).  But there seems no textual evidence to support Hookway’s 
view that Quine’s principle of charity should be included among them.  Quine makes 
no mention of charity in discussing them.  Moreover, Quine’s mention of the 
“supplementary canons” is relegated to one rather so t paragraph of Word and 
Object.  His remarks concerning them seem to amount to litle more than aside.  By 
contrast, Quine’s account of charity (1960, sect. 13, 57-61) is to all appearances a 
                                                
49 That such charity is limited in its application to smart people lends it a greater prima facie 
plausibility than broader charity principles like Quine’s.  For the smarter someone is, the greater the 
likelihood that the truth- and rationality-maximizing interpretation will apply to them.  But given the 
limits on human intellect, a principle which requires maximization come hell or high water would 
possibly be too strong.     
I postpone discussion of a further element of such charity till Ch. 2, namely, that the principles that 
intellectual historians actually employ are closer to what Richard Grandy dubs ‘the principle of 
humanity’ (Grandy 1973) than to, say, Quinean or Davidsonian charity principles.   
50 This attitude, in fact, suggests the wrongheadedness of properly normativist views of charity which 




prominent and substantial element of his general account of radical translation.  
Hookways’s reading, then, significantly mislays theemphasis in Quine’s account, 
assigning the supplementary canons an import out of proportion to their true 
significance. 
Hookway is abetted in this by a further peculiarity of his reading.  Hookway 
clearly regards the crux of Quinean charity as his injunction that sentences that are 
stimulus-analytic (or stimulus-contradictory) for natives are to be rendered with 
sentences that are so for English-speakers (Quine 1960, 68).  Hookway altogether 
downplays Quinean logic-charity.  He writes, “although Quine may believe that we 
are constrained to read our Logic into the verbal behaviour of the natives, his views 
on this matter are not clear” (Hookway 1988, 136).  In fact, there is little clearer in 
Quine’s account of charity than that translation imposes our logic: “The canon ‘Save 
the obvious’ bans any manual of translation that would represent the foreigners as 
contradicting our logic” (Quine 1986, 83).  To all ppearances, logic-charity forms a 
central element of Quine’s account.  Indeed, in Davidson’s opinion—which is not 
easily discounted in this regard—“Quine emphasizes [the principle of charity] only in 
connection with the identification of the . . . sentential connectives” (Davidson 2001e, 
136n16).  So there is little to be said in favor of pushing logic-charity to the margins 
of Quine’s account, as does Hookway. 
It is true that Quine apparently makes a distinction between two stages of 
translation.  The first includes the rendering of the ruth-functional connectives, 
whereas the second involves filling out the translation manual with analytical 




(1960, 68).  It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that these two stages 
correspond to a distinction between an obligatory, constitutive element and a non-
binding, purely pragmatic one in Quine’s account of translation, respectively.  There 
is simply no indication that Quine regards the prese vation of stimulus-analyticity as 
merely an optional pragmatic addendum to his main account of translation.  Quine’s 
does allow that the translator can turn an occasionl blind eye to the requirement of 
preserving stimulus-analyticity if this permits subtantial simplification in one’s 
analytical hypotheses (1960, 69); and this, to be sur , represents a concession to the 
pragmatic consideration of simplicity.  But it is not the requirement to preserve 
stimulus-analyticity (i.e., charity) which is the pragmatic element here; rather, charity 
is treated here as a generally de rigeur element that can occasionally be trumped by 
pragmatic considerations of simplicity.  Again, there is a sense in which Quine’s 
whole attitude to the intentional realms of mind an meaning is pragmatic and 
instrumental.  Since his account of mind and meaning includes charity, perhaps this 
might be thought to warrant a view of charity as pragmatic.  But Quine presents the 
non-factual, instrumental character of the intentional as an implication—on the basis 
of the indeterminacy of translation51—of what he takes to be the only plausible 
account of meaning, not as a presupposition of it.  So Hookway’s pragmatic 
interpretation draws no support from this quarter either.   So much for the pragmatic 
interpretation of Quinean charity.52 
                                                
51 A word on the relation of charity and the indeterminacy of translation for Quine: Georges Rey 
observes that though Quine’s argument for the indeterminacy of translation is often cited as a 
consideration in favor of normativism, the argument does not entail a principle of charity (Rey, 2001, 
124n20).  This is correct.  Charity figures more as a crucial presupposition of the interpretative scheme 
that, in Quine’s view, leaves scope for indeterminacy than as an implication of it. 
52 Issue may be taken as well with the content of the charity principle that Hookway wishes to ascribe 




It remains to consider the relative merits of the heuristic and constitutive 
interpretations.  In the present context, we can take he heuristic interpretation as 
holding that Quine’s principle of charity has an  posteriori status and that its content 
consists in the injunction not to attribute obvious fal ehoods to agents unless there is 
strong evidence to suggest otherwise.  The following three statements of Quine’s 
represent the chief textual support for the heuristic reading: 
“The maxim of translation underlying all this is tha  assertions startlingly false 
on the face of them are likely to turn on hidden differences of language.”  
“[O]ne’s interlocutor’s silliness, beyond a certain point, is less likely than bad 
translation . . . .”  (1960, 59)  “[T]he more absurd or exotic the beliefs imputed 
to a people, the more suspicious we are entitled to be f the translations . . . .” 
(1960, 69) 
 
On their face, these statements do suggest that there is a presumption against 
attributing obvious falsehoods but that the presumption is defeasible given sufficient 
countervailing evidence.  Moreover, as noted above (p. 30), Glock cites “Quine’s 
naturalism” as counting against Quine’s taking a constitutive approach to charity 
(2003, 33). 
 But these considerations must be weighed against others which support a 
constitutive reading.  At least with respect to logic, I have suggested that Quine takes 
an uncompromisingly strong view of the content of charity.  Quine presents the 
assumption that natives’ beliefs and utterances respect logical norms not as defeasible 
in individual cases but as binding.  The strength of Quinean logic-charity, then, 
conflicts with the heuristic reading.53  Moreover, the centrality of logic-charity for 
                                                                                                                                 
the aliens and ourselves: the best translation will be one that minimizes inexplicable error . . .” (1988, 
136).  Thus, Hookway attributes to Quine a holistic, maximizing principle of charity.  But, as I have 
suggested above, Quine’s principle does not appear holistic in general, nor maximizing in particular.  
53 In principle, charity’s having a strong content is consistent with its having an a posteriori status.  In 




Quine, attested to by Davidson, favors the conclusion that charity is constitutive for 
Quine.  Again, Quine’s most explicit formulation of a charity principle—“Save the 
obvious” (1986, 82)—is free of any qualifying rider of the sort which the heuristic 
reading would append (e.g., “unless there is strong countervailing evidence”), despite 
the fact that Quine in this context stresses that the scope of charity extends beyond 
logic, taking in obvious truths in every domain, “every little bit of knowledge or 
discourse.” 
 It cannot be denied that Quine makes statements tha  suggest a heuristic 
reading.  But worth noting is that these statements mo tly seem to function more in 
the way of backing or justification of his charity principle rather than as formulations 
of charity itself (cf. p.36 above).  So there is a tension between Quine’s application of 
charity (e.g., to logic) and his explicit formulation of it, on the one hand,  and the 
claims he makes by way of justifying the principle, on the other.  Whereas his charity 
principle (and application of it) itself seems quite strict, his efforts to justify it—such 
as they are—appeal to claims which are more lax.  Perhaps faced with the prospect of 
providing no justification for charity at all, Quine preferred to make an appeal to 
“commonsense” (1960, 59), even though the facts comm nsense certifies are not of 
sufficient strength to justify the sort of charity he actually seems to endorse and 
employ.  At all events, in Quine’s later statement of charity (1986, 82), it is the strict 
charity principle itself which is retained and not its problematic backing, of which 
Quine makes no further mention. 
                                                                                                                                 
However, the only textual evidence that Quine might assign charity an aposteriori status is the very 
evidence for assigning it the content, associated with the heuristic reading by Stein and Glock, which 




On balance, then, the evidence inclines me to see Quine’s view of charity as 
constitutive.  Thus, Quine can with some likelihood be classed as a genuine 
normativist alongside those like Davidson and Dennett whose interpretavistic views, 
though different from Quine’s in certain respects, bear the stamp of their predecessor 




Chapter Two: Normativism Within Davidson’s 
Interpretationism  
Introduction 
 In this chapter, I shall delineate and critically discuss more recent 
normativism, especially the influential version of it found in the work of Donald 
Davidson.  In particular, my concern will be to begin to develop a characterization of 
the charity principles at which the arguments of later chapters will level.  Although 
Davidson’s version of charity will be the major focus of the chapter, comparison with 
Richard Grandy’s principle of humanity will help bring out the form and function of 
Davidsonian charity, as well as certain liabilities to which it is subject.  Finally, I shall 
examine the arguments—such as they are—with which Davidson (and others) have 
sought to defend charity as a constraint on agency. 
Davidson’s Interpretationism 
 Davidson enunciates charity principles in the context of expounding an 
interpretationist account of language and of the propositional attitudes.  The loci 
classici for that account are the papers collected under the heading “Radical 
Interpretation” in Davidson (2001b), and that account is expanded in significant ways 
in Davidson (2004c).1  A peculiarity of Davidson’s interpretationist project is that its 
initial exclusive focus on language ultimately yields to a focus on intentionality more 
generally.  The ascription of linguistic meaning to an agent’s words comes to be seen 
as necessarily going hand-in-hand with the ascription to them of beliefs, desires, etc.  
But the later account, though more general, is also somewhat tentative and 
                                                
1 Davidson draws implications of his interpretavism and normativism for the possibility of 




programmatic.  Davidson’s more detailed (and better-known) formulations of his 
interpretationism actually occur in his treatment of language.  So I shall devote 
considerable space to examining the role of charity in Davidson’s account of 
language before I consider how, if at all, the proper appreciation of Davidsonian 
charity ought to be modified in the light of Davidson’s more general interpretationist 
account.    
 Davidson’s account of language is deeply indebted to two figures, Quine and 
Alfred Tarski.2  In outline, Davidson’s account, which he calls a theory of ‘radical 
interpretation’, strongly resembles Quine’s theory f radical translation.  In his 
account, Davidson is concerned chiefly with two questions: “What could we know 
that would enable us to” interpret someone’s words n a particular occasion, and 
“How could we come to know it?” (2001e, 125).  That is, Davidson is concerned with 
the questions in what sort of theory our knowledge of meaning might consist, and 
how we could acquire evidence for such a theory.  Davidson plausibly insists that, 
although what we know must allow us to interpret a potentially infinite number of 
sentences, the underlying knowledge itself must be finit , given “that man is mortal” 
(2001f, 8-9).  Moreover, the evidence for such a theory must not be semantic in 
nature (involving notions like meaning, synonymy, etc.) on pain of presupposing the 
very capacity of interpretation of which Davidson pur orts to give an account.  
Further, if one’s aim is to explain the ability to grasp the meaning of utterances, then 
the account should not take the form of describing a translation method between 
languages, as it does for Quine.  Such an  account would allow one to “know which 
                                                
2 The extent of Davidson’s debt to the former is reflected in his dedication to Inquiries: “TO W. V. 




sentences of the subject language [the translating language] translate which sentences 
of the object language [the language translated] without knowing what any of the 
sentences of either language mean” (2001e, 129).  As Davidson points out, one could 
use such a theory to interpret a language if the subject language happened to be one’s 
own, but the interpretation of one’s own language would necessarily escape the scope 
of such an account.  Hence, in Davidson’s view, it is not knowledge of a Quinean 
translation manual that underlies the ability to interpret a language. 
 Rather, Davidson submits, an interpretation theory might plausibly take the 
form of a Tarskian theory of truth, suitably modified so as to be able to handle the 
indexical elements ubiquitous in natural language.  Such a truth theory respects the 
requirement of finitude and, Davidson writes, “entails, for every sentence s of the 
object language, a sentence of the form: 
 s is true (in the object language) if and only if p. 
Instances of the form (which we shall call T-sentences) are obtained by replacing ‘s’ 
by a canonical description of s, and ‘p’ by a translation of s” (2001e, 130).  A focus of 
much research has been whether the wealth of natural-language locutions permits 
treatment within the Tarskian framework.3  But a more pertinent question which 
Davidson raises is whether (and how) one could confirm a truth theory for a natural 
language on the basis of the available evidence.  For it is in this connection that 
charity enters into Davidson’s account of language. 
 Davidson suggests, in effect, that standard hypothetico-deductive method can 
be used to test a truth theory.  A proposed truth theory for a natural language can be 
                                                
3 Davidson (2001e, 132) gives the following partial list of potentially problematic locutions: “sentences 
that attribute attitudes, modalities, general causal statements, counterfactuals, attributive adjectivs, 




tested through the T-sentences which it entails: it i  confirmed to the extent that it 
generates true T-sentences.4  So the problem of testing such a truth theory reduc s to 
that of determining the truth-values of a sampling of its generated T-sentences.  
Davidson finds a hint as to the solution of this problem if an interpreter can be 
supposed able to recognize when sentences are held tru  by members of a speech 
community. 
 Consider the (contextually-relative) T-sentence for the German sentence ‘Es 
regnet’ proposed by Davidson (2001e, 135): 
(T) ‘Es regnet’ is true-in-German when spoken by x at time t if and only if it is 
raining near x at t. 
 
Davidson suggests that (T) could be confirmed (and, indirectly, any truth theory that 
yields it as a consequence) by garnering support for the following claim: 
(GE) (x)(t) (if x belongs to the German speech community then (x holds true 
‘Es regnet’ at if and only if it is raining near x at t)) 
 
If an ability to determine whether and in which circumstances individuals hold 
sentences true is conceded, it would indeed be a relatively straightforward matter to 
confirm—or falsify—(GE).  Moreover, the truth of (GE) might seem to constitute 
strong evidence for (T).5  But Davidson notes that because one can be wrong about 
                                                
4 In the light of his employment of Tarskian truth theory for purposes of interpretation, Davidson 
modifies Tarski’s definition of a T-sentence.  Tarski took the notion of translation for granted, and 
defined truth in terms of it.  Davidson, by contras, takes the notion of truth for granted and undertakes 
to define interpretation in terms of it.  Accordingly, in the definition of a T-sentence, he understands p, 
not as a translation of s, but merely as a sentence true if and only if s is.  Aside from allowing him to 
avoid a circular appeal to the very notion he is providing an account of, this permits one to test a truth 
theory for a language through recognition of correct T-sentences without presupposing a prior ability 
to interpret the language (as would be presupposed if p were required to translate s).  Of course, there 
is a worry that with such an understanding of T-sentences, a truth theory cannot be expected to yield a 
genuine interpretation of a language.  Davidson responds to this by expressing the hope that various 
constraints, formal and empirical, placed on a truth theory will suffice to render its T-sentences 
interpretative.  I return to the subject of these constraints below.  
5 Its doing so, however, would seem to involve implicit appeal to some sort of charity principle, 




facts such as whether it is raining near one, one ca not “expect generalizations like 
(GE) to be more than generally true” (2001e, 136).  So the bruited route to the 
confirmation of T-sentences does not quite pan out. 
Davidson’s Appeal to Charity 
 Precisely at this point, Davidson’s discussion of the confirmation of a truth 
theory for a natural language takes a significant turn.  Davidson abandons talk of 
confirming such a theory by means of confirming some sampling of its entailed T-
sentences.  Rather, he suggests a method wherein one aims for a “best fit.”  One 
chooses that interpretation of speakers’ language that “maximizes agreement, in the 
sense of making” them “right, so far as we can tell, as often as possible” (2001e, 136).  
Davidson’s idea is that an interpretation is preferable to the extent that the sentences 
speakers are seen to hold true actually turn out true (in the view of interpreters), when 
judged in accordance with the truth conditions (expr ssed in the entailed T-sentences) 
assigned to sentences by the interpretation.  Thus, Davidson clearly subscribes to a 
kind of maximizing (or “optimizing”) charity principle.6  He maintains, however, that 
since there are an infinite number of sentences to consider, the maximization involved 
cannot be taken literally.7  Moreover, Davidson introduces an important qualification 
on the principle.  He writes, “it makes sense to accept intelligible error and to make 
allowance for the relative likelihood of various kinds of mistake” (2001e, 136).  Thus, 
                                                                                                                                 
perceptual inversion, a community holds true a sentence in circumstances precisely contradictory to its 
truth-condition.  Again, one can easily imagine a community’s holding true ‘That is gold’ co-varying 
with the presence of either gold or pyrite.  But ‘gold’ might still refer to gold for all that, as Kripke 
teaches us.  If sentences like (GE) are to serve as evidence for sentences like (T), such cases need to be
rendered exceptional; and that would seem to requir appeal to some sort of charity principle (more on 
charity presently, of course). 
6 See p. 45 above for a discussion of the general chara ter of such maximization principles. 
7 Perhaps Davidson would have found the following understanding of the sort of maximization 
involved acceptable: That interpretation is to be preferred which renders true the greatest proportion of 




it appears, some sentences incorrectly held true are not to be reckoned into the 
calculus of the optimal interpretation at all, and others are to be discounted in some 
degree according to what sort of mistake they represent.8  At all events, charity 
clearly plays an important methodological role in Davidson’s account of linguistic 
interpretation. 
 Davidson makes some tentative, broadly Quinean proposals concerning how 
one might plausibly discover a truth theory that interprets a speech community’s 
language, though he does note some divergences between his and Quine’s account.  
Like Quine, Davidson assigns a key role in the discovery of an interpretation to what 
Quine had called ‘occasion sentences’, namely, sentences assent to which is 
contextually-relative.  In contrast to Quine, however, Davidson dispenses with the 
notion of stimulus meaning and takes assent to sentences’ (general) co-varying with 
“objective features of the world” as a clue to their translation (2001e, 136).9  
Moreover, Davidson holds that, whereas Quine stresses charity “only in connection 
with the identification of the (pure) sentential connectives,” he applies it “across the 
board” (2001e, 136).  Davidson’s point, apparently, is that the maximization principle 
he enunciates places a constraint on interpretations in toto, not just on the translation 
of sentential connectives.  Indeed, the scope of Davidson’s maximizing charity is 
broader than the logic-charity imposed by Quine’s view of the translation of 
sentential connectives (cf. p. 34 above on logic-charity).  It is concerned not only with 
                                                
8 Whether true normativists such as Davidson can comfortably allow for such qualifications to charity 
principles is an issue to which I return below. 
9 Again, appeal to charity seems implicit in Davidson’  procedure here.  That assent to ‘Gavagai’ co-
varies with the presence of a rabbit can be taken to support the translation of ‘gavagai’ as ‘Lo, a rabbit’ 
only if hypotheses such as those mentioned above (p. 56, n. 5) are ruled out, which appears to require 
appeal to some sort of charity principle.  However, the implicit role that charity serves here, in the
context of discovery, is ultimately less significant than the methodological import which Davidson 




the logical coherence of beliefs but also with the general correspondence of beliefs 
with the facts.10 
 Davidson makes some observations in defense of such a charity principle that 
shed considerable light on it.  He writes, 
What justifies the procedure [of optimizing agreement with an interpreter] is 
the fact that disagreement and agreement alike are intelligible only against a 
background of massive agreement . . . .  The methodological advice to 
interpret in a way that optimizes agreement should not be conceived as resting 
on a charitable assumption about human intelligence that might turn out to be 
false.  If we cannot find a way to interpret the utterances and other behavior of 
a creature as revealing a set of beliefs largely consistent and true by our own 
standards, we have no reason to count that creature s rational, as having 
beliefs, or as saying anything.  (2001e, 137) 
 
This passage is of interest for several reasons.  Fir t, it leaves no doubt that Davidson 
regards charity as an a priori constraint on intentionality.  Hence, whereas there was 
room for debate with respect to Quine, Davidson can unqualifiedly be accounted a 
normativist.  Moreover, the passage reveals Davidson’s adherence to a distinct 
Threshold Principle of charity (cf. p. 46 above).  That is, intentionality, for Davidson, 
requires a certain—indeed, rather high—degree of truth and rational coherence 
among ones beliefs.11 
 In fact, in the passage quoted, Davidson—oddly—seem  to appeal to such a 
Threshold Principle to justify his Maximization Princ ple.  But the former principle is 
clearly unsuited to support the latter.  For that a correct interpretation of an agent(s) 
                                                
10 In two respects, however, the contrast Davidson draws with Quine in point of the scope of the 
application of charity is misleading.  First, as I have indicated in Ch. 1, though Quine’s most 
conspicuous application of charity is in connection with the connectives, in fact, Quinean charity takes 
in far more than that.  Second, though it is true that Davidson’s maximizing charity constrains 
interpretations in toto, it should be borne in mind that he exempts “intelligible error” from the scope of 
charity. 
11 Presumably, however, Davidson intends the qualifict ons which he expresses concerning his 
Maximization Principle to apply to his Threshold Principle as well.  That is, “intelligible error,” etc., 




must render many (or most) of their beliefs true in no way entails that it must 
maximize truth relative to other candidate interpretations.  In fact, Davidson must 
intend his employment of charity in the confirmation f an interpretative truth theory 
for a language to include his Threshold Principle as well as his Maximization 
Principle.  An interpretation will be confirmed to the extent that it both renders a 
suitable proportion of the sentences which speakers’ hold true, true in fact and 
surpasses other candidate interpretations in this regard.12 
Indeed, Davidson’s methodological proposal for confirming a truth theory 
would not be sound without the presence of the Threshold Principle.  For if a theory 
is to obtain any significant hypothetico-deductive support, it must—together with 
auxiliary charity principles and observed facts about which sentences community-
members assent to—yield entailments which are mostly true.  Maximization by itself 
cannot guarantee this.  At best, it can function methodologically to select among 
theories which do yield such entailments.  So, despite initial appearances, the 
Threshold Principle is an indispensable element of Davidson’s methodological 
proposals.13 
The Significance of Charity in Davidson’s Account o f Meaning 
So charity plays an important methodological role in Davidson’s account of 
meaning.  But more needs to be said about the general character of that account and 
the role of charity within it.  One might get the impression initially that the import of 
                                                
12 This still leaves the Maximization Principle unsupported by Davidson’s explicit statements, but at 
least Davidson “justifies the procedure” to the extent of appealing to Threshold charity as an a priori 
constraint on intentionality.  Perhaps he would justify the maximizing element similarly. 
13 Might one hold that Davidson is advocating a distinctive, non-standard hermeneutical methodology?  
This seems unlikely since he undertakes to defend only the charity principle on which his proposal 
relies, not the methodological soundness of such reliance.  Moreover, his initial consideration of 





charity in Davidson’s account of language is purely epistemological, that it enters in 
only to explain how one can confirm a translation of a language.  But its significance 
is greater than that.  For as Davidson points out, it is not enough that a truth theory 
yield correct truth-conditions for sentences to count as a theory of meaning for that 
language.14  A sentence like “‘Snow is white’ is true iff grass is green” would count 
as expressing a correct truth-condition for ‘Snow is hite’, but could hardly be 
regarded as giving the meaning of that sentence.  Some means of guaranteeing that 
the right-hand sides of T-sentences genuinely translate the sentences mentioned on 
the left is required.  Davidson speculates that a theory confirmed along the 
methodological lines he has sketched can be regarded as yielding T-sentences that are 
genuinely interpretative.  He writes, “we have supplied an alternative criterion: this 
criterion is that the totality of T-sentences should . . . optimally fit evidence about 
sentences held true by native speakers . . . . If that constraint is adequate, each T-
sentence will in fact yield an acceptable interpretation” (2001e, 139). 
This statement is of the utmost importance in understanding the nature of 
Davidson’s account of meaning and the role of charity w thin it.  For it makes clear 
that Davidson defines interpretation in terms of the evidence which would serve to 
confirm a theory of interpretation for a language.  It is precisely this constitutive role 
that he assigns to evidence that renders his account of language interpretationist (cf. 
p. 14 above).  Moreover, for Davidson it is accordance with his charity principle(s) 
that represents the key evidential element in his account of interpretation.  A theory’s 
passing the test of charity is what is supposed to ensure its interpretativeness.  Hence, 
                                                
14 Davidson understands the truth-conditions of a sentence very weakly, as captured by any sentence 




charity plays a methodological role for Davidson, but for that very reason, given the 
nature of his account, it is constitutive of meaning as well. 
Moreover, because of the role of charity within Davidson’s account, Davidson 
cannot be taken to be giving a reductive analysis of meaning in terms of concepts 
“better understood . . . or more basic epistemologically or ontologically” (2001e, 
137).  “Concepts like those of meaning,” Davidson writes, are “. . . not reducible to 
physical, neurological, or even behaviouristic concepts” (2001a, 154).  Davidson’s 
point is that an account of intentional notions like meaning cannot be given in wholly 
non-intentional terms.  One, so to speak, is caught in an intentional circle.   
At the end of the process of interpreting a language, Davidson holds that it is 
likely some indeterminacy will remain.  But since h t inks that the constraints his 
account places on acceptable interpretations are mostringent than analogous 
Quinean ones, he thinks that the sphere of indeterminacy will be correspondingly 
smaller.  In fact, he maintains that “the range of acceptable theories of truth can be 
reduced to the point where all acceptable theories w ll yield T-sentences that we can 
treat as giving correct interpretations . . .” (2001a, 152).  Ultimately, he thinks there is 
an arbitrary but innocuous element of choice among schemes of interpretation, 
analogous to the arbitrary choice among differently calibrated scales of measurement.  
“Indeterminacy of this kind,” he writes, “cannot beof genuine concern” (2001a, 154).  
Unlike Quine, then, by no means does Davidson wish to use indeterminacy to argue 




The Mutual Dependence of Meaning and Thought 
Davidson, even in setting out the above account of the radical interpretation of 
language, is quite explicit that the account is provisi nal.  For he holds that the 
interpretation of language and the attribution of pr positional attitudes must go hand-
in-hand: “. . . interpreting an agent’s intentions, his beliefs and his words are parts of 
a single project, no part of which can be assumed to be complete before the rest is” 
(2001e, 127).  Thus, in giving an account of the radic l interpretation of meaning, one 
cannot take the attribution of attitudes for granted. An account of the interpretation of 
language cannot rely on evidence consisting of speakers’ complex communicative 
intentions.15  For Davidson maintains that it is impossible to establish the presence of 
such attitudes independently of someone’s verbally communicating them.  So 
availing oneself of this source of evidence would—illicitly—presuppose the ability to 
radically interpret itself.  The problem is that “the attribution of thought depends on 
the interpretation of speech” (2001g, 163).16  By the same token, it seems the 
interpretation of language cannot escape dependence on the detailed attribution of 
thought.  Whereas in (2001e) Davidson gives the impression that the identification of 
one’s holding a sentence true is unproblematic, his considered view is quite different: 
“there is no chance of telling when a sentence is held true without being able to 
attribute desires and being able to describe actions as having complex intentions” 
(2001g, 162).17  In view of the mutual dependence of meaning and thought, then, 
                                                
15 Relatedly, Davidson also rejects accounts like those f Wittgenstein and Grice which attempt to cash 
linguistic meaning in terms of such intentions.  Cf. (2001e, 127) and (2001a, 143-44). 
16 Davidson (2001g) argues for this claim at length. 
17 Additionally, Davidson comes to hold that an account of linguistic interpretation must take into 
account that the attitude of holding a sentence tru, as a form of belief, admits of degrees.  The 
necessity of identifying the degrees to which sentences are held true gives additional force to the claim 




Davidson proposes a unified account of them.  My discussion of that—rather 
technical—account is necessarily simplified. 
Davidson presents his account in outline in (2004e).  His aim is to sketch a 
theory that allows for the simultaneous interpretation of a speaker’s language and 
attribution of beliefs and desires to them.  His account draws heavily on decision-
theoretic ideas.  Frank Ramsey’s Bayesian decision theory serves as a model of the 
sort of theory at which he is aiming.  But in order to encompass meaning as well as 
belief and desire, he supplements Ramsey’s theory with ideas deriving from Richard 
Jeffrey’s version of Bayesian decision theory.    
 Davidson, following Ramsey, takes for granted thatchoices among courses of 
action (or preferences among states of affairs) are gen rally determined by the 
subjective probabilities and valuations agents assign to possible outcomes of 
alternative courses of action (or states of affairs) according to the principle that agents 
maximize expected utility.  Thus, on the basis of someone’s choices, if one were in 
possession of their valuations of various outcomes, one could compute their degrees 
of belief in them; similarly, if one were in possesion of their degrees of belief, one 
could compute the valuations.  Ramsey, however, proposed a clever way for 
computing both from their choices alone.18  Thus, Ramsey provides a method for 
attributing beliefs and desires to an agent on the evidential basis of their “preferences 
between alternatives, some of them wagers” (2001a, 146)
                                                
18 Davidson describes the technique so: “Ramsey solved this problem by showing how to find a 
proposition deemed as probable as its negation on the basis of simple choices only.  This single 
proposition can be used to construct an endless series of wagers choices among which yield a measure 
of value for all possible options and eventualities.  It is then routine to fix the degrees of belief in all 




 Davidson is very explicit with respective to the normative underpinnings of 
Ramsey’s theory.  It assumes a “reasonable pattern of preferences between courses of 
actions” (2001g, 160) and a rational coherence of one’s values “in combination with 
[one’s] beliefs” (2004e, 153).  Davidson refers to the “conditions postulated by the 
theory” as “idealized” (2001g, 160).  Evidently, the Ramseyan account of attribution 
relies on an extremely strong charity assumption. 
 But despite what Davidson regards as the merits of he Ramseyan account, 
Davidson notes that it is subject to the criticism that it would need to be supplemented 
by a theory of the interpretation of language.  For, Davidson writes, “To learn the 
preferences of an agent, particularly among complex gambles, it is obviously 
necessary to describe the options in words.  But how can the experimenter know what 
those words mean to the subject?” (2001a, 147).  That seems to require a theory of 
interpretation on the part of the experimenter.  But since the interpretation of 
language in turn seems to require detailed knowledge of propositional attitudes (cf. p. 
63 above), we would be caught in a circle.  As a way out of this circle, Davidson 
proposes a theory, incorporating elements of the Ramseyan account, that interprets 
language as well as attributing attitudes. 
Moreover, Davidson abandons the idea, which in essence he had inherited 
from Quine, that agents’ attitudes of holding sentences true suffice as an evidential 
basis for a theory of meaning.  For various reasons, he thinks that knowledge of the 
degrees of agents’ belief in sentences is required, but such knowledge is not readily 
gleaned by an interpreter.  Davidson points out, however, that, on the one hand, 




theory of meaning seems to require a theory of degree of belief such as Bayesian 
decision theory can provide, suggests that the two are “evidently made for each other” 
(2004e, 158).  But, again, to avoid circularity, a unified account of belief, desire, and 
meaning needs to be provided. 
In that account, Davidson takes the attitude of an agent preferring one 
sentence true rather than another as basic.  As he points out, such attitudes on the part 
of an agent can plausibly be seen as “a function of what the agent takes the sentences 
to mean, the value he sets on various possible or actual states of the world, and the 
probability he attaches to those states contingent on the truth of the relevant 
sentences.  So it is not absurd to think that all three attitudes of the agent can be 
derived from sentences preferred true” (2004e, 158-59). 
In outline, the unified account will have the following structure19: Degrees of 
belief in sentences, as well as comparative strength of desire that sentences be true, 
will be attributed on the basis of preferences that sentences be true.  Meaning, in turn, 
will attributed on the basis of “knowledge about the degrees to which sentences are 
held true” (2004e, 159).  Once the meanings of sentences are determined, of course, 
propositional belief and desire fall out directly.     
Davidson emphasizes the crucial role of charity in his unified account of 
interpretation and meaning.  He writes, “What makes th  task practicable at all is the 
structure the normative character of thought, desire, peech and action imposes on 
correct attributions of attitudes to others, and hence on interpretations of their speech 
and explanations of their actions” (2004e, 166).  The role of charity in this task sheds 
                                                
19 For Davidson’s account of how such attribution might proceed, developed from Richard Jeffrey’s 




light on additional issues in the interpretation of Davidsonian charity to which I now 
turn. 
Issues in Interpreting Davidsonian Charity 
 Among the issues with respect to the interpretation of Davidson’s view of the 
propositional attitudes are the intended scope of his account of interpretation and of 
his principle of charity.  When Davidson addresses how ascription of attitudes is to 
proceed in any detail, as in (2004e), given the nature of his account, his focus is at 
most on sorts of attitudes—beliefs, desires, possibly actions—which have a decision-
theoretical bearing.  His view of the ascription of other sorts of attitudes is unclear.  
Taking a cognitive theory of emotion as a model, perhaps one might think that other 
sorts of attitudes could be defined in terms of beliefs or desires.  But recourse to this 
maneuver is pretty clearly ruled out for Davidson by the following quote: 
It is doubtful whether the various sorts of thoughts can be reduced to one, or 
even to a few: desire, knowledge, belief, fear, to name some important cases, 
are probably logically independent to the extent tha none can be defined 
using the others . . . .  (2001g, 156) 
 
So the general ascription of attitudes other than belief and desire will not fall directly 
out of the account of (2004e) for Davidson.  He does, however, write that “belief is 
central to all kinds of thoughts” (2001g, 156).20  So, apparently, he views the 
ascription of other sorts of attitudes as parasitic in some way on the ascription of the 
decision-theoretical ones. 
 This has the result of making them at least indirectly subject to charity 
constraints.  But beyond that, there is clear evidence that Davidson regards the 
principle of charity as a direct constitutive constraint on the attitudes generally.  In 
                                                
20 Cf. (2004e, 152) where he refers to the decision-theoretic attitudes as “the central cognitive and 




(1980c), he writes, “we make sense of particular beliefs only as they cohere with 
other beliefs, with preferences, with intentions, hopes, fears, expectations, and the 
rest” (1980c, 221).21  So evidently Davidson holds that the sphere of charity 
encompasses all sorts of attitudes which are at all subject to rational and epistemic 
norms.22 
 A further issue of interpretation of Davidsonian charity concerns the strength 
of the constraints that it imposes on those attitudes that fall within its scope.  In 
addressing this issue, some distinctions need to becarefully made, in the first 
instance, a distinction between (1) the strength of t e rational (and epistemological) 
norms by which processes and products of thought are to be assessed with respect to 
their rational (or epistemological) propriety, and (2) the degree of adherence to such 
norms, of successful performance, which Davidson views as a necessary condition for 
the possession of agency.  With respect to the former, there can be little doubt that the 
intended norms are of ideal strength. 
 A recent trend in the theory of rationality advocates that standards of 
rationality should be naturalized.  In general, this is the view that “various empirical 
facts about humans and our environment must be taken into consideration in 
determining what the normative principles of reasoning are” (Stein 1996, 36).  A 
central impetus behind this approach is the axiom that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.  If, as 
                                                
21 Cf. (2004c, 169-70) where Davidson notes that “The existence of reason explanations . . . is a built-
in aspect of intentions, intentional actions, and many other attitudes and emotions . . . .  An aura of 
rationality, of fitting into a rational pattern, is thus inseparable from these phenomena . . . .” 
22 Given the holistic nature of Davidsonian charity, there seems to be an at least prima facie tension 
between Davidson’s wish to subject attitudes quite broadly to charity and the need to treat of non-
decision-theoretic attitudes in a second round of ascription parasitic on a prior round of ascription of 
basic ones.  For this, in effect, isolates the basic ones from the latter—in violation of the holism of 





has seemed compelling to many, ethical norms are conditi ned by possibility, then 
perhaps rational norms are as well, in which case rtional norms would need to 
respect the limitations to which finite human agents are subject.  But since such 
limitations could only be determined empirically, the knowledge of rational norms 
would be rendered, at least in part,  posteriori.   
But such an approach, clearly, runs directly counter to the constitutive role 
which rational norms are meant to play in Davidson’ account of the propositional 
attitudes.  For Davidson is giving an account of the attribution of attitudes.  However, 
the limitations which must figure in a naturalized theory of rationality would surely 
include fairly detailed facts about human beings’ cognitive resources such as could 
only be gleaned through empirical knowledge of human psychology.  But acquiring 
such knowledge presupposes the attribution of attitudes and, therefore, cannot explain 
it on pain of circularity.  Naturalized standards, then, are plainly off-limits to 
Davidson.23  So the norms which Davidson must appeal would nee to be a priori 
and, therefore, inasmuch as they would not be qualified by empirical psychological 
limitations, in some sense ideal. 
But whether Davidson requires ideal performance with respect to the relevant 
norms is a separate question.  Christopher Cherniak (1986, 17-18) sees evidence in 
Davidson’s “Psychology as Philosophy” (1980d, 237) that Davidson does require 
perfect consistency among one’s propositional attitudes.  For Davidson there seems to 
assume that the transitivity of preference cannot be coherently violated.  Cherniak, 
further, cites Quineian charity as a source for Davidson’s requirement of perfect 
                                                
23 There is the additional point that Davidson’s central work on charity and radical interpretation 




consistency.  Indeed, Cherniak correctly observes that Quine’s view of translation in 
Word and Object presupposes perfect consistency for natives (at leas with respect to 
their beliefs) (cf. p. 40 above).24  But, Davidson’s words in (1980d) notwithstanding, 
the bulk of evidence suggests that Davidsonian charity can brook lapses of 
consistency.  Granted, Davidsonian charity includes a Maximization Principle, 
requiring that among competing interpretations thatone is to be preferred which 
renders interpretees’ attitudes truest and most coherent.  But there is no suggestion 
that a correct interpretation must (or even can typically) achieve perfect truth and 
coherence.  Rather, Davidsonian charity principles entail merely that an agent possess 
“a set of beliefs [and other attitudes] largely consistent and true by our standards” 
(2001e, 137) (cf. p. 59 above on Davidson’s Threshold principle).  So Davidsonian 
charity decidedly does not require ideal performance relative to rational norms and 
the norm of truth.  Cherniak errs, then, it appears, in addling Davidson with Quine’s 
requirement of perfect conformity to such norms.25  Given the evident implausibility 
of such a requirement, it is well that Davidsonian charity does not demand it. 
                                                
24 Moreover, with respect to what Davidson terms Correspondence, Quine assumes perfect 
performance as well: A native should never be attribu ed an obviously false belief.  (Recall that 
Quine’s norms are couched in terms of obvious truth, not truth simpliciter.  So a native’s entertaining a 
non-obviously false belief would not bear on one’s performance relative to the respective norm.)  
25 Cherniak is clearly concerned to distinguish his own view, a moderate normativism (see below), 
from the views of paradigmatic normativists like Davidson and Quine.  Even though the contrast 
Cherniak attempts to draw here with Davidson’s view is errorneous, it is likely that when all is said 
and done, Davidson, in fact, impose more exacting charity constraints than does Cherniak: Davidson’s 
Threshold Principle, though vague, seems to set the bar higher than does Cherniak’s analogous 
principle. 
Moreover, though Davidson does not require ideally r tional performance, I shall suggest subsequently 




Davidson’s Charity versus Grandy’s Humanity 
Thus far, I have presented Davidson’s Correspondence charity—as, indeed, 
Davidson himself often does, especially in his earli r papers touching on charity26—
as a matter of the truth of a subject’s beliefs, or, s mewhat more accurately, their 
agreement with an interpreter’s beliefs.  But by the time Davidson writes his central 
papers on radical interpretation, possibly under th influence of Richard Grandy’s 
“Reference, Meaning, and Belief” (Grandy 1973), Davidson appears to recognize the 
inadequacy of understanding Correspondence charity in these simple terms and to 
take the first steps towards a more careful formulation.  Accordingly, in this section I 
discuss Grandy’s critique of charity interpreted in terms of truth or agreement, and 
Grandy’s attempt at a formulation of a more adequate alternative constraint, “the 
principle of humanity.”  Then I compare Davidson’s more considered formulations of 
Correspondence charity to Grandy’s principle.  The excursus will afford considerable 
insight into Davidson’s mature formulations of charity. 
 Grandy’s critique is actually directed towards Quine’s principle of charity, 
which Quine presents initially in his account of radical translation in Word and 
Object (1960).  Grandy interprets Quine’s principle of charity as dictating that in 
translation one should seek to maximize a subject’s agreement with the translator 
with respect to obvious truths.27  Grandy thinks the principle so formulated is correct 
but not general enough.  Better, he notes, might be a more general principle which 
stresses that “the importance of agreement is proporti nal to obviousness” (1973, 
441).   But Quine ignores that obviousness is a matter of degree, as well as the fact 
                                                
26 Cf., e.g., (1980c). 




that obviousness is relative to a subject’s “situaton,” where this includes factors such 
as “focus of attention, expectations, instrumentation” and “the past history of a 
speaker” (1973, 441, 443).  Grandy observes that Quine possibly ignores such factors 
because they do not permit of ready behavioristic definition. 
 By contrast, Grandy proposes an alternative constrai t on translation, namely, 
the principle of humanity, which takes these factors into account.28  Interestingly, his 
account bears the stamp of the influence of Daniel Dennett’s philosophy of mind.29  
Like Dennett, Grandy stresses the “pragmatic” purpose f translation and the 
ascription of attitudes.  He sees the point of transl tion (and, it appears, interpretation) 
as allowing prediction and explanation of behavior.  A successful translation can be 
used in determining an agent’s beliefs and desires, which, with the help of “some 
model of the agent” can, in turn, be used to predict and explain its behavior (1973, 
443).30  But whereas Dennett’s intentional stance essentially appeals to principles of 
rationality in order to link up actions to beliefs and desires, Grandy, with little in the 
way of argument,31 rejects “mathematical decision theory” as a suitable model of the 
agent.  Instead, he suggests that, in fact, we use o rselves as a model and determine 
others’ actions by considering what we would do if we had the relevant beliefs and 
                                                
28 He plainly holds that his alternative constraint etails Quinean charity—re-interpreted to take 
account of degrees of obviousness and relativity to situation—as just described. 
29 Dennett’s “Intentional Systems” (1971) appeared a couple of years before Grandy’s article. 
30 It is tempting to see Grandy here as, like Dennett, espousing an instrumentalism.  But it is not clear 
that insisting on the predictive value of translation and interpretation automatically renders one an 
instrumentalist.  After all, Fodor, an arch-realist, would see the claim to reality of psychological posits 
as bound up with their role in laws and, therefore, equally closely bound up precisely with their 
potential use in prediction and explanation. 
31 Grandy allows that having elicited an agent’s entir  set of beliefs and desires, one might perhaps use 
decision theory to predict its behavior.  But, he writes, “this is not what we do in practice” (1973, 443).  
His objection seems based on the implausibility of our actually relying on a whole system of attitudes 




desires.32  That is, he emphasizes a role for simulation in our understanding of others.  
But, Grandy maintains, if the connections among attitudes (and the world) are 
insufficiently similar to ours, then we shall be unable to derive predictions in this way 
from their attitudes.  So as a “pragmatic constrain on translation” Grandy proposes 
the principle of humanity, “the condition that the imputed pattern of relations among 
beliefs, desires, and the world be as similar to our own as possible” (1973, 443).  
Thus, without the right relations, no attitudes.33 
 But so formulated, the principle is vague.  It leav s unspecified what are the 
relevant relations among one’s beliefs, desires, and world that one must approximate 
in interpreting others.  Grandy’s idea seems to be that there are principles which 
capture how human attitudes must characteristically re ate among themselves and to 
the world, and in choosing among translations one should choose that one that 
maximizes a subject’s adherence to these principles.  There is a question, however, 
whether these principles are to be thought of as normative ones.  He remarks that 
epistemological principles play a large role in telling us whether a particular sentence 
can be reasonably attributed to a speaker as an interpre ation of his utterance” (1973, 
445).  Moreover, the instance he cites of such a princi le—what he terms ‘a causal 
theory of belief’—seems to be normative.  Though he do s not attempt to formulate it 
precisely, the idea seems to be that speakers generally form beliefs about physical 
objects with which they have had some causal interac ion, however indirectly.  Of 
                                                
32 Or, more precisely, if we had some of their beliefs and desires, since Grandy thinks t is not plausible 
that prediction is based on an agent’s full set of attitudes. 
33 Grandy clearly thinks we possess a capacity of simulation whose deliverances are faithful to these 
relations among attitudes and the world and which, therefore, we can use in generating accurate 
predictions of our own and others’ behavior.  But since the details and plausibility of this proposal are
somewhat remote from the topic at hand, I shall hereafter focus only on the content of Grandy’s 





course, as Grandy himself notes, this principle is clo ely related to Alvin Goldman’s 
causal theory of knowledge (Goldman 1967, cited in Grandy 1973, 446n12).  
Essentially, Grandy’s principle just restates Goldman’s constraint on knowledge 
(justified true belief) as a constraint on belief gnerally.  Ed Stein, however, interprets 
the principle of humanity as permitting among the rel vant interpretative principles, 
principles of reasoning that diverge from normative principles (Stein 1996, 121), and 
certainly Grandy asserts nothing which commits him to the view that the principles 
constraining translation are all normative.  At all events, I shall proceed on the 
assumption that Stein is correct in this regard.  
 Grandy argues the superiority of his principle of humanity over, in effect, 
simple Correspondence charity by considering cases wh re both intuition and the 
principle of humanity favor seeing a subject’s utterance as reflecting a false belief but 
charity dictates presumptively viewing it as expressing a truth.  Suppose, for example, 
that you are standing with Paul at a party and he utters the sentence ‘John is a 
philosopher’, having misheard the man standing nearby being called ‘Ron’ and 
referred to as a philatelist.  As it happens, there is an individual in the garden named 
John (out of sight and earshot, and with whom Paul h s not interacted either directly 
or indirectly) who happens to be a philosopher.  Whereas charity would favor seeing 
the utterance ‘John is a philosopher’ as reflecting a true belief about the man in the 
garden, it is much more natural to see it as reflecting a false belief about Ron standing 
nearby.  Indeed, if Grandy is correct that something like the “causal theory of belief” 
is among the principles constraining our attitudes, then the principle of humanity 




with whom he has interacted, rather than a true beli f about John, with whom he has 
not.  Moreover, Grandy maintains, “the principle of humanity . . . instructs us to 
prefer the interpretation that makes the utterance explainable.  Since no reason could 
be given as to why Paul would have a belief about the philosopher in the garden, it is 
better to attribute to him an explicable falsehood than a mysterious truth” (1973, 445).  
Davidson’s Response to Grandy’s Account 
Whether or not Grandy’s argument is airtight, Davidson seems to have 
assimilated Grandy’s lesson that a correspondence princi le couched in terms of 
maximization of truth or agreement will not suffice.  Davidson writes, “The general 
policy . . . is to choose truth conditions that do as well as possible in making speakers 
hold sentences true when . . . those sentences are true.  That is the general policy, to 
be modified in a host of obvious ways” (2001a, 153).  The modifications which 
Davidson broaches in various places include the following: He writes that “it makes 
sense to accept intelligible error and to make allowance for the relative likelihood of 
various kinds of mistake” (2001e, 136); “Speakers can be allowed to differ more 
often and more radically with respect to some sentences than others, and there is no 
reason not to take into account the observed or infe red individual differences that 
may be thought to have caused anomalies . . .” (2001a, 152); “Disagreement about 
theoretical matters may be more tolerable than disagreement about what is more 
evident; disagreement about how things look or apper is less tolerable than 
disagreement about how they are” (2001g, 169).34  What is striking about these 
                                                
34 Cf. from (2004e, 157): “agreement on what is openly and publicly observable is more to be favored 




pronouncements is the extent to which they suggest Grandy’s principle of humanity.35  
Davidson’s allowance of “intelligible error” is reminiscent of Grandy’s injunction to 
“prefer the interpretation that makes the utterance explainable.”  Moreover, Grandy’s 
claim (in response to Quine) that “the importance of agreement is proportional to 
obviousness” (see p. 72 above) corresponds very closely to Davidson’s that 
“Disagreement about theoretical matters may be more tolerable than disagreement 
about what is more evident.”36     
 However, whereas Grandy would defend such claims as these by an appeal to 
humanity, the requirement that “the imputed pattern of relations among beliefs, 
desires, and the world be as similar to our own as possible” (1973, 443), Davidson 
makes no (explict) appeal to humanity as an umbrella principle.  Rather, his appeal is 
narrower, specifically, to epistemological considerations: “everything we know or 
believe about the way evidence supports belief can be put to work in deciding where 
the theory can best allow error, and what errors are least destructive of understanding.  
The methodology of interpretation is, in this respect, nothing but epistemology seen 
in the mirror of meaning” (2001g, 169).37 
Davidson, then, unlike Grandy (see p. 63 above), doesseem to limit the 
relevant “relations among beliefs, desires, and the world” to normative ones.  His 
view seems to be that it is not truth or agreement of a speaker’s beliefs with the 
                                                
35 As Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig observe, “Davidson’s conception of how the principle of charity 
is supposed to be applied is much more like what Grndy (1973) has called the ‘principle of humanity’ 
than his critics have supposed” (LePore and Ludwig 2005, 192n167).  
36 Inasmuch as Davidson, like Quine, appears to associate degree of obviousness with types of 
sentences, Davidson does not explicitly show quite the same recognition of the relativity of 
obviousness to a speaker’s “situation” as does Grandy (see p. 72 above).  But such a recognition would 
seem to underlie his statement that one should take into account “the observed or inferred individual 
differences that may be thought to have caused anomlies . . .” (Davidson 2001a, 152).  
37 For an interpretation of Davidson’s Principle of Correspondence similar to the one I present here, see 




interpreter’s which the Principle of Correspondence enjoins one to maximize, but 
rather the extent to which the speaker’s beliefs cohere among themselves, with the 
speaker’s external circumstances and, presumably, with those of their cognitive 
mental states, such as sensations, which are not propositional attitudes.38  Epistemic 
principles specify relations which must (not) obtain if beliefs are to possess epistemic 
warrant.  Davidson’s idea seems to be that one should minimize the extent to which 
the relations among these items violate relations dictated by epistemic principles.  
Grandy’s ‘causal theory of belief’ can serve as an illustration as well as any putative 
principle.  Thus, an interpretation which ascribes to a subject a belief about a physical 
object in the absence of (appropriate) physical interaction with it would detract from 
the coherence of the relations among their attitudes, circumstances, etc., for purposes 
of assessing the interpretation vis-à-vis other candidate interpretations.  Generally, it 
is not falsehood (or disagreement) per se, then, which needs to be minimized, but 
rather lack of epistemic warrant.   
But so understood, the distance between the Principle of Correspondence and 
the Principle of Coherence may seem to blur.  After all, the former turns out to 
concern coherence in accordance with norms as much as t e latter.  To retain a 
distinction, one might try to appeal to the fact that in the case of Correspondence the 
relevant norms are epistemic whereas in the case of Coherence they are rational.  But 
epistemology, at least insofar as it concerns relations of justification among beliefs 
(inference), pretty clearly overlaps with theoretical rationality.  Ultimately, then, it 
                                                
38 Davidson’s interpretationism, of course, is an account only of propositional attitudes.  Unless he 
holds that mental states which are not propositional attitudes are somehow dependent on those which 
are, there seems no bar to Davidsonian charity (and, hence, his account of attribution of the attitudes) 




appears, Davidsonian charity seems to reduce to a single principle, which involves 
assessing the degree of coordination entailed by interpretations among beliefs, 
desires, cognitive mental states other than attitudes, and an agent’s circumstances, in 
respect of both practical and theoretical rationality (as well as epistemology). 
A Few More Interpretative Questions   
Various interpretative questions, however, can be raised about the picture of 
Davidsonian charity I have just sketched.  First, there is a question how well-defined 
charity constraints are on Davidson’s accounting.  Davidson himself writes, “It is 
uncertain to what extent these principles [i.e., “the rules for deciding where 
agreement most needs to be taken for granted”] can be made definite—it is the 
problem of rationalizing and codifying our epistemology” (2004e, 157).   Indeed, 
given Davidsonian charity’s dependence on principles of epistemic warrant (and of 
rationality), our current uncertainty as to the specific and even general character of 
such norms is bound to impart a certain indefiniteness to charity proposals.  But even 
if our ignorance in this respect were abolished, there would still be a matter of 
spelling out the calculus to be used in assessing the extent to which candidate 
interpretations achieve epistemic and rational coherence.  Such assessment, of course, 
is a pre-requisite for settling which interpretation s maximizing (Maximization 
Principle), and whether any even meet minimal requirements for agency (Threshold 
Principle).39  In advance of precisifying the principle of charity, as Hans-Johann 
Glock notes, “charity becomes vacuous” (Glock 2003, 196). 
                                                
39 There is the additional important requirement of specifying at just what level the threshold is to be 
set.  Davidson writes, “Making sense of the utterance and behaviour of others . . . requires us to find a 





Is a Requirement of Agreement Retained? 
Question might be raised, moreover, whether Davidson, despite his revision of 
the Principle of Correspondence in the direction of epistemic coherence rather than 
truth or agreement, does not assign some role to the la ter, nonetheless.  In (2001g) 
where Davidson first explicitly characterizes Correspondence in epistemological 
terms, he still claims “what must be counted in favour of a method of interpretation is 
that it puts the interpreter in general agreement with the speaker” (2001g, 169).  This 
might suggest that both epistemic coherence and agreement are to be weighed n 
applying Davidson’s Principle of Correspondence.40  However, in his “Introduction” 
to (2001b), Davidson expresses agreement with David Lewis that “Charity prompts 
the interpreter to maximize the intelligibility of the speaker, not sameness of belief” 
(2001c, xix).  Moreover, by eliminating agreement from the purview of charity 
altogether, aside from avoiding—at least some—counterexamples of the sort that 
Grandy presents to charity, Davidson would seem to escape one of the perennial 
objections to interpretationist theories such as his. 
As John Heil points out, an interpretationism like Davidson’s appear subject 
to a regress problem.  Such a theory seems to make the activity of interpretation part 
of the constitutive conditions of a mind’s possessing propositional attitudes.  Heil 
writes, 
The activity of interpretation itself, however, evidently involves interpreters’ 
possessing propositional attitudes themselves.  This points toward a 
regress . . . :  my propositional attitudes depend on your interpreting me; your 
propositional attitudes depend on someone interpreting you; that someone’s 
                                                
40 Evnine, despite appreciating the role of epistemic coherence in Davidsonian charity, implies that 
Davidson retains a place for agreement as well: “The point about interpreting people so that they come 
out believing truths, by the interpreter’s lights (i.e. the Principle of Charity narrowly conceived), is 




propositional attitudes depend on some further someone; and so on.  How 
could such a process get off the ground?  (2004, 152). 
 
But some care is required in considering the justice of this criticism as it 
touches Davidson’s theory.  It is true that Davidson’  accounts of language and of the 
attitudes is shot through with references to ‘interpr tation’ (he even labels his method 
for treating language, for example, ‘radical interpr tation’, after all.)  He couches 
these accounts in terms of the conditions which must be met for an interpretation of 
one’s language or of one’s attitudes to be acceptable.  But ‘interpretation’ here is little 
more than a synonym of ‘theory’, I think, and introduces no more danger of a regress 
into Davidson’s account than would employment of the latter word.  Where a danger 
of a regress does arise is specifically with respect to the role of charity in Davidson’s 
account.  If the conditions for the acceptability of a theory of a subject’s language or 
attitudes depends on meeting charity constraints, ad ascertaining whether those 
constraints are met presupposes possession of a theory of one’s own attitudes—as 
would be the case if Davidsonian Correspondence charity were a matter of 
agreement—then we would indeed be off on a regress.  But if charity constraints 
make no reference to an interpreter’s attitudes, as Davidson’s revised principle of 
charity appears not to, then this risk of a regress is headed off.41  Perhaps this 
consideration lends further credence to the reading of Davidsonian Correspondence as 
dispensing with a requirement of agreement among interpreted and interpreter 
altogether. 
                                                
41 Granted, the resulting account of attribution will involve implicit reference to the norms governing 
the various kinds of attitudes, and so there will be implicit reference to those kinds of mental states.  




Could an Interpretationist Substitute Humanity for Charity?   
As I have suggested, I believe that the evidence mostly suggests that 
Davidson’s revision of Correspondence charity stops short of a full-fledged principle 
of humanity, in that he limits the relevant relations among attitudes, world, etc., to 
normative ones.  It is illuminating, however, to consider whether it would, in 
principle, be open to an interpretationist like Davidson to adopt Grandy’s humanity 
principle.  First, it should be noted that the context in which Grandy proposes 
humanity as an improvement upon charity is different from that in which Davidson 
would have to employ it.  For Grandy (1973), unlike Davidson, is concerned only 
with the presuppositions of radical translation, not with the methodology of the 
ascription of propositional attitudes as well.  Thus, in spelling out the method of 
translation, he can take psychological ascription for granted in a way that Davidson 
cannot. 
Moreover, it may be that employment of humanity presupposes psychological 
ascription and, therefore, cannot serve as a constrai t upon it, on pain of circularity.  
This, in any case, is the view of Glock.  As noted (see p. 73 above), application of 
humanity requires attentiveness to a speaker’s “situation.”  For example, humanity 
dictates that one not translate a speaker as agreeing with one with respect to some 
particular belief if their situation is such as to afford no acceptable explanation for 
their having that belief.  But Glock observes, “the principle of humanity faces an 
obstacle.  How can we establish what the natives’ po ition is, in advance of 
understanding any of their beliefs and desires?” (2003, 197).  His point is that 




without circularity serve in an interpretationist account of ascription such as 
Davidson’s. 
Some caution, however, is needed before accepting Glock’s verdict in this 
regard.  Glock seems to hold that application of humanity involves “crediting them 
[i.e., natives] with the beliefs and desires we would have had, if we had been in their 
position” (2003, 196).  But, since their ‘position’ i volves their attitudes, a temporal 
and logical priority of attribution is built into application of the principle.  This, I 
think, can be questioned.  As I have emphasized, what seems genuinely essential to 
humanity is “the condition that the imputed pattern of relations among beliefs, 
desires, and the world be as similar to our own as possible” (1973, 443).  But to 
assess candidate interpretations with respect to how well they fulfill this condition, 
does not obviously involve any obvious prior determination of natives’ attitudes.42  
Instead, it presupposes determining their situation in the world and seeing how well 
the attitudes postulated by particular interpretations cohere with one another and their 
situation so understood.  If an interpretation fulfills the condition humanity sets, then 
the attitudes we would have (or actions we would unertake) “if we would have been 
in their position” (where this now includes their other attitudes) will allow us to make 
fairly reliable predictions about them.  But this takes place after having made a 
humanity-based ascription of attitudes, not as a pre-condition of it.   
 Nonetheless, there are potential problems for a Davidsonian employment of a 
full-blooded principle of humanity in the not-too-distant offing.  These concern the 
epistemological status of knowledge of the similarity of the relations among sets of 
attitudes and with the world to one’s own.  Grandy himself would, presumably, 
                                                




appeal to the deliverances of a faculty of simulation as the source of this knowledge 
(cf. Grandy 1973, 443).  But aside from locating the source of this knowledge in a 
mysterious black box, this move re-instates the regress problem that Davidson’s 
revision of Correspondence charity appeared to dissolve.  For reading the output of 
one’s simulator, so to speak, is itself an instance of attribution, self-attribution of 
beliefs about the coherence of attitude, etc.  So attributing attitudes to others would 
presuppose their attribution in one’s own case.43  Because of simulation’s 
mysteriousness and the risk of regress it gives ris to, an interpretationist of 
Davidson’s sort should, I think, avoid appeal to it.  
 Instead of appealing to simulation, could a Davidsonian rely on an (at least 
partly) non-normative theory of the relations among “beliefs, desires, and world”?  If 
this is conceived as an empirical theory, then the obstacle is readily apparent.  The a 
posteriori confirmation of such a theory would presuppose having undertaken 
abundant attributions of attitudes.  So, on pain of circularity, an account of attribution 
should not appeal to knowledge of such an empirical theory.  Perhaps a Davidsonian 
could instead rely on a theory which was  priori.  The idea is that it might be (partly) 
constitutive of the concepts of belief and desire that hey (generally) be related in 
certain non-normative ways among themselves and with the world.44  So, in principle, 
it appears that an interpretationist like Davidson c uld adopt Grandy’s humanity 
principle.  But, as noted, there is little textual evidence for ascribing such a view to 
                                                
43 Grandy himself can afford insouciance in this regad, since unlike Davidson, he is not concerned to 
give an account of psychological attribution.  Davidson himself, one would think, needs to be more 
careful not to presuppose knowledge of one’s own attitudes. 
44 A theory known as ‘analytic’ or ‘a priori functionalism’ takes the view of belief and desire described 




Davidson (and, indeed, other prominent normativists).  Accordingly, I shall not take it 
as the target for my arguments against normativism in subsequent chapters.45    
 An issue, though, is whether Davidson’s revised charity principle, in which 
Correspondence is re-interpreted in terms of respecting epistemological norms, can 
really do the work that he asks of it.  As mentioned (see p. 76 above), Davidson’s 
revision of charity is prompted, at least in part, by a desire to allow “intelligible error” 
and do justice to Grandy’s insight that “the importance of agreement is proportional 
to obviousness.”  Success in this would seem to depend, then, on whether errors are 
sufficiently explainable (and obviousness cashable ) in normative-epistemological 
terms.  Davidson’s statement that “everything we know or believe about the way 
evidence supports belief can be put to work in deciding where the theory can best 
allow error” (cf. p. 76 above) suggests that he believ s this to be the case.  Whether 
this is plausible is an issue to which I shall retun subsequently.  In any case, that 
Davidson’s revision of his Correspondence principle extends the ambit of charity 
beyond properly rational norms so as to include epist mological ones as well, will be 
critical in assessing the success of my arguments against Davidsonian charity in later 
chapters.  
Arguments for Charity 
 As we have seen, all charity principles are not created equal.  Some, such as 
Davidson’s initial Correspondence principle, seem to have deficiencies, prompting 
proponents of charity to seek more acceptable altern ive formulations.  These 
                                                
45 Of course, a view based on humanity is, at best, mi leadingly labeled a ‘normativism’.  For, in 
general, humanity does not assume that the typical relations among beliefs, desires, and the world 
possess a normative character, although specific proponents of humanity principles could hold that 




alternatives are perhaps more defensible to the extent that they avoid the defects of 
the simpler versions.  But we have yet to consider what can be said by way of defense 
of charity principles (or, more properly, normativism) in general.  Thus, I next 
consider what proponents of normativism have had to say in support of that view.  On 
balance, normativists offer remarkably little in the way of argument for their view, 
and such arguments as they do advance, I point out, d  not hold up under scrutiny. 
Quine’s Arguments 
 The dearth of argument for normativism is most conspicuous in the case of 
Quine.  In Word and Object, Quine’s ‘justification’ of his principle of charity seems 
limited to two sorts of things: (1) consideration of a few cases where intuitions might 
seem to support its application (for example, he observes that when someone answers 
‘Yes and no’ to a question, we assume that the “the queried sentence is meant 
differently in the affirmation and the negation,” not that they are affirming and 
denying the same proposition [1960, 59]); and (2) an appeal to commonsense (“The 
common sense behind the maxim [i.e., the principle of charity] is that one’s 
interlocutor’s silliness, beyond a certain point, is less likely than bad translation” 
[1960, 59]).  However, we can grant Quine that we are inclined, among other things, 
to translate so as not to attribute crass contradictions, indeed, that this inclination 
perhaps has a basis in “commonsense” along the lines he suggests.  But that does not 
necessarily mean that that commonsense insight amounts to anything like an a priori 
constitutive constraint on belief.  It could just a well represent recognition of the fact 
that people’s degree of “silliness,” as a matter of a posteriori, empirical fact, is 




the “commonsense” underlying his maxim suggests a defeasibility that runs directly 
counter to the sort of strict, constitutive charity principle which, I have argued in Ch. 
1, Quine ultimately champions.   So Quine’s discussion of charity in Word and Object 
does little to support normativism.46 
Davidson’s Arguments 
 Davidson’s efforts to support charity, by contrast with Quine’s, are a bit more 
substantial. 
An Argument for Correspondence Charity 
One line of argument proceeds as follows (2001g, 168-69).  Davidson derives 
(1) Correspondence charity (for a given speaker “most beliefs are correct”) from the 
premise (2) that a belief can have a particular subject matter (“object in, or aspect of, 
the world”) only if one’s beliefs about that subject matter are predominately true 
(“False beliefs tend to undermine the identification of the subject matter”).  He 
endeavors to support this premise, in turn, by consideration of an example: (3) It is 
not clear to us that the ancients can be said to have believed that the earth is flat, since 
they lacked so many true beliefs about the earth (that “ his earth of ours is part of the 
solar system, a system identified by the fact that it is a gaggle of large, cool, solid 
bodies circling around a very large, hot star . . .,” etc.).47  It follows, further, from (1) 
                                                
46 At (1986, 82), Quine’s defense of charity consists in asking, “We have to base translation on some 
kind of evidence and what better?”  Similarly, at (1960, 58), he asks “Not to be dogmatic about it, what 
criterion might one prefer?”  This poses a legitimate challenge to opponents of normativism to 
articulate and defend an alternative conception of the propositional attitudes (and of translation) not 
based on a priori presuppositions of rationality, etc.  The prospects of success in this, however, may 
not be nearly as bleak as Quine assumes.     
47 There is some complexity here that I am eliding.  Davidson, it appears, suggests that the ancients’ 
lack of many characteristic beliefs about the earth calls in question their having believed that the earth 
is flat because it calls into question whether their b lief is about the earth (in the d  re sense).  He 
writes, “how clear are we that the ancients—some ancients—believed that the earth was flat?  This 
earth?” (2001, 169).  Of course, uncertainty of refe nce would yield uncertainty that they shared our 




that (4) a theory of interpretation can be correct only if it is generally “the case that a 
sentence is true when a speaker holds it to be.” 
 What are we to make of this argument?  Well, Correspondence charity, (1), 
follows from (2), and, ignoring quibbles, (4) follows from (1).  So the real question is 
whether Davidson’s example adequately establishes the truth of the key premise, (2), 
and, if not, whether the truth of (2) is otherwise readily apparent.  That the example 
does little to establish (2) becomes evident once the distinction between uncertainty 
and indeterminacy is borne in mind.  One can concede to Davidson that the ancients’ 
lack of many characteristic beliefs about the earth contributes to some uncertainty, 
psychological or epistemological, on our part as to whether the ancients can truly be 
said to have had a belief that the earth is flat.  But (2), rather, plainly concerns the 
(degree of) determinacy with which individual’s posse s beliefs concerning a 
particular subject matter.  For (3) to provide any real support for (2), it would have to 
be the case that uncertainty entailed indeterminacy.  But that is far from the case.  Our 
uncertainty as to the truth of Goldbach’s conjecture, of course, in no way diminishes 
the determinacy of the truth of either that propositi n or its contradiction. 
 Nor is the truth of (2) something that can be readily accepted as 
uncontroversial.  For the trend in much theory of refe ence of recent decades has been 
to relax the dependence of linguistic—and, by extension, psychological—reference 
on an individual’s possessing veridical information about a locution (or concept’s) 
referent.  Thus, though a descriptive theory of prope  names like Searle’s picks out 
                                                                                                                                 
either that they believed that the earth is flat (in the de dicto sense).  My feeling, however, is that there 
is relatively greater temptation to doubt that the ancients shared our concept arth than there is to 
doubt that they had a belief about the earth and its fla ness (in the de re sense).  But even the latter 
doubt is perhaps non-negligible.  ‘Earth’ in the mouths of ancients might be compared to ‘phlogiston’ 




the referent of a proper name in terms of an individual’s maximally satisfying 
descriptions predicated of that proper name, thereby tying reference to truth, a causal 
theory like Kripke’s (at least for proper names and natural kind terms) appears to 
divorce reference from truth.  Granted, if the sphere of application of such causal 
theories were relatively narrow, their truth, although qualifying Davidson’s premise, 
would not seriously undermine it.  But many proponents of such theories cast their 
net quite widely.  So the truth of (2) is quite contr versial, and, consequently, 
Davidson’s use of it renders his argument for Correspondence charity unavailing. 
 It is worth noting, moreover, the limited scope of the argument’s conclusion, 
even if it had succeeded in proving that conclusion.  First, it concerns 
Correspondence charity alone, not Coherence charity.  Granted, that truths 
predominate among one’s beliefs entails a certain degree of coherence among one’s 
beliefs, inasmuch as truths cannot contradict each other.48  But it has no implications 
at all for practical rationality, which is supposed to be included in the domain of 
Davidson’s Coherence charity.  Moreover, with respect to theoretical rationality, 
                                                
48 It is possible, however, that Davidson would see its implications with respect to theoretical 
rationality as greater than this.   Davidson’s view that “a belief is identified by its location in a p ttern 
of beliefs” and that this pattern “determines the subject matter of the belief” (2001g, 168) might 
suggest that he would hold that a belief’s logical content is similarly dependent on the presence of an 
appropriate pattern of beliefs.  So perhaps one cannot have a belief involving some logical operator 
like conjunction, a belief of the form p & q without having the beliefs p and q separately.  That is, in 
general, he might be inclined to hold that having beliefs generally requires believing their deductive 
consequences.  This would extend the implications of the conclusion of Davidson’s argument for 
theoretical rationality beyond mere consistency.  Perhaps Davidson might even take the relevant 
patterning to include not just what background beliefs exist but the inferential relations among beliefs 
as well.  In that case, Davidson’s view here might seem to entail that most of one’s deductive 
inferences be valid as well (it is difficult to see how one could derive implications for non-deductive 
inferential relations).  However, my discussion in the text is concerned only with the implications of 




though it entails some statal rationality (consistency),49 it entails nothing with respect 
to procedural rationality, such as the propriety of one’s logical inferences.        
 Moreover, even with respect to Correspondence charity, Davidson’s 
conclusion does not seem to deliver quite everything that Davidson would want.  For 
it seems to concern only that part of Correspondence having to do with the truth of 
one’s beliefs, not that having to do with the observance of epistemological norms 
governing warrant.  As my reading of Davidson’s revis d Correspondence principle 
suggests, Davidson appears to intend that principle to r quire, not just that an agent’s 
beliefs be mostly true, but that they have been mostly formed in ways that confer 
epistemological warrant on them.  The former, however, does not entail the latter.  
However unlikely, it would seem logically possible for someone to have mostly true 
beliefs which lack warrant because formed in epistemologically dubious fashion.50  
Moreover, Davidson appears oblivious to the fact tha e conclusion of his argument 
partakes only of the character of a Threshold Principle, asserting that the proportion 
of an agent’s beliefs which are true cannot fall below a certain (high) level.  In no 
way does it amount to a Maximization Principle, enjoi ing one to prefer that 
interpretation which renders the largest proportion of speakers’ utterances true.   But 
it is precisely Maximization charity which Davidson wishes to rely on for 
methodological purposes.51  So his argument falls short of the mark in numerous 
ways. 
                                                
49 Even here, it does not encompass relations of non-deductive coherence among beliefs. 
50 Conversely, it appears logically possible that some ne could be so singularly ill-situated that most of 
their beliefs, though warranted, are false.  So the two sides of Davidson’s revised Correspondence 
principle are logically independent.  
51 Davidson himself, just after presenting his argument, refers to Maximization as “the basic 
methodological precept” (2001g, 169).  He appears not to notice the distance between the argument’s 




A Transcendental Argument 
 A second line of argument, for which some commentators find evidence in 
Davidson, appeals to charity, both Correspondence ad Coherence, as a necessary 
condition or transcendental requirement for radical interpretation.52  Lepore and 
Ludwig summarize the argument as follows: 
(1) Interpretation from the standpoint of the radicl interpreter is possible. 
(2) If interpretation from the standpoint of the radical interpreter is possible, 
then the principle of charity is true. 
(3) Therefore, the principle of charity is true.  (2005, 204)53 
We have already seen (p. 58 above) that Davidson appeals to charity as a 
methodological device which is supposed to make it possible for the radical 
interpreter to confirm interpretations.  If the commentators are right, his view is that 
charity is not only sufficient for this purpose (inthe presence of certain other a priori 
and empirical constraints) but necessary, in that no other methodologically adequate 
expedient would be available to the radical interprter.  Whether recourse to charity is 
necessary (or even whether it is sufficient) for radic l interpretation is something on 
which I shall venture no opinion.54  But even if the second premise could be 
conceded, the first would itself be far from obvious.  It is by no means clear that 
interpretation purely on the basis of such evidence as is available to the radical 
interpreter is possible.  Barring extreme skepticism, one must grant that interpretation 
is a quotidian event.  But ordinary interpretation is ot restricted in its evidential 
                                                
52 Perhaps Davidson implicitly makes the argument in the following passage (2004e, 157): “Further 
interpretation requires the assumption of further agreement between speaker and interpreter.  The 
assumption is certainly justified, the alternative being that the interpreter finds the speaker 
unintelligible.” 
53 (Glock 2003, 195) seems to find much the same argument in Davidson.  
54 An interesting question, however, is whether an appe l might be made to a principle of humanity 




bases as is radical interpretation.  As Ludwig (2004, 354) points out, “We can appeal 
to knowledge of features of our own psychological type and to the fact that in practice 
others whom we want to interpret are conspecifics embodied in the same way we are 
and in similar environments, to infer with some plausibility the sorts of things they 
are apt to be thinking, in order to constrain our interpretations.”  So the fact of 
interpretation does not entail the fact of radical interpretation.  Since the very 
possibility of radical interpretation is far from obvious, the soundness of Davidson’s 
argument for charity founded upon it is equally so.55    
 In a sense, it may not be altogether incumbent on Davidson to give anything 
like a traditional formal philosophical argument for his principle of charity.  It might 
be enough if his account of the propositional attitudes, with its normativist 
underpinnings, were over the long run to prove the best explanation of the relevant 
phenomena by comparison with other initially plausible philosophical accounts of the 
attitudes.  That is, perhaps the truth of Davidson’ i terpretativism and its attendant 
normativism can be established by an inference to the best explanation.56  However, 
on any account of abduction, the most central good-making property of a theory is its 
explanatoriness, roughly, the degree to which, on the assumption of its truth, it would 
lead one to expect the occurrence of phenomena in the relevant domain.  In effect, my 
argument of later chapters can be viewed as suggestin  that normativist theories like 
Davidson’s quite crassly violate the requirements of explanatoriness in that they 
entail the scientific impossibility of what are clearly possible phenomena.  So, 
                                                
55 In fact, if radical interpretation has the implication that intentionality is indeterminate, as 
Davidson—following Quine—maintains, that itself should constitute some grounds to question the 
possibility of justified radical interpretation, given the prima facie determinacy of our thoughts.  




although I am sympathetic to the employment of inference to the best explanation as 
an argumentative strategy with respect to issues in the philosophy of mind and 
elsewhere, I hold that this strategy ultimately redounds to the detriment of 
normativism, not in its favor.  
An Argument from Dennett  
Some commentators find a separate line of argument for ormativism in 
Daniel Dennett’s work.  Dennett, clearly a proponent of normativism,57 gives an 
instrumentalist account of the propositional attitudes.  To possess attitudes is, on his 
view, to be an intentional system, “a system whose behavior can be (at least 
sometimes) explained and predicted by relying on ascriptions to the system of beliefs 
and desires (and hopes, fears, intentions, hunches, . . .)” (1971, 87).  Thus, Dennett 
intimately connects possession of the attitudes to the pragmatic values of 
explanability and predictability.  Moreover, Dennett takes for granted that 
explanations and predictions in terms of the attitudes will be rationality-based: “One 
predicts behavior in such a case by ascribing to the system the possession of certain 
information and by supposing it to be directed by certain goals, and then by working 
out the most reasonable or appropriate action on the basis of these ascriptions and 
suppositions” (1971, 90).  It would seem to follow, then, that possession of the 
attitudes by a system for Dennett requires at least th t degree of adherence to rational 
norms (Coherence) as will permit some explanation or prediction in accordance with 
                                                




them.  So the argument, if successful, establishes a Threshold Principle for 
Coherence.58 
But just how high a threshold would it establish?  In order to answer this 
question as well as to consider whether the argument succeeds, it will be helpful 
briefly to examine the version of normativism Christopher Cherniak expounds in his 
Minimal Rationality (1986).  Cherniak’s normativist outlook comes to the fore even 
in the first sentence of that work: “The most basic law of psychology is a rationality 
constraint on an agent’s beliefs, desires, and actions: No rationality, no agent.” (1986, 
3).  He makes it clear that he is “concerned with rationality conditions on belief sets 
and on the believer’s deductive abilities,” which he regards as “necessary conditions 
on agenthood” (1986, 5).59  Moreover, it is clear that he accepts the necessity of 
charity constraints on much the same basis as does Dennett.  He describes a theory of 
belief (the “assent theory of belief”) which places no rationality constraints on agents: 
“A believes all and only those statements that A would affirm” (1986, 6).  Cherniak 
                                                
58 A distinct line of thought in Dennett, which superficially might seem to be directed towards 
establishing normativism, on closer inspection is seen to level at a different, although related, 
conclusion.  Dennett appears to hold that in enviroments in which natural selection operates, 
organisms will be explainable from the intentional st nce, and so whatever amount of charity such 
explainability entails will apply to them (cf. 1971, 92-93).  Thus, human beings’ conformity to such 
charity is given by the a posteriori fact that they have been formed as a species in an environment in 
which natural selection operates.  This conclusion falls short of normativism in two respects.  At best it 
establishes that charity is a constraint on human bei gs (and other organisms) which have developed in 
this environment, not that charity is a constraint o  possession of the attitudes.  Moreover, Dennett’s 
line of thought establishes its conclusion only a posteriori, whereas normativism, as I have defined the 
notion, regards charity as an  priori constraint.  
59 Cherniak’s reference to charity, in effect, as a “law of psychology” might suggest that he regards 
charity as undergirded by an empirical generalization about agents’ rationality.  In that case, his view 
would not properly count as normativist.  However, Cherniak emphasizes that although “rationality 
conditions perhaps are not usefully regarded as ‘definitional’, they must be distinguished from 
empirical generalizations about human psychology.”  He writes, further, that they “have a centrality in 
a cognitive theory, such that they could not be rejct d on the basis of just some supposedly contrary 
‘data’ (1986, 27).  Thus, Cherniak appears to accept something like Quine’s rejection of the analytic-
synthetic distinction and accord the principle of charity the status that Quine and other adherents of 
charity influenced by him seem obliged to assign it, amely, that of a principle possessing “centrality” 
in the ‘web of belief’.  Accordingly, like Quine, Davidson, et. al., Cherniak can be comfortably 




rejects this theory essentially because of its lackof explanatoriness: “A cognitive 
theory with no rationality restrictions is without predictive content” as to “a believer’s 
behavior” (1986, 6).  Such a theory, he maintains, would deprive one of an adequate 
evidential basis for making attributions of the propositional attitudes; and it renders 
mysterious our ability to make successful predictions n the basis of such attributions. 
Cherniak, however, is quite explicit that such requirements of predictiveness 
only ground a moderate normativism.  He holds that for both “everyday 
psychological explanations of behavior” and for “cognitive theory,” what is required 
is what he calls “minimal, as distinguished from ideal, rationality” (1986, 3).  
Whereas an ideal rationality, broadly, requires an agent to undertake all actions and 
inferences appropriate to their belief-desire set (and to refrain from all that are 
inappropriate to it), minimal rationality demands only that they undertake (refrain 
from) some.60  Cherniak supports this weaker constraint by means of “exhaustion of a 
trichotomy” (1986, 8-9): (1) Because human beings are finite beings with finite 
cognitive and temporal resources, they could not satisfy a requirement of ideal 
rationality.  Imposition of such a constraint would have the unacceptable implication 
of making cognitive theory inapplicable to human beings.  (2) As argued above, if 
agents were subject to no charity constraint at all, hen this would unacceptably 
undermine the predictive power of belief- and desire-attribution.  Accordingly, (3), 
agents must be subject to a requirement of minimal rationality. 
 So Cherniak, sharing Dennett’s insistence on the nec ssity of charity 
constraints to assure the explanatoriness of attribu ion of the attitudes, argues to a 
                                                
60 Similarly, ideal rationality requires weeding out all inconsistencies from one’s belief-set, whereas 




Threshold principle which sets the bar for possession of the attitudes below the level 
of perfect rationality.  He holds that explanatoriness can be assured with a 
requirement of mere minimal rationality.  But it is worth noting that as Cherniak 
specifies the contrast between ideal and minimal ration lity, Davidsonian charity 
actually might seem to constitute a species of minial rationality.  For Davidson does 
not require perfect rationality of an agent, rather, merely a large degree of 
rationality.61  Though Davidson, unlike Cherniak, might not have recognized the bar 
to perfect rationality for finite creatures which Cerniak emphasizes, the threshold 
Davidson sets for agency seems to fall in the range of minimal rationality.  Moreover, 
as Cherniak himself acknowledges (cf.1986, 18-20), his minimal-rationality 
constraint is vague inasmuch as he does not specify a definite cut-off point for agency 
in the range between zero and perfect rationality. If minimal rationality suffices to 
guarantee explanatoriness and predictiveness, as Cherniak holds it does, then one 
would think that a reasonably high degree of adherence to rational norms would be 
required.  Otherwise, predictions based on such norms will usually fail, and surely it 
is a requirement of genuine explanation that an explanans should predict its 
explanandum with a high degree of probability.  Indeed, Cherniak himself evidently 
holds that the determinateness of one’s qualifying as an agent is in proportion to one’s 
degree of rationality.  So, on closer inspection, Cherniak’s view of charity seems to 
merge with Davidson’s.62 
                                                
61 Cherniak exhibits some tendency to view Davidson as, in fact, requiring perfect rationality (1986, 
17-18), but, as noted above (p. 70), I think the bulk of the textual evidence counts against such a 
reading of Davidsonian charity. 
62 Cherniak, however, appears to understand the sort of quantification involved in assessing whether a 
potential agent meets minimal requirements differently than does Davidson in at least one respect.  




 But how successful is Cherniak’s (and, thus, Dennett’s) argument for his view 
of charity?  Overall, I think not very.  I believe one can grant the first premise of his 
trichotomy argument, that agents are not subject to a requirement of perfect 
rationality for the reason he cites: that such a requir ment would debar finite creatures 
like human beings from counting as agents.  Moreover, if one grants his second 
premise, that agents must be subject to some charity constraint, his conclusion that 
they are subject to a minimal rationality constraint would be unavoidable.  So the 
issue is whether the second premise must be conceded. 
 As noted, Cherniak grounds his second premise, the requirement of some 
rationality constraint, on the necessity that attribution of the attitudes make possible 
prediction and explanation.  He supports this necessity, in turn, on the need to have an 
adequate evidential basis for attribution, and the ne d to do justice to our apparent 
success in making predictions on the basis of attributions.  Let us grant for the 
moment that it is, in fact, crucial that attribution allow prediction and explanation.  
Nonetheless, it is not clear that this entails anythi g like a charity constraint as this is 
ordinarily understood.  For, in the first place, it seems enough to guarantee the 
predictive and explanatory power of attribution if most agents should be largely 
rational.  Their behavior could be predicted by applying rational norms to their set of 
beliefs and desires, even if such prediction failed in the case of a minority of oddballs 
                                                                                                                                 
of token rational inferences (actions, etc.), Cherniak seems to wish to do so on the basis of the 




who exhibited a significant degree of irrationality.63  So predictiveness, it seems, can 
be had without a charity principle binding on all agents. 
 Moreover, it is not at all clear that the basis of intentional prediction and 
explanation of agents need be (wholly) normative in character.  For, as we saw (p. 72 
above), Grandy shares Dennett’s (and Cherniak’s) emphasis on prediction and 
explanation of behavior as the pragmatic point of attribution.  But Grandy, unlike 
Dennett, appeals to humanity rather than charity as rendering such prediction and 
explanation possible.  As I have pointed out, humanity requires only that the relations 
among attitudes (and the world) be “as similar to our own as possible” (Grandy 1973, 
443).  In general, there is no assumption that these r lations are normative, and, thus, 
none that the intentional prediction and explanation heir obtaining make possible are 
normative in character.  Cherniak himself evidently includes non-normative 
psychological principles in addition to normative ones as constraining attribution.  He 
writes, “the minimal rationality conditions in everyday practice are embedded in a 
broad range of other cognitive psychological theoris that fill in where the minimal 
agent’s behavior will depart from ideal rationality” (1986, 55).  He regards these non-
normative theories as enshrined in commonsense psychology, enjoying a status as 
central as that enjoyed by normative principles.  But the acknowledgement of such 
non-normative principles opens up the—at least theoretical—possibility that 
predictiveness could be afforded by such principles rather than by normative ones, a 
fact which calls into question the soundness of Cherniak’s inference from the 
necessity of predictiveness to a principle of charity.  
                                                
63 Put another way: Once it is granted—as one must—that explanation and prediction need not be on 





 Further, Cherniak seems to assume that the principles, whether normative or 
non-normative, which render the attribution of attitudes predictive need to have a 
quasi-constitutive character.64  But why cannot the predictive import of a theory f 
the attitudes instead be a matter of a posteriori, empirical generalizations whose 
confirmation the theory makes possible?  Cherniak, apparently, makes a tacit 
assumption that predictive content needs to be, as it were, written into the theory of 
the attitudes itself, or else there will not be a sufficient basis for attribution.  Indeed, if 
the possibility of attribution is undercut, the very possibility of confirming empirical 
generalizations in which the attitudes figure will be undercut.  But it seems that the 
possibility of attribution of the attitudes can be allowed for without building 
predictive content directly into the theory of the attitudes.  A Kripkean, scient fic 
essentialist theory of the attitudes, such as an a posteriori functionalism, would—one 
would think—allow attribution to proceed on the basis of rough-and-ready reference-
fixing descriptions of the attitudes (laying no claim to being quasi-constitutive),65 and 
it would allow generalizations which permit reliable predictions on the basis of the 
attitudes to emerge only a posteriori.  If such a scientific essentialism has seemed 
promising with respect to other scientific domains, then why not with respect to 
psychology as well?  I conclude, then, that Cherniak’s rgument for normativism, 
just as the other typical arguments for normativism considered above, fails to 
establish its conclusion. 
                                                
64 This is apparent in his remark that “A cognitive th ory [i.e., a philosophical theory of the attitudes] 
with no rationality restrictions is without predictive content; using it, we can have virtually no 
expectations regarding a believer’s behavior” (1986, 6).  
65 Similarly, one can have considerable success in ide tifying specimens of gold and other minerals in 





The upshot is that normativism—whether of Quine’s, Davidson’s, or 
Dennett’s sort—is left with little in the way of positive support.  More needs to be 
said, however, by way of rounding out the picture of Davidsonian charity that I have 




Chapter Three: Normativism and Modules, Prima 
Facie  Objections 
Introduction 
 Although Davidson’s explicit discussions of charity advert to principles of the 
sort that I have treated hitherto—namely, Maximizing and Threshold Principles—in 
the present chapter I shall highlight charity principles of a different sort that Davidson 
appears to embrace, albeit somewhat less explicitly than he does the aforementioned 
principles.  These principles, which I shall refer to as the Competence and 
Compartment Principles, respectively, appear to underlie Davidson’s account of 
familiar forms of irrationality like akrasia and self-deception in such papers as 
(2004c) and (2004a).  That account sees a need to posit sub-divisions of the mind in 
order to allow for irrational mental processes and ctivities.  Preparatory to 
developing my argument of Chapter Four, I shall find it helpful to discuss the relation 
of such Davidsonian compartments to the sorts of mental ‘modules’ that figure in 
much contemporary psychological theorizing.  Distinguishing among various 
conceptions of modules, I shall argue that the properties of one important sort of 
module bear directly on the tenability of Davidson’s Competence and Compartment 
Principles.  Last, I shall attempt to forestall certain objections that might be raised to 
my employment of the notion of modularity in arguing against normativism.  In sum, 
my goal here is to clarify the relevance of what might be called the mereology of the 




Additional Charity Principles 
 There is good reason to believe that Davidson advocates charity principles 
besides those which he enunciates in his articles of the ‘70s in which he sets out his 
account of radical interpretation.  These additional principles come to the fore in 
articles Davidson published in the ‘80s specifically concerning the topic of 
irrationality.  Ed Stein claims—I think rightly—to discover in Davidson (2004b) a 
principle of charity concerning an agent’s “reasoning competence” (Stein 1996, 
116n14).  Roughly, the principle makes a condition for their possessing propositional 
attitudes that for each rational norm, they embody a tendency to obey it.1  But to gain 
a proper appreciation of the principle Stein has in m d some discussion of the notion 
of competence is required. 
Competence and Performance 
 As Stein notes, the notion of a competence is closely associated with 
Chomskyan linguistics.  Chomsky distinguishes betwen a speaker’s linguistic 
performance, their actual linguistic behavior, and their linguistic competence, the 
(tacit) knowledge of linguistic rules—phonetic, grammatical, and semantic—which 
underlies and, along with other factors, serves to explain their linguistic behavior.2  
This distinction has the merit of accommodating the evident fact that one can have 
mastery of a language, knowledge of its rules, etc.and yet err in one’s linguistic 
performances, such as speech production, comprehension, and one’s intuitions about 
                                                
1 Stein speaks more narrowly of “principles of reasoning” because his focus is exclusively theoretical, 
but Davidson’s is not: If (2004b) contains a principle such as the one Stein identifies, it concerns all 
forms of rationality.  So it is appropriate to formulate it in terms of rational principles in general, as I 
have done here. 
2 A subtle question is whether the relevant knowledge should be thought of more on the model of 
‘knowledge how’ or ‘knowledge that’, i.e., propositional knowledge.  The word ‘competence’ itself is 





grammaticality.  Such performance errors are attribu a le to factors extraneous to 
one’s linguistic competence.  Stein distinguishes among factors that are “due to basic 
facts about the human condition” (such as “constrain s on processing time and 
memory”) and ones arising from one’s idiosyncratic s ate (for example, “lack of 
attention” owing to “an inadequate amount of sleep, excessive drug use, or 
excitedness” (1996, 40).3    
There is a complication that is glossed over by the simple identification of 
linguistic competence with tacit linguistic knowledge.  Namely, as Stein points out, 
there are various interpretations of what a competenc  is.  Aside from the 
interpretation of competence as a matter of knowledge, another viable interpretation 
sees it as the language-specific cognitive mechanisms which underlie one’s linguistic 
performance (1996, 53-55).  Whereas on the knowledge view competence is a matter 
of cognitive states, on the mechanism view it is more a matter of the cognitive 
processes, the transitions among psychological states which support language 
specifically.  These transitions are naturally thought of as ceteris paribus regularities, 
and, correspondingly, on this view performance errors are naturally viewed as 
divergences from these regularities owing to interfering factors, whether physical or 
psychological.   
What appears true of language, Stein points out, one might take to be true of 
reasoning as well.  One might see individual normative principles of reasoning like 
modus ponens as embodied in a rational competence, which is only imperfectly 
                                                
3 Stein designates the latter “situational” factors and the former “psychological” ones.  The latter 
designation is misleading since—as his examples themselves show—he clearly intends to include 
peculiarities of an individual’s psychological state (like lack of attention) among situational factors.   
Stein’s typology of the sources of performance error, then, appears substantially to cross-cut the 




manifested in one’s actual reasoning performance.  Again, this view would admit of 
either a knowledge or a mechanism interpretation.  O  the former, one’s reasoning 
competence would consist in one’s knowledge of principles of reasoning like modus 
ponens, whereas on the latter, it would reside in regularities holding true of one 
corresponding to principles of reasoning, such as th t if one believes p and q, as well 
as p, then, ceteris paribus, one infers q.4  Again, on the latter view, divergences from 
the normative principles of reasoning would be seen as performance errors 
attributable to outside factors interfering with the mechanism’s operation. 
Availing himself of this notion of competence, then, Stein attributes to 
Davidson a principle of charity according to which “t e principles of reasoning 
embodied in our reasoning competence” are “basically r tional” (1996, 116).   Let us 
call this charity principle Stein discovers in Davidson the Competence Principle.5  
Stein distinguishes strong and weak versions of this principle.  On the strong version, 
agents “should never be interpreted as irrational” in the sense that “all divergences 
from the normative principles of reasoning should be classified as performance 
errors” (1996, 116).  On the weak version, by contrast, agents should be seen as 
rational “unless there is strong empirical evidence to the contrary.”  However, the 
constitutive role charity plays in Davidson’s account of attribution places the weak 
version out of bounds for his purposes.6  Accordingly, I shall confine consideration to 
                                                
4 I suggest below that the mechanism interpretation m re nearly captures Davidson’s view. 
5 Stein—apparently correctly—further observes that tis entails what he calls the “rationality thesis,” 
that although “human beings can make errors in reasoning,” these are mere external interferences with 
an ideal rational competence (1996, 3).  This latter th sis, however, though relevant to Stein’s 
purposes, is not normativist in import, for Stein intends it to apply to human beings specifically andnot 
necessarily as a conceptual requirement.  Hence, I omit further consideration of it. 





whether the textual evidence supports Davidson’s adherence to a strong Competence 
Principle, or at least something closely approximatng it. 
Textual Evidence 
In (2004b), Davidson endorses a view of irrationality that sees it as a kind of 
“inner inconsistency” on the part of an agent (189).  Such a Humean conception is 
contemporary orthodoxy about what constitutes irrationality: it is a matter of a 
disharmony among one’s own attitudes and actions, and does not hinge on assessment 
relative to facts and values external to the agent.  But, more controversially, Davidson 
sees such inner inconsistency as, in some sense, involving a violation of the agent’s 
own standards of thought and conduct.  He writes, “It is only when beliefs are 
inconsistent with other beliefs according to principles held by the agent himself . . . 
that there is a clear case of irrationality” (2004b, 192).  Moreover, what he takes to be 
true of beliefs, he takes to hold quite generally of attitudes and actions. 
The dependence of irrationality on the individual, however, is attenuated by 
another facet of Davidson’s account of irrationality.  For Davidson holds that “all 
thinking creatures subscribe to my basic standards or norms of rationality” (2004b, 
195).  He maintains that a requirement for the possession of propositional attitudes at 
all is acceptance of “principles of decision theory”, “the basic principles of logic, the 
principle of total evidence for inductive reasoning, or the analogous principle of 
continence” (2004b, 195).  Now Davidson’s formulations at this point may suggest 
that he is committed to a Competence Principle, where the relevant competence 
consists in a stock of beliefs whose content corresponds to basic normative rational 
principles.   However, this reading is belied by Davidson’s observation that when an 




is, from his usual and best modes of thought and behavior” (2004b, 197).  Davidson 
suggests that for him to “have the fundamental values of rationality” is to “show 
much consistency in his thought and action.”  In these passages, Davidson clearly 
equates one’s “standards” to one’s patterns of thoug t and behavior, not to one’s 
normative beliefs. 
Moreover, Davidson insists that in a case of irrationality, “the views, values, 
and principles that create the conflict are at that moment all active tendencies or 
forces” (2004b, 197).  He maintains that “the elements that create the conflict” should 
not be viewed as “creating a merely statistical preponderance of the rational over the 
irrational.”  Rather, “all the beliefs, desires, inte tions, and principles of the agent that 
create the inconsistency are present at once and are in some sense in operation—are 
live psychic forces.”  So Davidson flatly denies that the agent’s necessary having the 
basic rational norms consists (merely) in their general conformity to the dictates of 
such principles.7  Rather, one’s having them is more a matter of exhibiting an active 
tendency to observe them.   Thus, he seems to commit hi self to the view that one’s 
possession of them consists in ceteris paribus regularities corresponding to the 
principles holding true of one.  Thus, with considerable plausibility, Davidson can be 
seen as subscribing to a Competence Principle, where one’s rational competence—as 
on the mechanism view—embodies ceteris paribus regularities corresponding to 
(basic) rational norms.8   
                                                
7 Perhaps Davidson does commit himself to an agent’s general observance of each individual basic 
rational norm.  If so, this would amount to an additional charity principle of Davidson’s.  It is not ne, 
however, that I wish to emphasize, if only because Davidson does not clearly advocate it. 
8 Is there reason to doubt that an agent can possess a normatively rational competence in the 
mechanism sense without possessing knowledge of normative principles too?  The existence of 




Clarification of a Few Points 
A proper appreciation of this principle, however, requires clarification of a 
few points.  First, any sort of mechanistic view may seem out of keeping with 
Davidson’s trademark doctrine of the anomalousness of the mental.9  But that 
doctrine specifically rejects only strict psychophysical (and psychopsychological) 
laws.  There is nothing in Davidson’s doctrine, or in his argument on its behalf , that 
would appear to commit him to the rejection of ceteris paribus laws of the sort bound 
up in the Competence Principle. 
A second point concerns Davidson’s apparent wish to distinguish between two 
kinds of principles of reasoning, basic and non-basic.10  Evidently, he only means his 
Competence Principle to apply to such principles of rationality as are basic.  
However, in this regard two issues immediately arise, (1), just what distinction 
Davidson intends to capture with this terminology, and, (2), whether Davidson has 
the resources in his account of attribution needed to draw the relevant distinction.  
With respect to the first, Davidson cannot, of course, simply identify basic principles 
of rationality as those to which agents generally adhere.  Rather, he needs to provide 
some handle on the relevant principles independent of their part in the Competence 
Principle itself if interpreters are going to be able to apply the Competence Principle 
in making attributions.11  So just what might Davidson mean by “basic principles of 
rationality”? 
                                                                                                                                 
without internal representations of the rules they observe suggests that a rational competence might 
well not require knowledge of normative principles.   
9 See (Davidson 1980c) for the classic statement of this doctrine. 
10 The passages from (Davidson 2004b, 195) quoted just above show this unmistakably.  Cf. also 
Davidson’s statement that the principle of total evid nce is “so fundamental that we cannot make sense 
of an agent who does not generally reason in accord with it” (2004b, 190). 
11 Of course, if the number of such principle is small, it might be possible to identify basic principles 




The interpretation might suggest itself that by ‘basic’ Davidson means 
‘general’.  The idea would be that basic rational principles are ones that subsume 
narrower, non-basic principles, rather in the way that a general logical principle like 
modus ponens ubsumes a more special principle of the form, If p and q then r, p and 
q, therefore r.  But if ‘basic’ is understood in this way, then a gent’s necessary 
disposition to obey the basic rational principles (nshrined in the Competence 
Principle) would guarantee their disposition to obey narrower, non-basic principles as 
well.  However, Davidson pretty clearly does not intend the Competence Principle to 
guarantee obedience to non-basic principles.  He intends a bifurcation between those 
rational principles adherence to which is conceptually mandatory and those adherence 
to which is not.  So the interpretation in question, I think, should be rejected. 
Davidson’s inclusion of “the basic principles of logic” (2004b, 195) in his 
representative list of principles that he takes to be fundamental in his sense might 
suggest a different line of interpretation.  For in axiomatic and natural-deduction 
treatments of deductive logic at least, a distinction is often made between primitive 
and derived logical principles.  Thus, in a natural-deduction system of the 
propositional calculus like E. J. Lemmon’s (1978), a small set of rules such as modus 
ponens and modus tollens are taken as primitive, and other rules, for example, what is 
often referred to as ‘disjunctive syllogism’, are justified in terms of them.  However, 
this proposed interpretation is rendered problematic by the familiar fact that logic 
recognizes no single canonical set of primitive principles: the principles taken as 
primitive within one logistic may be regarded as derivative within another.  As 




no logical principle is really logically prior to any other (Wittgenstein 1961).  Hence, 
despite its seeming promise, the primitive/derived distinction within logic is ill-suited 
to ground the basic/non-basic distinction that Davidson desires. 
In fact, there appears no satisfactory non-psychological basis for the 
distinction.  But a psychological basis would appear out of bounds for Davidson, or at 
least problematic.  It might seem natural to view as b sic those rational principles 
which, as a matter of empirical fact, agents universally possess a disposition to obey.  
But given the role that the basic/non-basic distinction plays for him as part of a 
constitutive constraint on the attitudes (that is, within the Competence Principle), 
such a view would obviously be circular.12  Perhaps it would be open to Davidson to 
hold that interpreters possess an ( priori) theory of which rational principles agents 
are universally disposed to obey.  However, this would greatly—and perhaps 
implausibly—increase the baggage with which Davidson w uld need to saddle 
interpreters.  Moreover, Davidson’s normativism would remain indeterminate until a 
list of such principles is provided; and it would impose upon the champion of this 
view the seemingly difficult task of motivating the inclusion of particular principles 
in the list.  But perhaps these are not decisive obj ctions.  Accordingly, I shall 
proceed on the assumption that Davidson construes basic rational principles along the 
lines suggested. 
Comparison to Other Charity Principles 
 A bit of comparison of Davidson’s Competence Principle to his other charity 
principles is in order.  First, the Threshold and Maximization Principles 
                                                
12 The same point would apply to any attempt to draw the distinction empirically, e.g., in terms of the 
obviousness or non-obviousness of violations of ration l principles as assessed by agent’s judgments 




fundamentally differ from the Competence Principle in that they constrain an agent’s 
rational performance rather than their competence.  Moreover—and relatedly—on the 
face of it the latter principle is logically independent of the former.  It seems 
conceivable that an agent could possess a competence that includes all basic rational 
principles without exhibiting much actual rationality because subject to massive 
interferences with the exercise of the relevant dispositions.13  Again, it appears prima 
facie conceivable that an agent’s rational performance could be sterling but simply 
because they have had few occasions to engage their irrational competencies with 
respect to basic principles (or even because massive interferences have actually 
rectified the outcomes of those competencies!).  So Davidson’s introduction of a 
Competence Principle represents a substantive addition to his battery of normativist 
principles. 
A significant feature of Davidson’s Competence Principle is that in contrast to 
his other charity principles, it is non-holistic in character.  Whereas the Threshold and 
Maximization Principles constitute tests applied to an agent’s attitudes en masse, the 
Competence Principle is a test of each individual rational principle within an agent’s 
rational competence.  Consequently, the Competence Principle is vulnerable to 
straightforward refutation by counterexample in a way that its companions are not.  
Whereas the latter readily brook individual deviations from rational norms so long as 
a sufficiently high level of overall rationality ismaintained, the Competence Principle 
bars even a single principle conflicting with basic rational ones from entering into 
                                                
13 Additionally, there is a question as to how much rationality would necessarily be secured even by 
perfect performance with respect to basic principles.  For even in that case, non-basic principles might 
be massively violated, and there would appear no reason why these violations could not outweigh the 




one’s rational competence.  As will be seen, the argument of subsequent chapters 
exploits this vulnerability of the Competence Principle by making vivid the 
possibility of such deviant principles’ being included in one’s rational competence.14 
It should also be mentioned that, although Davidson makes no explicit 
mention of this, presumably, he intends the scope of the Competence Principle to be 
epistemic as well as more properly rational.  As I argued in Chapter Two, rightly 
understood, Davidsonian charity imposes on agents con traints as much concerning 
proper epistemic function as rationality.  These sorts f normativity get, as it were, 
rolled up into one big ball in Davidson’s account of he Threshold and Maximizing 
Principles.  So I think it is no great stretch to interpret Davidson’s Competence 
Principle as requiring agents to embody competencies reflecting basic 
epistemological norms.15  At any rate, I shall proceed on the assumption that i  does. 
                                                
14 There is some evidence that Daniel Dennett, like Davidson, may accept a variety of Competence 
Principle.  Ed Stein, at least, views Dennett in ths light (see Stein 1996, 116n14).  Indeed, Dennett 
maintains that intentional systems “must be supposed to follow the rules of logic” if ascriptions of 
attitudes to them are to afford any “predictive power at all” (1971, 95).  It is not altogether clear, 
however, whether Dennett means that such rules are embedded as dispositions in one’s rational 
competence or merely that, as a statistical matter, agents must be supposed usually to observe them.  
But if Stein is right in attributing a view like Davidson’s to Dennett, there remain important differenc s 
between them.  Dennett seems to adhere to a holistic version of charity with respect to one’s reasoning 
competence.  For Dennett asserts, “not all the infere ce rules of an actual Intentional system may be 
valid . . .” (1971, 95).  Nor is his point merely tha  such systems can dispense with non-basic 
principles.  For Davidson’s bifurcation of principles into basic and non-basic appears lacking in 
Dennett.  In fact, Dennett even contemplates the possibility of agents who lack such a seemingly basic 
rule as modus ponens (at least in full generality) (1971, 95).  Rather, Dennett’s view seems to be that 
charity dictates merely that agents possess a prepond rance of valid inference rules.  In effect, he 
seems to advocate something like a Threshold Principle with respect to rational principles.  (Cf. [Stein 
1996, 124-27] on this brand of charity.)  This has the significant implication that Dennett’s version f 
normativism escapes that component of my argument of subsequent chapters that levels at Davidson’s 
non-holistic Competence Principle.  However, other components of the argument touch Dennett’s 
version as much as Davidson’s. 
15 In contrast to rational norms which appear to concer  only propositional attitudes and actions and 
the relations among them, epistemological norms maytreat of the proper relations of propositional 
attitudes (especially beliefs) to other sorts of cognitive mental states (e.g., sensations) as well (and
perhaps also to the external world). On the reading I am proposing, then, Davidson holds that agents 





Argument for the Competence Principle     
The interpretation of the Competence Principle aside, what reason does 
Davidson give us to believe it?  Well, his argument (2004b, 195-96), though a bit 
obscure, on close inspection appears closely to co-incide with one recounted by 
Stephen Stich.  Stich writes, 
It is part of what it is to be a belief with a given intentional characterization, 
part of the concept of such a belief, if you will, to interact with other beliefs in 
a rational way—a way which more or less mirrors the laws of logic.  This sort 
of interaction with other beliefs is a conceptually necessary condition for 
being the belief that not-p or for being the belief that if p, then q.  Thus if a 
belief fails to manifest the requisite interactions with other beliefs, it just does 
not count as the belief that not-p or the belief that if p, then q.  (1990, 37) 
 
Davidson, I think, essentially makes Stich’s argument.  However, his version 
concerns not just beliefs but propositional attitudes more widely.  So it is not just 
“laws of logic” that must be manifested but principles of rationality generally—or, 
rather, those that are “basic.”  Moreover, one needs to be quite clear that manifesting 
“the requisite interactions” be taken as a matter of competence rather than 
performance if the argument is to be relevant specifically to establishing the 
Competence Principle.16 
The problem with this ‘argument’ is that, in the most glaring fashion, it simply 
begs the question.  There is the slightest conceptual distance between saying that to 
be an agent (a bearer of propositional attitudes) one’s attitudes must be disposed to 
interact according to basic rational norms (the Competence Principle) and saying that 
to be a token-propositional attitude requires being disposed to interact according to 
basic rational norms.  Anyone who harbors doubts about the former will harbor 
                                                




doubts about the latter as well.  So, I conclude, th  Competence Principle remains 
unsupported.   
Compartment Principle 
According to the Competence Principle, divergences from basic rational 
principles must be viewed as performance errors, attribu able to factors interfering 
with an inherently rational competence.  This raises the question what interfering 
factors might give rise to such performance errors.  At first sight, one would think 
that all sorts of factors, both purely physical and mental, might, in principle, do so.  
But, remarkably, there is some evidence that Davidson wishes to locate the source of 
such performance errors exclusively on the mental plane, more specifically, in the 
influence of one mental compartment upon another.  So, ultimately, Davidson appears 
to envision a refinement of the Competence Principle along the following lines: A 
compartment of the mind embodies a capacity or competence for deploying 
propositional attitudes in accordance with basic standards of ideal rationality unless 
subjected to external interference by another mental compartment, resulting in 
performance error.  When an agent exhibits irrationl mental processes, then, 
Davidson sees this as due to the influence of one mental compartment or competence 
upon another (as opposed to, say, the influence of the agent’s purely physico-
chemical states).  Let us call the resulting charity principle the Compartment 
Principle.   
The Textual Context of the Principle 
Davidson’s most sustained treatment of mental compart entalization appears 
in his “Paradoxes of Irrationality” (2004c).  In this difficult article, Davidson’s 




the course of doing so, to defend certain key theses of Freudian psychoanalysis as 
conceptually required by an adequate account of (certain kinds of) irrationality. These 
include the claims, (1), that the mind includes semi-independent structures containing 
propositional attitudes and memories, (2), that the contents of parts of the mind can 
combine, as in intentional action, to cause events within the mind and without, and, 
(3), that some of the interactions among parts can be seen on the model of physical 
causation (2004c, 170-72). 
The first paradox Davidson identifies springs from the way we describe and 
explain propositional attitudes.  An element of rationality seems to be built into our 
very descriptions of propositional attitudes and the fact that we explain them in 
rationalizing terms.  For example, to use Davidson’ illustration, Roger’s intention “to 
pass an examination by memorizing the Koran . . . must be explained by his desire to 
pass the examination and his belief that by memorizing the Koran he will enhance his 
chances of passing the examination” (2004c, 169).  Since fitting attitudes “into a 
rational pattern” through rationalizing explanations is inseparable from the attitudes, 
it can seem puzzling how irrationality can exist at all (2004c, 169-70).  
This first paradox is, I think, easily dissolved.  In the first place, Davidson’s 
claim that the very descriptions of the attitudes impl cates them in rationalizing 
explanation is made to seem plausible only by his cerry-picking examples, such as 
Roger’s complex instrumental intention.  A description of a simple attitude like the 
belief that the earth is round, by contrast, in no way seems necessarily to call for a 
rationalizing explanation.  Moreover, even if rationalizing explanation were 




possible.  For a demand for explanation by reasons would not be tantamount to a 
demand for explanation by good reasons.  A belief, for example, can be held for a 
reason (i.e., on the basis of other beliefs one holds) but still count as irrational 
because fallaciously inferred from those other beliefs.  
Davidson’s manner of dissolving this paradox, however, is rather different, 
perhaps because of his focus on certain kinds of irrationality in this article, namely, 
akrasia and wishful thinking.  Adapting a case considered by Freud, Davidson 
describes an akratic man who while walking in the park, removes a branch from his 
path , but later, thinking it a danger to passersby in the hedge into which he has tossed 
it, returns to the park to replace it, even though he realizes that he has motives not to 
return—the time and trouble involved—which outweigh his concern for the safety of 
passersby (2004c, 172-74).  Moreover, Davidson describes a case of wishful thinking 
where a “young man very much wishes he had a well-turned calf and this leads him to 
believe he has a well-turned calf,” where “the entire explanation of his holding the 
belief is that he wanted to believe it” (2004c, 178).  Davidson asserts that in such 
cases of irrationality there is a mental state that causes the relevant action or 
propositional attitude without serving as a reason for it.  Thus, in the case of wishful 
thinking, “a desire causes a belief.  But the judgment that a state of affairs is, or 
would be, desirable, is not a reason to believe that i  exists” (2004c, 179).17 
This introduction of non-reason mental causes into the account of irrationality 
brings in its train an appeal to mental compartmentalization.  For rather inscrutable 
reasons, Davidson finds such causes problematic.  Apparently, the only way 
                                                
17 There might be some room for debate about this.  Granted, a desire is not a theoretical reason for a 




Davidson can conceive of such non-reason mental causation is when cause and effect 
are segregated in different minds, or at least different mental compartments.  As 
Davidson notes, non-reason mental causation between minds appears unproblematic.  
Thus, for example, my wish for you to enter my garden may lead me to “grow a 
beautiful flower there,” which may, in turn, entice you to enter (2004c, 181).  
Moreover, what applies in the case of such social interactions, Davidson holds, can 
apply to a single person as well.  Indeed, Davidson writes, “if we are going to explain 
irrationality at all, it seems we must assume that e mind can be partitioned into 
quasi-independent structures that interact . . . ” (2004c, 181). 
Thus, in (2004c) Davidson seems to have arrived at a Compartment 
Principle—or something close to one: an agent’s irrational mental processes are due 
to the influence of one mental compartment upon another.  So Davidson takes himself 
by this route to have vindicated, among other things, the coherence of Freud’s appeal 
to mental compartments.  Far from incoherent, such compartments are required to 
explain (a form of) irrationality.18 
                                                
18 A point that is easily missed is that the influence of one compartment upon another as required by 
the Compartment Principle in instances of irrationality is not to be conceived of as direct intentional 
action.  In a case of self-deception, for example, th  intention in Compartment1 that there should be a 
belief that p in Compartment2 does not cause that belief directly in the manner of basic actions, as my 
intention to raise my arm causes my arm to raise.  Rather, as in Davidson’s analogy of enticing 
someone into one’s garden with a beautiful flower, the intention produces the effect indirectly: “What 
is essential [to the analogy] is that certain thoughts and feelings of the person be conceived as 
interacting to produce consequences on the principles of intentional actions, these consequences then 
serving as causes, but not reasons, for further mental vents” (2004c, 185).  Thus, the picture is the 
following: Compartment1acts so as to produce consequences C which, in turn, produce a belief, say, in 
Compartment2. 
There is much puzzling about this picture, however.  Fi st, one might wonder why Davidson should 
insist upon it, as opposed to direct action.  If the interaction were direct, though, perhaps one would be 
tempted to say that the intention in Compartment1 is, in fact, a reason for the belief in Compartment2, 
which runs counter to Davidson’s insistence that ins a ces of irrationality involve non-reason mental 
causes.  Or would such direct interaction be inconsistent with Compartment1 and Compartment2 being 
separate compartments?  In any case, it is intuitively odd to imagine a mental compartment conniving 
through means-end reasoning to produce physical consequences in order, ultimately, to induce an 




Unclear, however, is whether Davidson intends the compartmental model to 
apply to all irrationality.  In (2004c), Davidson stops short of c mmitting to this.  In 
the later article, (2004b), however, he comes closer to an unqualified assertion of the 
Compartment Principle.  There he writes, “What is needed to explain irrationality is a 
mental cause of an attitude, but where the cause is not a reason for the attitude it 
explains” (2004b, 190); and he appears to assert quite generally, “it is only by 
postulating a kind of compartmentalization of the mind that we can understand, and 
begin to explain, irrationality” (2004b, 198).  At all events, in assessing Davidsonian 
charity, I feel the textual evidence justifies considering the plausibility of the 
Compartment Principle, along with that of other charity principles to which Davidson 
subscribes. 
Critical Discussion 
But Davidson’s derivation of the Compartment Principle itself requires some 
critical discussion.  An appeal to non-reason mental causes is problematic for at least 
two reasons.  First, it is not obvious how much irrat onality they are implicated in.  
Davidson cites wishful thinking and akrasia as involving such causes (see p. 114 
above), and there is some plausibility in regarding wishful thinking, perhaps even as a 
matter of conceptual necessity, as involving the non-rationalizing causal influence of 
a wish in the formation of a belief.  That non-reason mental causes are implicated in 
akrasia, however, is far from obvious.  Granted, Davidson’ own account of akrasia 
finds a place for such causes, in the influence of the mental states of one compartment 
                                                                                                                                 
parts of the mind as independent agents” (2004c, 185).  It is unclear, though, how Davidson’s picture 
avoids characterizing parts as agents.  Perhaps desite appearances, Davidson should actually be taken 
as holding that the intentions of Compartment1 do not really produce consequences C “on the 
principles of intentional action” but, rather, merely as ordinary causal consequences, which, in turn 





upon another.  But there appears nothing in the very concept of akrasia that dictates 
such an account.  Indeed, other philosophers provide accounts that dispense with any 
necessary role for non-reason mental causes.19  Of course, even less obvious is that 
forms of irrationality consisting of making inferences according to patterns that 
deviate from canonical logical principles must involve non-reason mental causes.  On 
their face, they seem to involve causes that are reasons—ones, however, that just 
happen to be bad reasons.  Moreover, there is the difficulty of seeing why non-reason 
mental causes must operate cross mental compartments and not within them.  As 
noted, Davidson’s suggestions to that effect are obscure.  Without clear and 
compelling argument, there seems little reason to see Davidson’s proposal that 
                                                
19 George Rey’s account of akrasia, for example, is based on a distinction he draws between central 
and avowed attitudes (Rey 1988).  According to Rey, one possesses two distinct sets of attitudes, one’s 
central beliefs and preferences, which “enter into stances of practical reasoning which largely 
determine one’s acts,” and one’s avowed beliefs and preferences, which underlie one’s sincere 
assertions (Rey 1997, 294).  It is the capacity for discrepancies to arise between these two sets of 
attitudes that is foundational for Rey’s accounts of akrasia. 
Rey gives the following concise description of akrasia: “Akrasia occurs when someone avows all the 
relevant preferences, avows one to be higher than the other; but still centrally values the other over the 
one” (1988, 282).  The akratic’s situation, then, appears to be this: she has avowed preferences P1 and 
P2, and an avowed belief that P1 is of greater weight than P2.  Moreover, she simultaneously has 
central preferences P1* and P2*, with the same content as P1 and P2, respectively, but such that P2* is 
of greater weight than P1*. 
An example will make things more vivid.  Suppose an individual confronts a choice at a social 
function between either sticking to his vegetarian pri ciples (but going hungry) or giving in to his 
hunger and partaking of a meal containing meat.  Avowedly seeing reasons supporting either option, 
he may avowedly believe that on balance the reasons which support sticking to his principles are 
greater.  Yet he may find himself choosing to eat because he centrally assigns greater weight of reasons 
to that option. 
What is of interest in Rey’s account in the present context is that it dispenses with non-reason mental 
causes in explaining akratic acts.  On his account, such acts are completely explained by the central 
beliefs and preferences which rationalize them.  One might object that little is gained by way of 
criticizing Davidson’s attempted derivation of a Compartment Principle by this observation, since Rey 
himself finds it necessary to appeal to a kind of compartmentalization to account for akrasia, namely, 
that among avowed and central attitudes.  On closer in pection, however, his account of akrasia is seen 
to run counter to the Compartment Principle.  For th ugh it adverts to compartments, it makes no 
appeal to the interfering influence of one compartment on the other, which the Compartment Principle 





irrationality involves compartmental interaction as more than an empirical hypothesis, 
not as the conceptual requirement that Davidson plai ly takes it to be. 
However, Davidson does not posit compartments solely in order to 
accommodate the supposed element of non-reason mental causation in irrationality.  
At points, he lays stress on how irrationality can involve a subject’s entertaining 
logically inconsistent beliefs.  Thus, in “Deception and Division,” Davidson’s 
account of self-deception involves attributing to a subject simultaneously the belief 
that p and the belief that not p (2004a, 208).  But Davidson holds that such 
inconsistent beliefs must belong to distinct mental compartments: “we must accept 
the idea that there can be boundaries between parts of the mind; I postulate such a 
boundary somewhere between any (obviously) conflicting beliefs” (2004a, 211). 
Note, however, that even if such boundaries are necssary in cases of crass 
inconsistency, this is still not enough to yield a Compartment Principle, since there is 
no suggestion that all irrationality involves such crass inconsistencies.20  So this 
alternate route to compartments also fails to yield a Compartment Principle.21  An 
additional difficulty with Davidson’s proposal—of a sort familiar by now—is that it 
relies on making a bifurcation between obvious and non-obvious inconsistencies.  
Davidson plainly does not intend it to apply only to beliefs whose contents are in 
formal contradiction, so he owes an account of which beliefs are obviously 
                                                
20 The premises might also be questioned that it is an a priori fact that the belief that p and the belief 
that not p cannot belong to the same mental compartment. 
21 It is worth noting that self-deception, to the extent that it involves crass inconsistency, constitutes a 
form of irrationality that also involves non-reason mental causes.  For as Davidson points out, in 
central cases of self-deception the belief that not p is itself causally implicated in engendering the very 
belief that p.  But, of course, the fact that not p is not a reason to believe its contradictory p (2004a, 




inconsistent.  But it is implausible that he can draw this distinction with the meager 
resources of his (apparently) purely normative-based interpretativism.22   
 It is also worth noting ways in which the appeal to compartments may 
ultimately be problematic for normativists.  In the first place, it is by no means clear 
that Davidson’s detailed account of attribution (see p. 64ff. above) applies without 
modification to a compartmentalized mind, or if not, whether and how Davidson can 
modify it so that it does.  Central to Davidson’s account is that it intimately weds 
attribution of an agent’s propositional attitudes with interpretation of their language.  
What Davidson offers is “a combined theory of meaning and belief” and desire 
(2004e, 156), on which attribution depends on observable evidence about whether an 
“agent prefers one sentence true rather than another” (2004e, 158).  It is only to the 
extent that attitudes rationally and causally condition such preferences (and their 
overt expression) that renders them susceptible of attribution.23  Hence, attitudes 
which have no direct rational and causal bearing on an agent’s verbal behavior seem 
to fall out of the scope of Davidson’s account.  In essence, then, it appears that 
Davidson’s account cannot straightforwardly accommodate unconscious attitudes.  
But, leaving to one side such phenomena as Multiple Personality Disorder, 
compartments of the sort Davidson contemplates would be aphasic, and their contents 
unconscious.  Davidson’s account seems unable to ground attribution of such 
contents.  Now this difficulty might seem to lapse where, as in Freudian theory, 
                                                
22 Cf. the discussion above (p. 106) concerning the difficulty Davidson confronts in distinguishing 
between basic and non-basic principles of rationality. 
23 Thus, Davidson writes, “. . . the preferring true of sentences by an agent is . . . clearly a functio of 
what the agent takes the sentences to mean, the valu  he sets on various possible or actual states of the 
world, and the probability he attaches to those state  contingent on the truth of the relevant sentences.  
So it is not absurd to think that all three attitudes of the agent can be constructed on the basis of the 




contents are—at least in significant measure—capable of becoming conscious.  To 
the extent these contents become conscious, they will t pically acquire the sort of 
connection to linguistic behavior that on Davidson’s account permits their attribution.  
However, it will be noted, to the extent they become conscious, they are no longer to 
be reckoned to unconscious compartments.  At best, Davidson’s account seems to 
allow their attribution qua conscious.  While they are unconscious, for all Davidson’s 
account is concerned, it is as if they do not exist.  So Davidson’s account, if it is to 
accommodate compartments of the very sort Davidson himself wishes to allow for, 
appears in need of substantial supplementation.   
In the second place: As Davidson observes, certain forms of irrationality seem 
to involve attributing crass inconsistencies to an agent.  Davidson, like many non-
normativists, reaches for the expedient in such cases of quarantining inconsistent 
beliefs in separate compartments.  However, if the notion of contradictory beliefs 
within a single compartment offends against Davidson’s normativist intuitions, it is 
far from obvious that the introduction of multiple mental compartments to 
accommodate them readily comports with those same intuitions either.  Now in light 
of the introduction of compartments, one might think that Davidson intends his earlier 
enunciated charity principles (such as the Maximization and Threshold Principles) to 
be applied to compartments individually: compartments should be treated as isolated 
spheres within which individually truth and coherenc  should be maximized, etc.  
However, that is not Davidson’s view.  Maximization a d Threshold Principles 
remain in effect as global constraints on the mind as a whole.24  But as Davidson 
                                                
24 By the same token, it is presumably Davidson’s intention that the Competence Principle also be 




himself notes, the Maximization Principle enjoins seeking a unified, consistent 
interpretation of an agent insofar as possible.  So to the extent that partitioning 
accommodates inconsistences, it might seem to run co ter to charity’s imperative to 
minimize them (2004c, 182-84).   
The potential conflict between compartmentalization and charity is 
particularly keenly grasped by Christopher Cherniak.  As I pointed out earlier, 
Cherniak and Davidson share a broadly normativist outlo k, and they agree in 
according a place to compartmentalization in their pictures of the mind.  But whereas 
the route Davidson takes to acknowledging mental compartments is through the 
existence of irrational phenomena, Cherniak posits them on the basis of more 
mundane facts about the structure of memory.  Cherniak sees it as a non-contingent 
feature of our commonsense picture of the mind that i  contains distinct memory 
storages, along the lines suggested by cognitive-psychological models which 
distinguish between short-term and long-term memory (1986, 54-56).  Moreover, that 
commonsense picture further compartmentalizes long-term memory in that it 
“assumes an organization of long-term memory, one that determines the pattern of a 
search for an item . . .” (1986, 56).25  Cherniak holds, further, that once this picture is 
taken into account, one will not be tempted—as Quine clearly was in formulating his 
principle of charity—to deny that minds can entertain obvious logical inconsistencies 
(1986, 56).  Such compartmentalization makes intellgib e the possibility of abundant 
                                                                                                                                 
suffice for individual compartments to appear to embody rational competences only when viewed in 
isolation.  Rather, they must be seen to do so against the backdrop of the entire cognitive system of 
which they are a part.  Generally, my arguments against normativism in succeeding chapters will be 
directed against versions which, like Davidson’s, take the whole cognitive system, not individual 
compartments, as the unit to which charity standards pply (monocentric normativism).  However, at 
points I consider the prospects for arguing against a polycentric normativism. 
25 Cherniak notes that cognitive-psychological theory contemplates the possibility that both ‘working’ 




inconsistency: “Logical relations between beliefs in d fferent ‘compartments’ are less 
likely to be recognized than relations among beliefs within one compartment, because 
in the former case the relevant beliefs are less likely to be contemporaneously 
activated, and . . . it is only when they are activated together that such relations can be 
determined” (1986, 67).26      
 But, like Davidson, Cherniak recognizes a tension between the possibility of 
abundant inconsistency that compartmentalization raises and holistic charity 
constraints.  Essentially, the problem is that such in onsistency can potentially clash 
with the Threshold Principle.27  He writes, 
The cost of compartmentalization is some isolation of subsets of the belief 
system from each other, and the resulting lack of interaction can fragment the 
total system.  The contents of long-term memory are subject to less stringent 
rationality requirements than the contents of short-term memory, but they are 
not permitted unlimited irrationality.  Only a balance of compartmentalization 
of long-term memory enables a complete cognitive system to qualify as 
minimally rational.  (1986, 69)28 
 
Too much compartmentalization, because of the attendant inconsistency and 
irrationality that it introduces, must be ruled out.  This potential clash between 
compartmentalization and charity will loom large in my argument of the next chapter. 
                                                
26 Worth noting is that, unlike Davidson, Cherniak app rently does not rule out the possibility of 
obvious consistency within a single compartment.  Rather, he merely stresses how 
compartmentalization increases the likelihood of inconsistencies. 
27 Although, of course, Cherniak, with his moderate normativism, sets the threshold of requisite 
rationality lower than does Davidson.  
28 In—and around—the quoted passage, Cherniak is concerned to make at least two distinct, though 
related, points: (1) that too much compartmentalization tends to conflict with charity requirements, and 
(2) too much compartmentalization threatens the degree of integration required for personhood.  The 
latter point concerns the possibilities of causal interactions among one’s propositional attitudes, rather 
than their logical relations per se.  Accordingly, I think it more properly falls under the heading of 




Mental Modularity  
In general, my argument of the next chapter will suggest that, in various ways, 
mental compartments, specifically, in the form of psychological modules, pose 
problems for Davidsonian charity.  So it is appropriate that I set out the relevant sense 
of ‘module’ on which my argument relies and clarify how such modules relate to the 
compartments that Davidson (and Cherniak) discuss. 
The Notion of a Module 
 With respect to the divisibility of mind, the philosophical tradition has itself 
been somewhat ‘schizophrenic’.  On the one hand, philosophers like Plato and 
Descartes have often insisted on the simplicity of the mind, especially when doing so 
has seemed a way to establish the immortality of the soul.  But, on the other hand, in 
the Phaedrus and elsewhere Plato himself famously presents a trip r ite division of 
the mind or soul into rational, spirited, and impulsive elements (Plato 1961).  
Psychologists, by contrast, in recent years at leas, h ve been fairly ‘unanimous' in 
recognizing the mind’s divisibility on one or another basis.  A number of pathological 
phenomena—including multiple personality disorder, split-brain phenomena, and 
blindsight, to name a few—seem to call into question he picture of the mind as a 
unified sphere of consciousness, at least in abnormal cases.  But psychologists have 
found it expedient to see the normal mind too as consisting of parts, and many of their 
specific proposals in recent years have employed th notion of a module.  
 Gabriel Segal (1996) provides a taxonomy of various conceptions of modules 
present in the literature which, he believes, “have  good chance of being genuine 
psychological natural kinds” (1996, 141); and prepaatory to defending a thesis of 




components, each of which has some specific job to do in the functioning of the 
whole” (Carruther 2006, 2)—Peter Carruthers analyzes current conceptions of 
modules in great detail.  Of course, to the extent that the mind is universally 
acknowledged to possess various faculties, there is a sense in which it is 
uncontroversial that the mind consists of parts.  But the notion of a module, as both 
Segal and Carruthers make clear, is more robust than that of a mere faculty.  Rather, 
they are theoretical entities posited in order to account for psychological faculties or 
capacities (Segal 1996, 141).  Moreover, there seem agreement that individual 
representations (or arbitrary sets of such representatio s) do not count as modules (cf. 
Carruthers 1996, 3).   
 Segal, in his classification, makes a basic distinctio  between synchronic and 
diachronic modules.  But since diachronic modules in essence merely seem to amount 
to a kind of higher-order module—modules for the acquisition over time of 
synchronic modules—I shall focus mainly on the varieties of synchronic modules, 
that is, modules that underly capacities that one can exercise at some particular 
time.29  Among these, Segal identifies the following kinds: (1) intentional modules, 
(2) computational modules, (3) Fodor modules, and (4) neural modules.  Segal 
describes an intentional module as “a specific body of psychological states” that 
underlies a competence and cites as examples the Freudian unconscious30 and 
                                                
29 Segal’s characterizes a synchronic module generally as “a component of the mind, or brain, a 
mechanism, a system or some such that explains [a] competence” (1996, 142). 
30 Smith (1999, 120) distinguishes different senses in which Freud uses ‘unconscious’: 
 
. . . Freud uses the term ‘unconscious’ in several ways.  Sometimes the term is used to 
designate a functional system of the mind containing mental representations that are 
unconscious but not preconscious  (and possessing special irrational characteristics . . .). 




Chomsky’s view that our linguistic competence consists n part in our tacit 
knowledge of linguistic rules (1996, 143). 
 But the stark differences between Freudian unconsci u  and Chomskyan 
linguistic competence suggest that two sorts of things are perhaps run together in 
Segal’s notion of an intentional module.31  Accordingly, it may be worthwhile to 
attempt to achieve some clarity about what those two sorts of things might be.  An 
issue is what bodies of psychological states are meant to count as intentional modules.  
Segal hints that they need to be “appropriately related” in some way, but he is vague 
as to what relation is constitutive.  With respect to Chomsky, Segal stresses the 
thematic, conceptual relations shared by the items of linguistic knowledge that for 
Chomsky underly our linguistic competence: “The knowledge concerns a self-
contained array of interrelated concepts (Phrase, Noun, Verb, Anaphor, Quantifier, 
etc.) that fit together some what in the manner of a scientific theory . . .” (1996, 143).   
But Segal is aware that some other basis of unity needs to be employed to 
effectively carve out the notion of intentional module towards which he is striving.  
He maintains that “Mere knowledge of a theory isn’t likely to be a psychologically 
interesting category” (1996, 143).  That is, the sort of thematic coherence 
characteristic of a theory (as holds in the case of Chomskyan linguistic competence) 
is not sufficient for being an intentional module.  Accordingly, using Fodor’s 
                                                                                                                                 
consciously represented . . . .  Finally, Freud someti es describes as ‘unconscious’ all mental 
items under neuroscientific description . . . . 
 
Apparently, it is something like the first sense that Segal has in mind in maintaining that the Freudian 
unconscious counts as an intentional module.  My argument of subsequent chapters, however, will 
involve describing modules that, though working with s ates belonging to the Freudian unconscious, in 
fact, constitute what I subsequently term ‘processing modules’ (see p. 127 below).   
31 In a footnote, Segal acknowledges that he provides “only a very quick first sketch of intentional 
modularity” and that “If one or more genuine psychological natural kinds fall under the concept then a 




terminology, Segal attempts to fill the breach with the requirement that the relevant 
body of psychological states exhibit either ‘informational encapsulation’ or ‘limited 
accessibility’ vis-à-vis the contents of rest of the mind (but especially consciousness).   
Thus, for example, Chomsky’s tacit linguistic theory is inaccessible to consciousness.  
Segal, then, stipulates that an intentional module is “a set of appropriately related 
psychological states” which “exhibits either informational encapsulation or limited 
accessibility” (1996, 143).  
But the only sort of appropriate relation Segal has broached is the thematic 
one.  This, however, is lacking in the Freudian case, for Freudian theory permits quite 
various contents to be consigned to the unconscious.  So all Segal really has to hold 
together the category of intentional modules is the notion of an encapsulated or 
inaccessible set of psychological states.  Does this suffice to capture an interesting 
category of module?  I don’t know.  But, in any case, the differences between 
Freudian unconscious and Chomskyean linguistic competence seem sufficiently great 
to—at the very least—represent instances of distinct species of module, whether or 
not they fall under a common genus which Segal would designate ‘intentional 
module’. 
Thus, Carruthers cites R. Samuels (1998) as a proponent of what the latter 
terms ‘informational modules’.  These  are “organized bodies of innate information” 
in specific domains which can be drawn upon as the mind performs the tasks related 
to given domains (Carruthers 2006, 32).  The sort of intentional module represented 
by Chomskyean linguistic competence appears in all essentials to coincide with 




clearly not count as an informational module.  Of course, there is the obvious point 
that the Freudian unconscious contains affective and desiderative mental states 
besides ones aptly called ‘informational’.  But thelack of thematic unity, again, is the 
decisive difference.  Accordingly, I propose to call the species of intentional module 
represented by the Freudian unconscious ‘a non-thematic odule’.  There would 
seem to be nothing particularly abstruse about suchmodules.  Indeed, any sort of 
memory storage that can receive disparate contents would also count as such. 
Both informational and non-thematic modules contrast with Segal’s category 
of ‘computational modules’.  These are processors which perform some specific 
mental function by operating on physical representations in a language of thought 
(1996, 143-45).  So, for example, psychological theorists have posited computational 
modules corresponding to such mental functions as mind-reading, language-
processing, and reasoning in various domains.  As the name makes plain, the 
conception presupposes the computationalist view of the metaphysics of mind, which 
both Segal and Carruthers are concerned to defend (cf. Segal 1996, 148-49; 
Carruthers 2006).  But Carruthers is careful to allw the possibility of processors 
which operate along non-computational, connectionist lines (2006, 45n23).  Hence, it 
seems sensible to acknowledge a genus of processing modules under which one can 
distinguish both computational and non-computational modules as species.  
Segal identifies Fodor modules as a species of computational module, one that 
possesses a number of specific properties: “(1) Domain specificity (2) Informational 
encapsulation (3) Obligatory firing (4) Fast speed (5) Shallow outputs (6) Limited 




Characteristic patterns of breakdown” (1996, 145).  Fodor’s inclusion of several of 
these properties (such as fast speed and shallow outputs) is explained by his exclusive 
focus on input-output systems like the early visual system.  But Segal envisions the 
possibility of non-Fodorian computational modules which dispense with some of 
these properties.  Moreover, Carruthers, in the context of defending his thesis of 
“massive mental modularity,” explicitly develops a notion of computational module 
considerably weaker than that of a Fodorian module.  H  argues that if that thesis is to 
be remotely plausible several of the Fodorian requirements must be excluded.  Thus, 
for example, if modules are to account, not just for perception, but for central 
processes of belief-fixation, desire-formation, and planning, then modules must be 
allowed to deliver deep, conceptual outputs, not merely shallow ones.   
There remains the neural module, which Segal describes as “a functional 
component of the brain, describable in purely neurological terms” that subserves 
some particular cognitive capacity (1996, 145).   Discussions of modularity take place 
fairly universally against the background of an assumption of physicalism.  So 
proponents of modules will hold that modules are neurally realized in some fashion.32  
Neural modularity, however, is the view that they can be mapped onto specific 
neurological systems, where those systems are individuated in terms proper to 
neurophysiology, instead of being realized by global fe tures of the brain.  Although 
the issue whether modules are realized by neural modules is an important empirical 
                                                
32 It is worth noting, however, that there seems no obvious conceptual bar to entertaining the 




question, it is a bit remote from the—more conceptual—concerns of the present 
project.  So I shall ignore the issue of neural modularity in the sequel.33   
 My discussion, then, yields the following classification of types of modules: 
1. Processing 
    1.1 Computational 
        1.1.2 Fodorian 
        1.1.3 Non-Fodorian  
    1.2 Non-computational 
2. Non-Processing (‘intentional’) 
   2.1 Thematic (‘informational’) 
   2.2 Non-thematic 
 
Davidsonian Compartments as Modules 
Where, if anywhere, might Davidson’s compartments fit in this classification?  
Well, as Davidson himself notes, he characterizes compartments at a highly abstract 
level: “In particular,” he writes, he “has nothing to say about the number or nature of 
divisions of the mind, their permanence or aetiology” (2004c, 186n6).  Nonetheless, 
his account is not so indefinite as to allow some conclusions to be drawn.  First, his 
compartments have at least a connection with with intentional modules, specific 
bodies of psychological states34 that exhibit informational encapsulation (and limited 
accessibility).  Indeed, their very raison d être within Davidson’s account of 
                                                
33 As noted above, I shall also ignore the diachronic, module-forming modules.  But Chomsky’s LAD, 
short for ‘Language Acquisition Device’, can serve as an example of such.  This is a postulated innate 
system which in response to environmental stimuli gradually issues in a developed linguistic 
competence (for Chomsky, an intentional module).  In general, the synchronic modules which a 
diachronic module outputs can be either processing modules or purely intentional ones. 
34 Not that these bodies of psychological states should be thought of as mere sets of states, constituted 
extensionally.  For Davidson plainly allows compartments to persist over time despite changing their 
contents.  (Indeed, the same holds for all varieties of modules.  Even the contents comprised by 




irrationality is to allow for the segregation (that is, the causal-functional isolation) of 
mental contents from other mental contents.35 
But it would be quite a stretch to identify Davidson’s compartments with 
intentional modules.  Davidson plainly sees them as containing, not just beliefs, but 
desires and intentions as well.  Moreover, Davidson’s compartments are not mere 
collections of information (or other mental states), as are intentional modules.  
Rather, among other things, they are meant to be arenas in which mental processes 
take place, in which beliefs and desires “can combine, as in intentional action, to 
cause further events in the mind or outside it” (2004c, 171).  So, to this extent, they 
appear to amount to a kind of processing module.36  But processing modularity, as it 
appears in Fodor and Carruthers, for example, appears closely tied to the execution of 
particular cognitive functions: a processing module is a component of the mind that 
“has some specific job to do in the functioning of the whole” (Carruthers 2006, 2), 
whether it be mind-reading, language-processing, or reasoning37  However, this tie to 
particular functions is absent from Davidson’s characterization of his compartments. 
                                                
35 There are limits, however, to the amount of encapsulation that Davidson is prepared to permit.  
Given Davidson’s content-holism, he is committed to holding that to the extent that different 
compartments contain mental states whose contents share conceptual components, those compartments 
must significantly overlap.  Thus, he writes, “We should not necessarily think of the boundaries 
[between compartments] as defining permanent and separate territories.  Contradictory beliefs about 
passing a test must each belong to a vast and identical etwork of beliefs about tests and related 
matters if they are to be contradictory” (2004a, 211).  But this does not impact the tie between 
Davidsonian compartments and intentional modules, for Segal’s notion allows for partial encapsulation 
(or inaccessibility). 
36 It should be noted that the mere fact that Davidson’s compartments appear agentive in character 
would not preclude them from counting as processing modules.  Carruthers (2006), e.g., in his 
envisioned architecture postulates practical-reasoning modules which, taking beliefs and desires as 
inputs, issue intentions as outputs.  
37 For those like Carruthers who embed modularity in the context of evolutionary psychology, the 
function of a module would largely seem to be determined by its contribution to biological fitness.  
However, Carruthers and others recognize a category of learned modules (contrasting with innate ones) 
which are acquired in the course of learning particular skills, e.g., motor skills (2006, 10n6).  The 
functions of such modules, whose possession can be highly contingent and variable, might, it appears, 




Granted, as a class they serve an explanatory role for him in accounting for 
irrationality, but it would be odd to regard this as  function; and even if it were, 
Davidson by no means limits their operation so narrowly.  In fact, for all Davidson 
says about the matter, they might exhibit just about any cognitive function or 
functions.38  Again, Davidson at points seems somewhat inclined to regard his 
compartments as temporary.  Though, as noted, in (2004c) Davidson remains neutral 
about whether they are permanent or not, in (2004a) he asserts, “We should not 
necessarily think of the boundaries [between inconsistent beliefs] as defining 
permanent and separate territories” (211).  Whatever his reason for holding this, if the 
compartments are temporary this would be a respect in which they differ from the 
relatively permanent sort of processing module that Fodor and Carruthers envision.  
Nonetheless, in terms of the typology set out above, rall they most closely 
resemble processing modules. 
General Structure of My Argument 
Having clarified the notion of modularity that will figure in my argument 
against normativism, I now set forth the general structure of that argument.  The aim 
is to envision minds that do not hew to Davidson’s Competence, Threshold, or 
Compartment Principles.  So I describe parts of minds, modules, that evidently 
embody irrational competences, thereby conflicting with the Competence Principle.  
Moreover, since these modules diverge from standards of ideal rationality in virtue of 
their normal operations and not through the external influence of some other mental 
                                                
38 Indeed, as Davidson describes them, they appear rather homuncular.  It seems that potentially they 
might incorporate all or most of the functionality of the whole person.  In this regard, a comparison of 
his compartments to the distinct personalities involved in Multiple Personality Disorder might not be 




compartment, they also violate the Compartment Principle.  But, further, these 
modules (or collections of them) can be envisioned as subsisting in a mind prior to its 
full development, either ontogenetically or phylogenetically, in such a way as to 
largely exhaust its capacities for propositional thought and reasoning.  In such a mind, 
irrational processes would clearly predominate and, therefore, the mind itself would 
violate the Threshold Principle.39  The conceivability—indeed the scientific 
possibility—of the hypotheses I adduce, then, suggests the untenability of those 
principles. 
Forestalling Objections 
Before setting forth my argument in detail, however, I wish to forestall certain 
objections that might suggest themselves at the outset.  Specifically, for various 
reasons, one might argue that the sorts of modules I shall describe escape the intended 
sphere of application of normativist constraints and that, therefore, they cannot be 
legitimately adduced as violations of those constraints.  That is, a type of counter-
                                                
39 Some word of explanation of why the argument is couched specifically in terms of modules are in 
order.  For in principle there would seem no (obvious) conceptual bar to envisioning a competence 
lodged, not in a module, but in the more holistic function of a mind.  If that competence were 
irrational, it would violate the Competence Principle, of course, and the Compartment Principle 
(because if the divergence from rationality is not due to performance error a fortiori it is not due to 
performance error induced by an interfering compartment).  But for several reasons it appears 
preferable to make the argument specifically in terms of modules.  First, as a matter of empirical fact, 
it is more likely that such ceteris paribus regularities as constitute psychological competences will be 
found in subsystems of the mind, like modules, than in the mind’s more holistic operation.  As Georges 
Rey observes—with respect to intentional action, but the point generalizes—“Ordinary human 
behavior is arguably the result of interaction among a multitude of probably quasi-independent 
subsystems of the mind . . . and where there is such complex interaction, one seldom expects there to 
be any clear, scientifically respectable laws, at least not at the level of the interaction.  The laws 
concern regularities about the subsystems . . .” (2001, 111).  Second, and relatedly, the sci ntific 
hypotheses about irrational competences—or at least the most plausible versions of them—which lend 
themselves to employment in my argument are formulated in terms of parts of the mind, in terms of 
modules.  Third, although irrational competences lodged in holistic mental function could be used to 
argue against Competence and Compartment Principles, they would not serve as readily to argue 
against the Threshold Principle.  For that argument d pends on the detachability of competences, a 
feature that competences based in modules can possess, whereas ones based in holistic mental function 
cannot.  The dissociability that can attach to modules forms a key element, then, in my argument 




argument can be mounted which has the following form: Normativists constraints 
apply only to mental processes which possess property P; mental processes within 
modules do not possess P; therefore, normativist constraints do not apply to them.  
There are several properties which with some initial pl usibility might be selected for 
substitution into this schema: It might be held that normativist constraints apply only 
to mental processes with propositional content (propositional attitudes); or only to 
certain sorts of propositional attitudes (specifically, decision-theoretical ones); or, 
again, only to mental processes which are rationality-evaluable.  Moreover, different 
reasons can be advanced for thinking that the processes in modules lack the relevant 
properties, for example, because they are ‘subdoxastic’ or ‘subpersonal’ or non-
inferential. In the present section, I shall canvass the various considerations that speak 
for and against the contentions underlying these arguments.  My response will be to 
suggest that, in each case, these arguments either construe the scope of normativism 
too narrowly or else exclude modular processes fromthat scope on flimsy grounds. 
An Argument Based on a Distinction from Stich 
One potential argument is founded on a contention, associated with Stephen 
Stich (Stich, 1978), that tacit mental processes of the sort liberally postulated in 
recent information-processing cognitive psychology do not involve genuine beliefs 
but rather distinctive ‘subdoxastic’ states, which, in fact, on one reading lack 
propositional content altogether.  Since the states involved in modular hypotheses like 
those I consider in later chapters are of the sort Stich would reckon subdoxastic,40 an 
argument against my employment of these modules against normativism could be 
                                                
40 A complication here is that Stich actually sees the states postulated by Freudian theory as doxastic.  




constructed along the following lines: Normativist constraints apply only to beliefs 
(and other decision-theoretical attitudes); modular mental states are not beliefs (or 
other decision-theoretic attitudes); therefore, normativist constraints do not apply to 
modules.41  The  argument merits close scrutiny.  First I examine Stich’s contention, 
then the premise that limits normativist constraints to decision-theoretic attitudes. 
Beliefs versus Sub-Doxastic States 
Stich makes a distinction between beliefs and ‘sub-doxastic states’ which he 
understands to be “non-belief states that play a role in the proximate causal history of 
beliefs” (1978, 499).  Regarding this as an intuitive distinction, Stich seeks to identify 
features of beliefs that undergird our intuitions about what does and does not count as 
belief, thereby providing a partial “analysis of our ordinary concept of belief” (1978, 
499).  Stich emphasizes “two characteristics which beliefs exhibit and subdoxastic 
states do not: access to consciousness and inferential integration [i.e., a lack of 
encapsulation]” (1978, 511).  Since the states routinely postulated in information-
processing cognitive psychology appear to lack these f atures, they cannot count as 
genuine beliefs. 
One might wonder to what extent a distinction that requires marking with 
arcane terminology is “entrenched in intuition,” as Stich asserts (1978, 499).  To 
some extent, Stich actually seems to pivot between two different distinctions at 
various points: the distinction between beliefs andnon-belief states, and the 
distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states proper.  Whereas the former 
                                                
41 Bermudez (2009) interprets Stich as holding that subdoxastic states lack propositional context 
altogether.  On this strong reading, an alternative argument could be made—one which does not rely 
on confining the scope of normative constraints to decision-theoretical attitudes: Normativist 
constraints apply only to propositional attitudes; modular mental states are not propositional; therefore, 




distinction is an everyday one, the latter is a bit more abstruse.  As Stich rightly points 
out, traditionally, it has its home in epistemology, where a distinction is made 
between non-inferential beliefs and the non-beliefs (sensations, etc.) which lead to 
their formation without serving as premises for them.  Stich is suggesting that the 
distinction should have a home in cognitive psychology as well.  For the states which 
cognitive psychologists posit, for example, to explain the formation of beliefs 
manifested in judgments of grammatical intuitions should similarly by regarded as 
sub-doxastic—non-beliefs that happen to be causally implicated in belief-formation.42           
But Stich does not give compelling reason to think this.  In the present article, 
Stich exhibits an a priori functionalist orientation to the psychological ontlogy.43  
He clearly thinks that through reflection alone it is possible to arrive at “some 
property or cluster of properties” that capture the essence of such mental states as 
belief.  However, one can question such an ontology and the semantics on which it is 
based.  If one adopts a Kripkean approach to the semantics of mental vocabulary, then 
the essence of mental states like belief turns out to be something that is discovered 
only a posteriori.  Hence, no special privilege need attach to those predicates which 
reflect our intuitions about the properties possessed by mental states like belief. 
But leaving aside broad issues of ontology and semantics for the moment, 
Stich’s argument fails on its own terms.  For the intuitions that beliefs must be 
accessible to consciousness and inferentially integra d hardly appear robust.  
                                                
42 Significantly, however, whereas the subdoxastic state  of traditional epistemology lack inferential 
connection with the beliefs they cause (because they are taken to lack propositional content), Stich 
regards the subdoxastic states of cognitive psychology as exhibiting inferential relations amongst 
themselves and with the beliefs they produce.   
43 Cf. (Stich 1983) where Stich argues on the basis of an a priori functional analysis of belief to an 




Personally, I do not share these intuitions in any significant degree,44 nor—more 
tellingly—have the abundant cognitive psychologists who have felt little 
compunction in couching their modular and other information-processing hypotheses 
involving tacit processes in terms of belief.  If access and integration were a priori 
conditions on beliefs, as Stich evidently takes them to be, these theorists—
implausibly—would stand convicted of serious conceptual confusion.45 
Generally, Stich appears over-confident in his intuitions.  This is particularly 
glaring when he attempts to precisify the access-to-consciousness criterion.  Wishing 
to accommodate Freudian unconscious beliefs, he claims that our intuitions can allow 
for lack of conscious access when this is due, as in the case of psychoanalytic theory, 
to “a psychological mechanism capable of interfering with the ordinary process 
leading from belief to assent or to conscious awareness” (1978, 505).  But I suspect 
that few will have a robust intuition that supports drawing a line between belief and 
non-belief at so seemingly arbitrary point as does Stich, namely, between 
informational states unconscious due to some blocking mechanism and informational 
states (like those modular theory posits) unconscious owing to the mind’s structural 
                                                
44 It is instructive to contrast the—quite strong—intuition that belief does not share the direction of fit 
of desire to see how weak the intuitions Stich cites really are. 
45 To his credit, Stich at least tries to explain how it is that these psychologists have neglected his 
intuitions.  He writes, “It would be my guess that . . . many of those concerned with cognitive 
simulation have been so captivated with the promise of inferential accounts of the mechanisms 
underlying perception and thought that they have fail d to note the rather special and largely isolated 
nature of the inferential processes between beliefs and subdoxastic states.  Failure to take seriously the 
matter of access to consciousness likely has a less cr ditable explanation.  Since the heyday of 
behaviorism, conscious awareness has had a bad name among many psychologists.  And the attitude 
seems to persist even among those who have come to se  behaviorism as a dead end” (1978, 517).  But 
that Stich’s intuitions are so easily resisted even when—post-Fodor—the notion of encapsulation has 
been thoroughly assimilated and behaviorist scruples about consciousness have long receded into the 




features.46  Moreover, Stich plays rather fast and loose with h s intuitions.  He 
identifies it as “a further principle embedded in our pre-theoretic notion of belief” that 
“inference . . . is a relation exclusively among beliefs” (1978, 511).  Yet despite 
holding that inferential relations exist among the states hypothesized in the 
information-processing models of cognitive psychologists,47 he nonetheless—
inconsistently—insists that they are not beliefs.48 
It is also worth considering whether (and how) Davidson could appropriate 
Stich’s argument.  Presumably, Davidson would not rega d Stich’s access and 
integration conditions on belief as constituting a partial analysis of belief in the way 
that Stich, an a priori functionalist, does.  For his account of attribution based on the 
Principle of Charity is as close to an analysis of belief as a normativist like Davidson 
is able to offer.  But could Davidson argue that tht account entails either or both of 
Stich’s conditions on belief? 
I am not prepared to argue definitively that that account does or does not 
entail these conditions.  But a few observations are in order.  First, with respect to the 
                                                
46 For all Stich’s effort to accommodate Freudian unconscious beliefs, Freudian theory is as replete 
with completely inaccessible unconscious informational states as merely repressed ones.  So, in fact, 
Stich’s access-criterion threatens to consign modules like those on which my argument rests in large 
part to the sphere of subdoxastic states and, therefor , potentially outside the scope of normativism.  
Hence, the importance of my addressing Stich’s distinction. 
47 Whether such processes should in fact be seen as inferential is an issue which I consider below. 
48 An additional point worth mentioning is the following: Stich takes for granted that the states 
hypothesized in information-processing models lack inferential integration, and it must be conceded 
that many have been inclined to see informational ecapsulation as an essential feature of modular 
processes.  Carruthers, however, (2006) argues for a picture of modularity that considerably weakens 
or even banishes altogether this condition on modularity.  Accordingly, even if inferential integration 
were required by belief, this would not clearly disqualify all modular states. 
There are complications with respect to access-to-cons iousness as well.  Though such information 
states as those representing things like grammatical rules would be screened off from consciousness, 
many others involved in modular hypotheses have more ordinary contents which are (or can be) 
conscious.  Perhaps, though, in the case of the latter S ich might insist that when such contents are 
conscious it is not the selfsame state that is so.  Rather, a conscious (or pre-conscious) belief gives rise 




access condition, in (2004c), where Davidson defends other Freudian theses, he also 
shows himself friendly to the existence of unconscious attitudes (2004c, 185-86).  It 
is not clear, however, whether or not he would countenance regularly inaccessible 
states as well as merely blocked ones of the sort that Stich addresses.  Second, 
perhaps Davidson’s semantic holism vaguely suggests tha  having a propositional 
content at all, let alone a belief, requires that it be inferentially integrated with the 
broader network of such contents. But, more importantly, Davidson’s Threshold 
Principle, which requires than an agent exhibit a preponderance of (ideal) rationality, 
seems to entail that one’s beliefs be highly integrated.  Otherwise, one runs the risk of 
readily falling into inconsistencies or, more generally, routinely drawing theoretical 
or practical inferences that, though locally rational (i.e., with respect to those attitudes 
with which they are integrated), considered from the standpoint of one’s entire belief 
set, are less than ideally rational.   So quite possibly Davidson would endorse 
inferential integration as a constraint on belief.49 
But most important to note is that in the present dialectical context it would be 
question-begging for Davidson to try to appropriate S ich’s argument along the lines 
just outlined.  For at issue is whether Davidson ca resist my arguments of Chapters 
Four and Five against his normativism by (1) insisting hat his normativism applies 
only to beliefs (and other decision-theoretic attitudes) and (2) denying that modular 
processes involve beliefs.  It is clearly question-begging, then, for him to appeal to his 
normativism to establish that beliefs must be inferentially integrated and that, 
therefore, modular processes cannot count as beliefs.  Hence, I conclude that attempts 
                                                
49 Whether this should lead him to deny that modular processes involve belief, however, will depend 




to ward off my arguments against normativism by invoking a belief-subdoxastic 
distinction fail.50  
Likewise, this holds true of the alternative counter-argument founded on a 
strong reading of ‘subdoxastic’ according to which subdoxastic states are interpreted 
as lacking propositional content altogether.51  On this reading, the counter-argument 
runs as follows: Normativist constraints apply only to propositional attitudes; modular 
mental states are not propositional attitudes; therefore, normativist constraints do not 
apply to modules.  A merit of this version of the argument is that its first premise, 
unlike that of the original version, is uncontroversially true.  This advantage, 
however, is offset by the difficulty of establishing the stronger second premise.  Since 
considerations drawn from (Stich 1978) fail to establish that modular states are not 
beliefs, a fortiori they fail to establish the argument’s second premis , that they are 
non-propositional.  So this version of the counter-argument is equally unavailing. 
Is Normativism Confined to Decision-Theoretic Attitudes? 
Suppose for the moment, however, that Stich had succeeded in establishing 
this much—that modular states are not beliefs (or other decision-theoretic attitudes).  
                                                
50 It is important to be clear here: My point is not that the informational states involved in modules 
should be seen as beliefs.  Whether that is so I take to be an open question.  Rather, my point is that no 
compelling a priori reason has been given to disallow the possibility that modules might involve 
beliefs. 
51 It should be noted that, although Bermudez (2009) ascribes the strong reading to Stich, a careful 
reading of Stich reveals that at no point does he commit himself to subdoxastic states necessarily being 
non-propositional.  Granted, the strong reading is encouraged by the fact that the corresponding 
distinction drawn in traditional epistemology (betwen non-inferential beliefs and the non-belief states 
underpinning them)—on which Stich claims to base his own distinction—is naturally taken as 
coinciding with a propositional/non-propositional distinction.  For the tradition would hold that it is 
precisely because the non-belief states (like sensatio , etc.) lack propositional content that their 
support of ultimate beliefs is non-inferential.  Stich, however, breaks with the traditional distinction in 
allowing that sub-doxastic states can have inferential relations with beliefs (and among themselves).  
While this does not necessarily indicate that he tak s sub-doxastic states to be propositional (since 
perhaps inferential relations can subsist among non-pr positional items—an issue to which I return 
below), it does suggest that one cannot mechanically read off every feature of the traditional distincon 
onto Stich’s own.  Certainly, Stich does not explicitly state that subdoxastic states should be construed 
as non-propositional.  Nor does he cite any considerations that can be construed as establishing that 




This would counter my argument against normativism only if the scope of 
normativism is confined to decision-theoretic attitudes.  But is it?  Above (see p. 68) I 
have argued that Davidson apparently intends charity constraints to apply, not just to 
decision-theoretic attitudes, but to all (familiar) sorts of propositional attitudes.  I 
shall dwell a bit further on this point.  As discussed, this reading of the scope of 
Davidsonian charity is not without its difficulties.  In the first place, his most detailed 
account of attribution (2004e) confines itself to the decision-theoretic attitudes.  Nor 
are attempts to extend his account more broadly unproblematic.  Davidson rejects the 
idea of trying to define other sorts of attitudes in terms of basic, decision-theoretic 
ones.  An alternative approach to extending his account is suggested by George Rey 
(personal communication).  Rey holds that a kind reading of Davidson would see him 
attributing attitudes in two stages: (1) an initial attribution of decision-theoretic 
attitudes and (2) a second round, parasitic on the first, in which non-decision-theoretic 
attitudes are ascribed.  But this leaves Davidson with a rather large—
unacknowledged—promissory note to make good on, namely, setting forth an 
account of how the second round of attribution is to procede.52   
 But even leaving aside the textual evidence, the problems presented by trying 
to restrict the scope of Davidson’s account to decision-theoretic attitudes are even 
greater.  For then Davidsonian interpretativism could no longer claim—even in 
                                                
52 Rey’s proposal raises subtle issues about the relations between Davidson’s attributionism, charity, 
and rationality-evaluability.  On the simplest picture, the scope of all three would coincide.  But Rey 
actually proposes his idea of an extended account of at ribution as a way Davidson, not merely could 
account for all types of attitudes, but might even allow for types which need not hew to charity 
constraints.  In that case, attribution would be broader than charity (and, presumably, rationality-
evaluability).  (I discuss this aspect of Rey’s proposal in greater detail in Chapter Four.)  Davidson 
himself seems to regard at least some non-decision-theoretic attitudes as subject to charity (cf. p. 68 
above).  At any rate, for the time being, I shall assume the correspondence for Davidson of attribution, 




prospect—to amount to a general account of propositional attitudes and propositional 
content.53  It would stand in need of supplementation by some th r style of account 
altogether to handle non-decision-theoretic attitudes.  But diminishing the ambitions 
of the theory entails a corresponding diminishment of i s interest—and plausibility.  
For it seems unlikely that there should be two entir ly disjoint constitutive bases for 
propositional content.  And to the extent that some suitable non-interpretavist basis 
would need to be sought for the additional propositi nal attitudes, Davidsonians 
would face the—perhaps recalcitrant—problem of explaining why that basis is 
unsuited to serve for the decision-theoretic propositional attitudes as well.  So a 
limitation of the scope of interpretavism renders it unsatisfyingly narrow, implausible, 
and unstable.54  Accordingly, all things considered, it appears prefe able to take the 
scope of Davidson’s normativism to encompass all attitudes. 
Thus, the first premise of the counter-argument based on Stich’s belief-
subdoxastic distinction should be rejected: It cannot be assumed that normativist 
constraints are intended to apply only to beliefs and other decision-theoretical 
attitudes.  Accordingly, even if modular states are not decision-theoretic, this will not 
automatically exempt them from having to obey charity constraints.   
                                                
53 Davidson is quite explicit, of course, that his attributionism lays no claim to being an account of the
mental in general, since, for example, it has nothing to say about mental states besides the attitudes.  
But on the view presently being canvassed, its significa ce is still further circumscribed, namely, to a 
subset of those attitudes.   
54 Most of these problems are avoided on the view that takes the additional attitudes as parasitic on 
basic ones: The account retains its interest by being an account of all the attitudes (at least in pros ect), 
does not implausibly involve two disjoint accounts of content, nor lay itself open to subversion by a 
non-normativist alternative.  Of course, there would remain the rather tall order of specifying precisly 




An Argument Based on a Distinction from Hornsby 
 Another, rather similar, counter-argument to my argument against 
normativism is based on the purported distinction between personal and subpersonal 
mental states.  The counter-argument runs as follows: Normativist constraints apply 
only to personal states; modular mental states are ubpersonal states; therefore, 
normativist constraints do not apply to modules.  To assess this argument, it will be 
necessary to attain some clarity about the personal-subpersonal distinction itself.  The 
widespread acceptance of some such distinction among any contemporary 
philosophers of mind warrants dwelling on it at some length. 
The Personal-Subpersonal Distinction 
Hornsby (1997a) offers a lucid treatment of the distinction.  Hornsby observes 
that the personal-subpersonal terminology originates with Daniel Dennett, who, in 
turn, finds precedent for the distinction in the work f Ludwig Wittgenstein and 
Gilbert Ryle (Dennett 1969, 95).  This list of names suggests that it is primarily 
representatives of the hermeneutical approach to the mind who have found it useful to 
employ personal-subpersonal distinctions.  At its most basic, the hermeneutical view 
posits a dichotomy among the methods of the natural and human sciences.  However, 
with the rise of cognitive science in recent decades, which employs natural-scientific 
methods, philosophers like Hornsby have had to retreat somewhat from this stark split 
between the psychological and the natural-scientific.  So Hornsby posits instead a 
distinction within the mental realm between folk or commonsense psychology, on the 
one hand, and scientific psychology, on the other.  She insists that, despite the 
successes of cognitive science, commonsense psychology persists as an autonomous 




ontological and methodological character.55  Whereas traditionally hermeneutical and 
naturalistic approaches to the mind are conceived of as competing, on Hornsby’s 
picture, they are viewed as cooperative enterprises.  Scientific psychology merely 
augments commonsense psychology, while preserving it tact.  “There is no longer 
any need,” she writes, “to choose between accounts . . .” (1997a, 159).  One has the 
best of both worlds—or so it would seem. 
The personal-subpersonal distinction has its place, then, within this project of 
carving out a domain of commonsense psychology insulated from encroachment by 
scientific psychology.  For Hornsby, Dennett, and others, that distinction serves to 
mark the Great Divide between folk and scientific psychology: On the one side is the 
personal level, the domain of familiar, everyday mental states and activities, and on 
the other, the subpersonal level, the more esoteric province of cognitive science.  
More needs to be said, however, by way of clarifying that divide, since the terms 
‘personal’ and ‘subpersonal’ are themselves rather esoteric, and there is no one 
uncontested way of drawing the distinction. 
The Explanatory Distinction 
 Hornsby, citing the example of Dennett, advocates making the distinction in 
terms of the sort of explanations mental states permit.  Thus, she distinguishes 
between states which submit to the explanations of scientific psychology 
(subpersonal) and those which submit to commonsense-psychological explanations 
(personal).  In the case of commonsense-psychological explanations, she clearly 
accords reason-explanation a prominent place, although she takes the commonsense-, 
personal level to include sensation and perception, which plainly requires explanation 
                                                
55 More particularly, as for Davidson, commonsense psychology has an interpretationist basis that 




of some non-rationalizing character: “We constantly treat one another as sentient and 
rationally motivated: we use commonsense psychology,” she writes (1997a, 158). 
As for scientific explanation, presumably she would accord the deductive-
nomological pattern of explanation an important place.  However, she seems 
particularly to emphasize the role in cognitive scien e of what initially appears a 
version of Robert Cummins-style explanation by functional analysis (Cummins 
1983).  Thus, she writes, subpersonal accounts “have a place in a story of how it can 
be that something has the various capacities without which nothing could be the sort 
of intelligible being that a person is” (1997a, 161).  (This stress on the explanation of 
capacities is, of course, characteristic of Cummins-style explanation.).  However, as I 
shall suggest below, it is more likely that she construes cognitive science’s 
explanatory role in terms of Dennett’s three explanatory stances: intentional, design, 
and physical (Dennett 1971). 
In any case, Hornsby clearly holds that mental (and psychologically relevant 
physical) states can be partitioned into disjoint classes according to whether they 
admit of commonsense- or scientific styles of explanation, respectively.  She writes, 
“the accounts of subpersonal Psychology must be addressed to a different set of 
explananda” than those of personal psychology (1997a, 167).  Moreover, on her 
thoroughly hermeneutical view, the explanatory differences among these classes of 
states reflect a deep difference of ontological and methodological character: 




methods.  Most crucially, the states studied in comm nsense-psychology are subject 
to normativist constraints of the general sort articulated by Davidson.56  
Daniel Dennett agrees with Hornsby as to essentials.  Like Hornsby, in his 
original employment of the terms ‘personal’ and ‘subpersonal’, Dennett also makes 
the distinction along explanatory lines.  Unlike Hornsby, however, the early 
Dennett—in a way that now seems dated—limits the subpersonal level to physical 
states of the human being (1969,  esp. 178-79).  Hornsby, writing later than Dennett, 
is in a better position to acknowledge that cognitive psychology trades in both 
neurophysiological states and fully intentional states.  Accordingly, she distinguishes 
two corresponding kinds of subpersonal psychology, “neuroscientific” and 
“ functional” (1997a, 163), and contemporary proponents of the personal-subpersonal 
distinction follow her in this. 
The Whole-Part Distinction 
But one may wonder what justifies marking the split be ween commonsense 
and scientific psychology with the terms ‘personal’ and ‘subpersonal’.  Apparently, at 
least part of what Hornsby has in mind is that only reason-explanations such as figure 
in commonsense psychology seem to involve an essential reference to a person 
(1997a, 157-8, 161).  In providing a rationalizing explanation of why Columbus 
sailed the ocean blue one must mention Columbus himelf (“He wanted to find a 
shorter route to the Orient and believed he could do so by sailing west”), whereas in 
providing scientific explanations of psychological phenomena one can adopt an 
impersonal causal idiom (“Representations p and q in the visual system produce 
representation r”).   
                                                
56 For Hornsby’s allegiance to a broadly Davidsonian account of meaning and content, with its 




Clearly, then, personal-subpersonal distinctions have much to do with subjects 
of predication, that is, with which subjects possess which mental and 
neurophysiological properties.  This connection to subjects of predications is explicit 
in a second personal-subpersonal distinction that Hornsby discusses, if only to reject 
it.  Hornsby observes that the personal-subpersonal distinction is sometimes drawn in 
terms of a whole-part distinction, personal-level states being those properly 
predicated of the whole person, subpersonal-level state , of some part of the person.  
She notes, further, that the whole-part distinction is ot equivalent to the explanatory 
distinction, since, she maintains, “there can be facts bout (whole) persons which, 
because they lack explanations from the commonsense standpoint of commonsense 
psychology, are not personal-level facts [in the explanatory sense]” (1997a, 162).  
(Apparently, she means the “capacities and abilities upon which our being 
commonsense psychological subjects depends,” things like the ability to “recognize 
faces, to catch balls, to do long multiplication . . .” [1997a, 159].)  Since, as I have 
emphasized, her main interest in the personal-subpersonal distinction is to mark out a 
domain methodologically discontinuous with natural science, she sets aside the 
whole-part distinction in favor of her and Dennett’s explanatory distinction. 
However, although she is not explicit, it is fairly clear that she conceives of 
her distinction as at least in large part coinciding with the whole-part distinction.  For 
at several points she helps herself to formulations that reflect that distinction.  Thus, 
for example, in discussing functional subpersonal accounts of the seemingly simple 
activity of catching balls, she maintains that the abundant complex tacit calculations 




(1997a, 165).  That is, they are activities of some part (or parts) of the ball-catcher, 
not of the whole person herself.  It is instructive, then, to consider how the whole-part 
distinction divides up mental and neurophysiological st tes into personal and 
subpersonal categories.   
Proponents of a whole-part distinction have a very definite conception how 
that distinction carves up such states.  On that conception, the personal is supposed to 
take in conscious mental states, whereas the subpersonal is supposed to consist of 
(deeply) unconscious states, as well as any neurophysiological states that support 
mental activity.57  The affinity in this regard to Stich’s belief-subdoxastic distinction 
is striking.  Granted, Stich is more exclusively focused on mental states (and, even 
more specifically, informational ones).  However, with respect to these, he is explicit 
in placing the boundary between beliefs and subdoxastic states along the 
conscious/deep unconscious divide.58  The impression one has is that the belief-
subdoxastic and personal-subpersonal distinctions, though notionally quite 
different—the former is couched in functionalist terms, the latter in terms of subjects 
of predication (or style of explanation)—give expression to the same root intuition: 
                                                
57 The qualifier ‘deeply’ is required because proponents of the whole-part distinction would assign 
states that are merely contingently inaccessible to consciousness to the whole person.  For example, the 
repressed states postulated by psychoanalytic theory would be judged personal, since on that theory 
they are ultimately accessible (though with difficulty).  By contrast, the thoroughly inaccessible states 
of the cognitive unconscious would be classified as subpersonal.  For the notion of a deep unconscious 
see (Searle 1992).  On the cognitive unconscious see (Kihlstrom 1999). 
58 As noted (see p. 134 above), he takes access to consciousness as a necessary feature of belief.  More
precisely, he maintains that our intuitions can allow for lack of conscious access when this is due, as in 
the case of psychoanalytic theory, to “a psychological mechanism capable of interfering with the 
ordinary process leading from belief to assent or to conscious awareness” (1978, 505).  So it is deeply 
unconscious states subserving belief-formation that he reckons subdoxastic. 
It is worth noting, further, that Stich seems to view his other condition on belief, inferential integration, 
as performing no additional work in determining theextensions of ‘belief’ and ‘sub-doxastic’.  




that folk and scientific psychology carve up the mental sphere along the 
conscious/deep unconscious divide.  
But does the whole-part distinction succeed in capturing the intended 
extensions where Stich’s distinction did not?  Now perfect sense can be made of a 
distinction between states and properties of the whole person and of a part of the 
person.  My brain, for example, has the property of being smaller than a breadbasket 
whereas I myself lack that property.  However, there is little reason to suppose that 
the whole-part distinction corresponds to the categori s of conscious and non-
conscious states, respectively. 
For example, despite Hornsby’s claims to the contrary, can’t one attribute the 
tacit calculations involved in ball-catching to the whole person, to the ball-catcher as 
well as, say, some module (or modules) forming partof her mental architecture?  To 
many of us, there will appear nothing incoherent in saying something like, “She (the 
ball-catcher), albeit unconsciously and involuntarily, performs numerous complex 
calculations before placing her legs and arms in a position suitable for catching the 
ball.”  Why, then, are typical proponents of the personal-subpersonal distinction 
inclined to say that there is?  It cannot be on the basis of some general principle that 
states properly predicated of mere parts cannot be s at s of the whole of which they 
are parts.  For anyone will readily admit (quite loudly, in fact) that hey touched the 
hot stove, when their hand accidentally comes in contact with it.  Though to infer that 
something must belong to a whole because it belongs to its part is to commit a fallacy 
of composition, it is equally fallacious to infer that what belongs to the part cannot 




would be forced to concede that the familiar states (s nsations, perceptions, beliefs, 
desires, etc.) that belong to the part of the person known as the conscious mind are 
themselves subpersonal, not states of the whole person at all! 
So why do proponents of the whole-part distinction think that distinction 
divides mental and neurophysiological states up in the way that they suppose?  I 
suspect that what may be at work here is the following: At times, people are 
susceptible to an intuition that they (their self, the person that they are) begins and 
ends at the borders of their consciousness; that whlies beyond, the unconscious 
mental states cognitive scientists attribute to them, are not, in fact, their own.  Indeed, 
someone in the grip of this intuition feels that the entire cognitive unconscious is no
part of one’s self;59 even more, that the very brain and body to which they are 
attached is no part of them.  Of course, this intuition is a dualist one; but the longevity 
of that philosophy of mind bespeaks the prevalence and power of this intuition. 
This intuition concerns a distinction between the person and the non-person 
(between my states and the states of what is not even part of me, although associated 
with my thinking in some way).  Moreover, those in the grip of this intuition place the 
boundary between person and non-person precisely where t e adherent of the whole-
part distinction does, namely, between conscious and no -conscious states.60  
Perhaps, then, at some level those tempted by the whole-part distinction confuse their 
personal-subpersonal distinction with this person-nonperson distinction.  
                                                
59 This sense is intensified by the strangeness of the sorts of processes and states involved in accounts 
of the cognitive unconscious. It reaches its extreme when, as in phenomena like unconscious racism, 
the contents attributed are ones that we, not just fail to identify with, but would consciously repudiate 
(cf. Wilson 2002). 
60 Perhaps the distinction is better put as one between s lf and non-self.  This is because what is no part 
of me may be part (or parcel) of some other person.  Indeed, one can be drawn to a view that sees the 





They may also be misled by a specious argument along the lines of the 
following: 
(1) The cognitive unconscious (and other such parts of minds) are 
essentially minds in miniature. 
 
(2) Token mental states cannot be shared by different minds. 
 
(3) Therefore, a person cannot share in the token mtal states of the 
cognitive unconscious. 
 
The first premise may or may not be true; the issue involved are complex and best 
addressed in another context.  The second premise, of course, is one that many in the 
history of philosophy have found compelling, perhaps even a conceptual truth.  But 
even supposing both premises true, the argument is, of course, invalid.  It can be 
rendered valid by supplying the additional premise that persons are minds, but that is 
not something one can take for granted.  Indeed, on the usual view, a person is neither 
identical to, nor (at least typically) constituted by, a mind.  Rather, they are in some 
sense composites of both mind and body.61  So the argument under consideration fails 
to justify the conclusion that deeply unconscious states cannot be states of the whole 
person, as the proponent of the whole-part distinctio  believes.   In fact, if the 
argument were sound, it would boomerang against the proponent of the whole-part 
distinction.  Applied to the conscious part of the mind it would yield the conclusion 
that persons cannot share in the token mental states of the conscious mind either!  
Again, there seems little reason to think that a whole-part distinction coincides with a 
distinction between conscious and unconscious states. 
                                                
61 The intuition that one’s self consists in one’s consciousness may lull some, however, into accepting 
that persons are minds.  That intuition, though question-begging in the present context, may further 




 Accordingly, it is unavailing to the normativist who hopes to evade the force 
of my argument against normativism by confining the sphere of application of charity 
principles to personal states.  For the whole-part distinction fails to exclude the 
unconscious subsystems on which my argument relies from the putatively charity-
governed personal sphere.  But perhaps the explanatory distinction will fare better in 
making the desired cut. 
Assessing the Explanatory Distinction  
There are grounds, however, for doubting the very tnability of the 
explanatory distinction.  As noted, Hornsby holds that her explanatory distinction 
bifurcates mental states into those that allow of only scientific explanation 
(subpersonal) and those that allow of only commonsense-explanation, especially 
reason-explanation (personal).  Whereas the former possess the status of scientific 
posits, the latter demand an interpretationist account, one which subjects them to 
charity constraints. 
 But there is cause to harbor some doubt about Hornsby’s bifurcation.  Perhaps 
one and the same state can admit of both rationalizi g and scientific explanation, say, 
deductive-nomological explanation.  As I argue below (p. 158, and n. 68), systems 
like those posited by cognitive scientists to explain human reasoning seem to involve 
processes that permit both ordinary reason-explanations and purely causal, 
information-processing ones.  So there is some reason to question Hornsby’s 
bifurcation of states by style of explanation.  But perhaps if pressed, Hornsby could 
simply recast her explanatory distinction in terms of those that admit of scientific 
styles of explanation, on the one hand, and those that admit of only reason-




states that are scientifically-tractable and those that are not, despite the consideration 
that I have just raised, and this might suffice for he  purpose of marking out an 
autonomous domain of commonsense psychology.62  However, there is ample reason 
to doubt whether commonsense psychology is secure against the inroads of scientific 
patterns of explanation. 
In the first place, it may be that folk-psychological explanation itself can be 
cast in deductive-nomological terms.  Many think that folk psychology is a shared 
(possibly innate) tacit theory which people use to xplain one another’s behavior 
along the lines of the scientific model (see, e.g., Gopnik and Melzoff 1997).  The 
reason-explanations that people cite explicitly may simply be elliptical expressions of 
unarticulated underlying explanations fitting the D-N model.  Such a view, if true, 
would completely undermine Hornsby’s insistence on the explanatory distinctiveness 
of folk psychology. 
Of course, the theory-theory view of folk psychology on which such a 
conclusion rests is controversial.  Moreover, in farness to Hornsby, it must be 
granted that, prima facie, much in the sphere of folk psychology may look out f 
reach of scientific explanation.  Scientific psychological treatments tend to be 
directed at the workings of subsystems of the mind or person, leaving the field largely 
clear for commonsensical explanations of the large-scale behavior of the person. 
But this is not to concede the impossibility of scientific-psychological 
explanation at that level.  Behavior at that level would almost certainly be the 
                                                
62 Though she would have to concede that at least many cognitive-scientific processes permit reason-
explanation and, therefore, are ‘rationality-evaluab e’ (i.e., permitting of evaluation by rational 
standards), she could, nonetheless, consistently maintain that they are immune to charity requirements.  
So the modified personal-subpersonal distinction could still serve to bracket off irrational subsystems 




complex resultant of the interactions of numerous psychological subsystems.  It may 
very well be, therefore, that few, if any, law-like g neralizations can be formulated 
that apply directly to that large-scale level which, in turn, would permit employment 
in standard deductive-nomological explanations.  But given laws applying to the 
subsystems and a model of how they interact, it might be possible in principle, 
however much difficult in practice, to provide scientific explanations of an 
individual’s large-scale behavior.  In that case, rationalizing or other commonsensical 
explanations would at best amount to practically indispensable stopgaps, to be 
employed pending attainment to fuller, more adequate scientific explanations. 
Moreover, when one turns from the human being’s overt b havior to their 
familiar mental states (their beliefs, desires, perceptions, etc.), the prospects for 
scientific explanation appear much improved.  As I intimated above (p. 144), 
Hornsby seems beholden to Dennett’s picture of cognitive science.  But that picture, I 
think, misrepresents its true character.  On that well-known view, human beings’ 
behavior in the broadest sense permits explanation  three independent levels, the 
intentional-, design-, and physical-levels (Dennett 1971).  Commonsense psychology, 
with its vocabulary of familiar states and its rationalizing pattern of explanation, 
operates at the intentional-level, whereas cognitive science stakes out the lower 
design- and physical-levels.  Perhaps Hornsby would see the two sorts of subpersonal 
psychology she mentions, functional and neurophysiolog cal, as corresponding to 
these two levels, respectively. 
Clearly, this picture lends itself wonderfully to the view that commonsense 




on this picture, each level addresses its own proprietary set of explananda, with the 
methods and concepts peculiar to that level.  Cognitive science, thus banished to the 
design- and physical-levels, leaves folk psychology, occupying the intentional-level, 
intact. 
This tidy picture suggests that the states which cognitive science trades in are 
taxonomically distinct from those of commonsense psychology.  Indeed, Hornsby is 
quite explicit in contrasting “belief and desire,” for example, with the “states of a 
subpersonal Psychology,” however great the “information l, or ‘cognitive’, 
sophistication” of those latter states may be (1997a, 164-65).  But the fact that 
psychological theorists with no particular philosophical axe to grind so readily apply 
the familiar categories of belief, desire, etc., to the informational and desiderative 
states that figure in their modular (and other) accounts suggests that the burden of 
proof is on proponents of Hornsby’s distinction to show that the unconscious states 
these accounts treat of are not of familiar sorts.63  On its face, a personal-subpersonal 
distinction appears a needless reduplication of types of mental state: for every 
familiar sort of mental state, proponents of that dis inction are forced, 
uneconomically, to posit an analogue on the other side of the conscious-unconscious 
divide.  But why should not instead one and the same familiar sort of mental state be 
capable of enjoying a dual life on each side of that divide? 
Moreover, Hornsby’s tidy picture on which commonsense- and scientific 
psychology operate at distinct explanatory levels fail  to do justice to the way 
cognitive science actually works.  Pace Hornsby and Dennett, the explanatory models 
                                                
63 Hornsby clearly allows that such states include propositional attitudes, indeed, ones “whose contents 




which cognitive scientists typically formulate do n t treat of some set of explananda 
altogether isolated from those of commonsense psychology.  For it must be allowed 
that cognitive psychology seeks to explain familiar kinds of states like conscious 
sensations, perceptions, beliefs, and desires (such as some would characterize as 
personal), even if in doing so it appeals to an apparatus of, in some respects markedly 
different, deeply unconscious states and processes (which some might be tempted to 
label ‘subpersonal’).  The abstruse posits of cognitive scientists are introduced to 
causally explain conscious perceptions, beliefs, etc. Thus, for example, a module that 
parses sentences along Chomskyean lines, on the basis of quite ordinary perceptual 
information as input delivers a quite ordinary grammatical judgment as output 
(Chomsky 1980).  Even if the intervening steps be thought to involve reference to 
unfamiliar sorts of states, they must be thought of as enmeshed in a complex causal 
interaction with familiar sorts.  Hornsby and Dennett’s picture falsifies both scientific 
and commonsense-psychology by neglecting their close relationship.   
Moreover, the inescapable overlap among commonsensical and scientific 
psychology—the fact that conscious perceptions, beliefs, etc., need to figure in both 
forms of psychology—threatens the very consistency of Hornsby’s personal-
subpersonal distinction.  For Hornsby’s distinction s supposed to mark an ontological 
and methodological divide; and even if there is no problem imagining a type of state 
(belief, say) figuring in both commonsensical and scientific explanations, that 
ordinary types of states would need to figure in both commonsense and scientific 
psychology would (on the hermeneuticist’s assumptions) require them—per 




simultaneously!  In sum, a personal-subpersonal distinction such as Hornsby wants to 
draw appears untenable.  Accordingly, it fails to aff rd the normativist a coherent 
basis on which the scope of charity can be restricted to a subset of propositional 
attitudes and, therefore, can be of no real use to the normativist who wishes to evade 
the force of my anti-normativist argument.   
Are Modular Processes Non-Inferential? 
 Another attempt to counter my argument against normativism might seek to 
deny the relevance of modular processes to charity principles by denying that 
standards of rationality even apply to such processes, that is, by denying that they are 
‘rationality-evaluable’.  In particular, I mean to c nsider a possible argument for this 
conclusion based on denying that modular processes are inferential:  If the transitions 
between states of modules are non-inferential, theny would seem not to permit 
reason-explanation and, therefore, fall out of the sphere of evaluation by rational 
norms altogether.   
 The notion that modular processes are not inferential might be suggested from 
certain considerations mentioned by Zenon Pylyshyn (2003).  Whereas Fodor’s usage 
of ‘inference’ (e.g., in Fodor 1983) is quite liberal, Pylyshyn does not think it 
appropriately employed “to refer to processes that are systematically restricted as to 
what type of input they may take and the type of principles that they follow” (2003, 
38n8).  Thus, he wishes to distinguish inference from “other sorts of causal 
regularities” on the basis of (at least) two criteria.  Inferential processes must apply to 
representations from all domains and they must embody distinctively logical 




involved in early vision are inferential (since they take only visual inputs and embody 
non-logical processes), his line of reasoning might be hought to impact other 
putatively modular processes as well.64  So it merits some consideration. 
 Many sorts of modules postulated by theorists besides early vision follow 
principles which appear non-logical.  Thus, desire-forming modules produce desires 
on the basis of various inputted beliefs, etc., yield desires as outputs, where there can 
hardly be said to be logical principles which licens  the transition from those beliefs, 
etc., to the desire.65  Moreover, domain-specificity, if not exactly a necessary 
condition for modularity, is characteristic of most modules posited by contemporary 
theorists.  In fact, at least for proponents of massive modularity, the bulk of deductive 
and statistical inferences are supposed to be carried out by domain-specific modules.  
                                                
64 One can envision another route to the specific conclusion that early vision is not inferential.  In 
logic, ‘inference’ is, of course, a synonym of ‘argument’, where this is typically understood as a 
structure consisting of propositions.  So if one accepts Fodor’s line that early-visual contents are not 
propositional, then, guided by the logical usage, one may be inclined to conclude that early-visual 
processes are non-inferential.  With respect to putatively modular processes more broadly, the intuition 
(discussed by Stich but, ultimately, rejected—see p. 137 above) that inference is a relation only among 
beliefs will lead one to conclude that modular processes are non-inferential if they do not involve 
beliefs (say, because they are subdoxastic).  I have argued there is no compelling reason to accept th 
notion that modular processes are subdoxastic.  But the intuition would still entail that non-
propositional, Fodorian early vision is not inferential since it cannot involve belief, which is 
uncontroversially propositional.  Moreover, the intu tion would yield the same conclusion even with 
respect to modules whose processes involve any sort of p opositional attitude besides belief (e.g., 
desire-forming modules, for which see Carruthers [2006]).  In this thesis, I do not assess whether 
inference subsists only among beliefs or propositional attitudes, since, as will emerge, I think the 
rationality-evaluability of modules can be defended even if they are non-inferential. 
65 In the first instance, one might conclude this because the output of such modules is a desire and, one 
might hold, logical principles only apply to beliefs.  However, if one takes a less narrow view of the 
‘logical principles’ which, according to Pylyshyn, must figure in inferences, then perhaps they can 
involve non-informational states like desires and itentions.  Pylyshyn’s focus is theoretical, but to 
allow for practical reasoning, Pylyshyn, it seems, should grant that processes can count as inferential in 
virtue of embodying any sort of principle of rationality, not just those that are logical in character.  In 
that case, the conclusion that the desire-forming modules do not involve inference is much less 
straightforward.  For, presumably, Pylyshyn does not want to require that the principles underlying 
inference be normatively correct ones.  That is, unless he is a normativist, he will not wish a priori to 
preclude the possibility of regular patterns of bad inference.  So on what basis is one to say that the 
desire-forming modules do not operate according to logical or rational principles as opposed to 




By Pylyshyn’s criteria, however, these could not count as genuine ‘inferences’.66  Is 
there perhaps something amiss with Pylyshyn’s criteria? 
 It should be noted first that Pylshyn does not really provide any argument for 
his criteria of inference.  But there is a certain—at least prima facie—force to his 
assertion that inferential processes must involve distinctively logical principles: Isn’t 
it logic, after all, that treats of inference?67  But it is much less clear why one should 
insist that processes be unrestricted in their inputs if they are to count as inferential.  
Imagine a module that takes inputs only from some specific domain like folk biology 
and then issues in beliefs of the form ‘a is M’  when the inputs include beliefs of the 
forms ‘All S are M’ and ‘a is S’.  It seems quite natural to label this process an 
inference, even though if—say, by some alteration of its connections with other 
modules—it were fed inputs from some other domain, it would operate quite 
differently or even yield no output at all.  Indeed, it seems quite possible to provide a 
reason-explanation of why the bearer of these states comes to believe a is M, namely, 
because she believes that all S are M and that a is S.68  It seems arbitrary to deny that 
there is an inference here.69   
                                                
66 In fairness to Pylyshyn, it should be noted that his attention is confined to vision.  It is not clear 
whether he contemplates the possibility that ‘cognitio ’ (in contrast to input systems) might be 
modular as well.  But, in any case, it is appropriate to ask what the conditions he places on inference 
imply with respect to modules involving central processes. 
67 There may be some difficulty in clarifying just what is and is not a logical principle, as opposed to a
bad logical principle, but this need not be an insoluble problem.  (Deductive logical principles at least, 
I suppose, could be characterized as ones involving only topic-neutral vocabulary.)   
68 It is this seeming possibility of applying such reason-explanations to modules which suggests that 
Hornsby (cf. p. 132 above) cannot define personal-level mental states simply as those that permit 
reason-explanation.  Rather, it appears, she needs to define them as those that admit only of reason-
explanation (and not also of scientific explanation). 
69 Perhaps Pylyshyn is guilty of a confusion.  If processes’ inputs are domain-specific, that might be 
thought to preclude the principles on which they operate from counting as logical, since logical 
principles are supposed to be domain-general.  But such principles are domain-general in the special 





 Ultimately, I do not wish to take a definitive stand as to whether (or which) 
modular processes are inferential.  Given my general scientific-essentialist 
orientation, I am inclined to think constraints on what counts as inference will need to 
be determined a posteriori, not a priori, as Pylyshyn attempts to determine them.  But 
suppose Pylyshyn’s criteria of inference are correct.  Even though this would rule out 
most modular processes from counting as inferential, I do not think this would have 
the implication, fatal to my argument, that modules are not rationality-evaluable and, 
therefore, beyond the scope of charity constraints.  This is so for at least two reasons.  
First, rational standards are statal as well as procedural.  So even if modular processes 
themselves are exempt from rational norms, the stats which they output (and even 
the intervening states bound up in their internal operations) would appear subject to 
such norms as the requirement of logical consistency.  Moreover, the processes 
themselves, even if non-inferential, will be subject to epistemological norms 
governing belief-formation, which apply regardless of whether the relevant processes 
are inferential.70  Hence, charity principles can still get a grip even with respect to 
modules that involve non-inferential processing.  So I conclude that the potential 
counter-argument to my argument against normativism that attempts to exempt 
modules from the scope of charity by consigning them to a special realm of 
arationality fails. 
 In fact, as my discussion of Stich, Hornsby, and Pylyshyn has shown, attempts 
to remove modular processes from the scope of charity qu te generally appear 
unpromising.  That is, to the extent one is inclined to view propositional attitudes as 
                                                
70 Some, e.g., Stephen Stich (1990), interpret rationl ty broadly to include epistemological norms.  But 
whether one places the latter within or alongside the set of rational norms, normativists like Davidson 




subject to charity constraints, there will be little principled basis for denying that 
modular processes can be so constrained as well.  Accordingly, the tenability of those 
very constraints is rendered dubious by the scientif c possibility of modules that do 




Chapter Four: An Argument From Basic Freudian 
Wish-Fulfilment 
Introduction 
 With characterizations of charity and modularity in place, I can begin to 
develop my argument against normativism by describing a module which embodies 
some of the key processes which Freud ascribes to the part of the personality which 
he labels the ‘id’,1 namely, basic forms of what Freud refers to as ‘wih-fulfilment’.  I 
will argue that this module conflicts with the princ ple of charity, at least the 
influential version of it proposed by Davidson.  More ver, given the evident 
coherence of this module, I shall suggest, there is a on to reject normativism’s 
insistence on the principle of charity as a condition of agency.  Finally, I shall 
respond to objections that might be raised specifically against the employment my 
argument makes of Freudian theory and phenomena. 
Freud’s Id 
Freud introduced the word ‘id’ (or, rather, its German equivalent, ‘das Es’) 
relatively late in his career (see, esp., Freud 1923).  Prior to his formulation of a 
tripartite division of the personality into id, ego, and superego, he worked with a 
picture of the personality as consisting of consciousness and the Unconscious, or as 
Freud sometimes refers to these parts of the personality, the systems Cs. and Ucs. 
(see, e.g., Freud 1915).2  “The nucleus of the Ucs.,” Freud writes, “. . . consists of 
                                                
1 Freud uses ‘primary processing’ as a general term o refer to the sorts of mental processes involved in 
the id. 
2 Freud’s earlier view of mental architecture is someti es referred to as his ‘topographical’ model of 
the mind, whereas the later, three-part view, as his ‘structural’ model.  With respect to the former, 
however, it should be noted that he sometimes refers to the system Cs. as the ‘preconscious’ (Ps.), 




wishful impulses” (1915, 186).  It is to the system Ucs., further, that unacceptable 
mental contents are consigned through the repressing agency of the system Cs.  But 
since the processes involved in repression (as opposed t  what might be termed 
deliberate ‘suppression’) are themselves unconsciou, t gradually dawns on Freud 
that it only confuses the issue to label the system to which they belong ‘Cs.’  The 
classification of parts of the personality that he has really intended to make all along 
is not fundamentally one based on access to consciousness.  So ‘system Cs.’ yields to 
‘ego’, and ‘system Ucs.’ to ‘id’. 3  But though the terminology changes, the referents 
(by and large) do not.  Accordingly, in characterizing the id, I indifferently apply 
Freud’s pronouncements about the system Ucs. to the id. 
 The id, the ontogenetically earliest system, is the seat of various biological 
instincts or needs (hunger, for example).4  Its function is to rid the organism of 
psychic energy or tension produced by internal and external stimulation.  At first, the 
id exists as a mere sensory-motor mechanism which releases tension (and wards off 
further stimulation) through reflex actions.  But this mechanism ultimately proves 
insufficient to quell such sources of tension as hunger.  So a psychological 
development ensues.  Primary process comes into being.  ‘Primary processing’—it is 
primary in point of time—is Freud’s blanket term for the distinctive mode of 
functioning of the id.5  Within primary process, memory-images of instinctual objects 
                                                                                                                                 
their—relatively—ready capacity for consciousness (1915, 173).  The distinction between Cs. and 
Ucs., then, should be understood as largely one of access. 
3 On Freud’s considered view, then, ego states correlate only imperfectly with (access-)conscious ones 
and id states with (access-)unconscious ones.  
4 The brief sketch in this paragraph of some of the central features of the id leans heavily on Hall 
(1954, 15-21). 
5 At times, however (cf. 1915, 187), Freud uses ‘primary process’ specifically with reference to two 
processes, displacement and condensation, which he regards as “distinguishing marks” of primary 




such as food are produced in order to satisfy the wishes caused by instinctual 
demands.  They can do so because the id does not distinguish between such memory-
images and genuine perception.  It is this representatio  of “the wish fulfilled as a 
hallucinatory experience” which Freud terms wi h-fulfilment (1916-17, 129)  The id, 
operating according to the pleasure principle, strives “towards gaining pleasure,” 
with an “entire disregard of reality-testing” (1911, 219, 225).  The unconscious 
processes of the id “equate reality of thought with external actuality, and wishes with 
their fulfilment—with the event . . .” (1911, 225).  As such primary process itself 
proves inadequate to meet the individual’s instinctual demands, secondary process, 
the logical, reality-oriented patterns of thought belonging to the ego, develops.  But 
primary process is by no means supplanted altogether.  In circumstances where the 
ego is unable satisfactorily to minister to one’s wi hes, primary process revives.  Such 
is the case, for example, during sleep, when primary process produces hallucinatory 
images in the form of dreams.6  Moreover, Freud sees wish-fulfilment as implicated 
in other processes as well, such as neurotic symptos. 
 Aside from the id’s wish-fulfilling character, its blithe disregard for reality, 
Freud assigns several other distinctive features to the id and its processes.  As Freud 
writes, the “latent processes” of the id have “characteristics and peculiarities which 
seem alien to us, or even incredible, and which run directly counter to the attributes of 
consciousness with which we are familiar” (1915, 170).  He maintains, first, that 
within the id there is “exemption from mutual contradiction” (1915, 186).  But despite 
initial appearances, his point does not seem to be that the id freely forms 
                                                
6 More strictly, primary process—the id—produces  dreams as conscious byproducts of its unconscious 




contradictory beliefs.  Rather, as emerges from the following, his point seems to be 
that the id readily allows conflicting wishes to exist side by side without either being 
gratified in preference to the other: “When two wishful impulses whose aims must 
appear to us incompatible become simultaneously active, the two impulses do not 
diminish each other or cancel each other out, but combine to form an intermediate 
aim, a compromise” (1915, 186).7  From the standpoint of charity, of course, this 
tolerance of conflicting wishes is a much less drastic feature than the tolerance of 
contradictory beliefs would be.    
Moreover, it appears that beliefs within the id are unhedged, that within the id 
there is “no negation, no doubt, no degrees of certainty” (1915, 186).8  Again, Freud 
maintains that the id’s processes are timeless: “they are not ordered temporally, are 
not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all” (1915, 187).  
Presumably, he means that the id’s contents are untensed, that the id lacks temporal 
concepts altogether.9  Additionally, the id is marked by what Freud labels ‘mobility of 
cathexes’, by which at bottom he seems to mean that the strength of wishes within the 
id is variable, with one wish capable either of surrendering its strength to another 
(‘displacement’) or appropriating the strength attaching to several others 
(‘condensation’) (1915, 186-87). 
Doubtless, much exegetical work would be needed to formulate and defend a 
definitive interpretation of Freud’s pronouncements on the characteristics of the id.  
                                                
7 If within the process of wish-fulfilment a wish that p invariably gave rise to a belief that p—along 
lines which I expound below—then the existence of conflicting wishes in the id would compel Freud 
to acknowledge contradictory beliefs there as well.  But Freud’s remark that in such cases of conflict a 
compromise is sought averts this commitment. 
8 Perhaps Freud also means to assert that the id lacks the concept of logical negation, although it is not 
entirely clear in the present passage. 




But I shall spare myself that effort, since I shall be selective with respect to the 
features of the id that I shall assign the charity-v olating module upon which my 
argument against normativism turns.  It is primarily the id’s wish-fulfilling character 
that is reflected in the module that I shall describe.  The cogency of my argument in 
no way depends upon my fidelity to Freudian ideas in all respects.  In fact, inasmuch 
as some have found Freud’s full conception of the id dubiously coherent, my 
argument can only gain in force if the relevant module draws modestly from the set of 
characteristics Freud attaches to the id.  Any doubts an impartial judge might harbor 
about the coherence of Freud’s id, I am confident, will lapse with respect to the 
module I describe, which, again, seeks to embody Freud’s central ideas about wish-
fulfilment.10 
Basic Wish-fulfilment  
Because the case for the conflict between Charity and a wish-fulfilling module 
can be made without bringing in the less basic sorts of wish-fulfilment, I shall 
initially only treat the two most basic sorts mentio ed above: infantile hallucination 
and dreaming.  And, with respect to the latter, I shall only mention the dreams of 
young children, which in Freud’s view, are straightforward, undisguised wish-
fulfilments (1916-17, 126-35).  Only subsequently, in discussing less basic forms of 
wish-fulfilment, will I treat the “dreamwork,” that is, the various processes by which 
according to Freudian theory the wishes instigating dreams in adults (the dream’s 
                                                
10 Linda Brakel (2002) offers a defense of the coherence of the id even construed as possessing most of 
the striking properties Freud assigns it.  She argues for its coherence by demonstrating its consistency 
with a certain atomistic account of content, namely, Ruth Millikan’s proper-function naturalism (cf. 
Millikan, 1993).  In the present context, I take no stand with respect to the success of her attempted 
defense.  (A complication is that her enumeration of the features of the id—and her interpretation of 




“latent content”) are rendered unrecognizable in the dream-imagery which expresses 
them (“manifest content”). 
Sebastian Gardner (1993) presents a thoughtful reconstruction of Freud’s 
theory of the basic forms of wish-fulfilment.11  He extracts something like the 
following structure for such wish-fulfilment: An unsatisfied biological need, (1), 
yields a wish, (2), which, in turn, produces a wish-fulfilling representation, (3), 
causing a feeling of satisfaction,12 (4), that, finally, leads to the termination (or 
quiescence) of the wish, (5) (1993, 124-25).  Moreover, Gardner lays stress on several 
features of his reconstruction.  First, the wish-fulfilling representation, (3), as an 
hallucinatory experience, is sensory in character; and the feeling of satisfaction, (4), is 
an experience of sense-pleasure.  Thus, neither introduces an element of judgment or 
belief into wish-fulfilment.  Although the wish-fulfilling representation possesses a 
content, it is of a pre-propositional character (1993, 122). 
                                                
11 See esp. 120-26.  Gardner credits James Hopkins for the conception of wish-fulfilment he develops 
(124n18). 
12 With respect to the words ‘satisfaction’ and ‘fulfilment’, some terminological clarification is in 
order.  First, it is worth noting that though the English ‘wish-fulfilment’ is used to translate Freud’s 
‘Wunschbefriedigung’, the second element of that compound is usually rendered as ‘satisfaction’ in 
English (although sometimes as ‘fulfilment’).  Second, in common parlance, ‘satisfaction’ and 
‘fulfilment’ seem virtually synonymous.  Third, I think it is safe to say that in the phenomenon of 
wish-fulfilment wishes are neither satisfied nor fulfilled in any ordinary sense. 
Acknowledging this, Richard Wollheim introduces a terminological distinction between what he calls 
‘satisfaction’ and ‘gratification’ (Wollheim 1979, 47).  He defines the terms roughly as follows: 
 
my desire that p is satisfied iff p 
my desire that p is gratified iff it is for me as if p  
 
With the former, Wollheim appears to want to capture o dinary usage of ‘satisfaction’, but with the 
latter, the “kind of pseudo-satisfaction,” as he puts it, that Freudian wish-fulfilment represents (for a 
related notion, which Peter Carruthers calls ‘quasi-s tisfaction’, see Carruthers [2006, 297]). 
I largely leave to one side for the moment what Wollheim thinks it takes for it to be “for me as if p”.  
But at least part of what he has in mind is what I, following Gardner, call ‘the feeling of satisfaction’ in 
my reconstruction of wish-fulfilment.  This is just the familiar sort of pleasure that often accompanies 




 Such wish-fulfilment is usefully contrasted with what Davidson in (2004a) 
describes as “wishful thinking” on “a minimal account.”  On such an account, wishful 
thinking is “a case of believing something because on  wishes it were true” (2004a, 
205).  For example, it seems one can imagine a phenom on of a structure similar to 
that which Gardner sketches in which wishes immediat ly give rise to beliefs of 
identical propositional content (call this phenomenon WT.)13  Such would qualify as 
wishful thinking on the minimal account but not as wi h-fulfilment, which seems to 
essentially involve a sensory element.  In fact, Gardner emphasizes that basic forms 
of wish-fulfilment need not be supposed to involve propositional belief at all.  He 
observes, “it is not a priori that belief is a condition for the cessation” of the wishes 
involved; “and there is no independent reason . . . for introducing belief into the 
process,” since “there are no further effects to be explained that would provide 
evidence for the presence” of a belief (1993, 125). 
Nor, in Gardner’s view, should the ‘wishes’ involved in wish-fulfilment be 
understood as ordinary wishes or, indeed, any other familiar desiderative 
propositional attitude: “the psychoanalytic concept of wish is not the same as, 
however closely it may be related to, the concept ex ressed by ordinary use of the 
term” (1993, 126).  Indeed, he denies that psychoanalytic wishes are propositional 
attitudes at all.14  The upshot, then, is that on Gardner’s reconstruction at least, basic 
forms of “wish-fulfilment” involve “only pre-propositional content” (1993, 122). 
Now in certain respects, Gardner’s account of basic wish-fulfilment is not 
inimical to my aim of demonstrating a conflict betwen Freudian wish-fulfilment and 
                                                
13 I shall return to this point below. 




Davidsonian Charity.  First, Gardner appears to conceive of wish-fulfilment as a sort 
of competence.  The impression he gives is of wish-fulfilment occurring as a ceteris 
paribus regularity in circumstances where the straightforward meeting of biological 
needs is impossible (as for the infant or dreamer).  Moreover, on his conception, the 
relevant competence is not a rational one in that the phenomenon of wish-fulfilment 
involves non-rationalizing transitions among mental s tes.  But it is not an ir rational 
competence, for the states which it involves are not even the sort which are aptly 
assessed with respect to rationality, namely, propositional attitudes.15  Rational norms 
apply only to sets of propositional attitudes.  In fact, for the most part, rational and 
epistemic norms apply only to sets of mental states which include belief or some type 
of cognitive attitude possessing a direction of fit (unlike emotion) and, specifically, 
that of belief.16 
Comparison with the sort of wishful thinking I discuss above (WT), in which 
beliefs are directly produced by wishes, highlights this point.  If the wishes involved 
are understood to be propositional attitudes, it is immediately apparent, I think, that 
the structure is an irrational one.17  (And even where they are not so understood, the 
structure at least clearly contravenes epistemic norms.)  But, when belief drops out, 
replaced by non-propositional sensory experience, as in Gardner’s wish-fulfilment, no 
                                                
15 Recall that charity on my reading includes epistemic as well as properly rational norms.  Now one 
might think at first sight that Gardner’s wish-fulfilment involved the violation of some sort of 
epistemic norm.  But though the generation of hallucinatory imagery based on wish-like states may 
seem like poor epistemic design, it would not seem to violate any epistemic norms, which solely 
govern belief-formation and its warrant. 
16 An apparent exception is the principle that prefernces should observe transitivity. 





norms are violated.18  So wish-fulfilment as Gardner characterizes it ult mately fails 
to advance my argument against Davidson’s interpretavism: If wish-fulfilment is to 
conflict with Charity, it must involve propositional ttitudes (including cognitive 
ones) in some fashion. 
Accordingly, on my somewhat revised account, we are to envision wish-
fulfilment as possessing the following structure: An unsatisfied biological need, (1), 
yields a wish that the need be satisfied, (2), which, in turn, produces an appropriate 
wish-fulfilling hallucination, (3), resulting in a belief that the wish is satisfied, (4), 
which causes a feeling of satisfaction, (5), that, finally, leads to the termination (or 
quiescence) of the wish, (6).  I shall say something shortly by way of defending this 
alternative account (and demonstrating its conflict with charity requirements).  But 
for the moment, then, we are to envision a module that embodies basic processes of 
wish-fulfilment along the lines sketched.  Following Freud’s account of the id, the 
module should be thought of as existing and operating prior to the individual’s 
development of conscious thought altogether.  Even with the first blush of conscious 
thought, however, it can be envisioned as operating longside conscious thought (and 
action), especially, in very literal wish-fulfilling dreams generated during sleep when 
one is unable to minister to one’s wishes through cons ious action).19 
                                                
18 No norms are violated regardless of whether the wishes involved are propositional or not: it is the 
absence of the cognitive attitude that tells. 
19 Note that the dreams themselves should be thought of as falling outside the province of the wish-
fulfilling module itself.  For though we often speak of someone sleeping as ‘unconscious’, dreams 
actually would seem to belong to access-consciousness, whereas I follow Freud in conceiving of this 
id-module as lacking such consciousness.  Hence, the dreams, I think, should be thought of as 
conscious byproducts of the unconscious hallucinatory experiences which figure in the wish-fulfilling 
processes proper.  I shall address how it is that those experiences are able to become conscious (or, 





But in terms of the typology presented earlier (see p. 129 above), what sort of 
module would this be?  Well, the first thing to note is that it is not an informational 
module like Chomskyean linguistic competence (i.e., a body of thematically related 
information drawn upon in the performance of specific tasks) but, rather, a sort of 
processing module—a system charged with performing a specific mental function, 
namely, gratifying wishes engendered by biological needs.20  Moreover, it does not 
seem to be especially Fodorian, especially in view of the role that fully 
conceptualized content plays within it.21  Rather, it is a module in the looser sense 
that Carruthers (2006) employs in arguing his thesis of massive modularity (p. 128 
above).  The module, further, trades on an additional feature of Carruthers’ account of 
modules, namely, that they can be complex, built up o t of more fundamental 
modular building-blocks.  For the id-module I have described is naturally seen as 
encorporating a wish-generating sub-module (producing wishes in response to 
information concerning bodily states such as an empty stomach), an image-generating 
sub-module (giving rise to hallucinations), a belief-g nerating module, and an 
affective module (producing a pleasurable response to the wish-fulfilling belief).  
                                                
20 As noted earlier, I avoid consideration of the philosophical issue whether such modules are best seen 
in computational or non-computational terms, as well as the empirical issue of whether one should 
expect them to be realized by specific neurological systems.  It is worth mentioning, however, that 
interesting work has been done in modeling central aspects of Freudian theory along computationalist 
lines.  See, e.g., Boden (1987) and Wegman (1985). 
21 Perhaps, though, it can be envisioned as possessing at least one of the other defining properties of 
Fodor modules.   At least in its initial form, the module appears domain-specific, since its inputs are 
limited to wishes derived from the domain of biological need.  But it is neither encapsulated nor 
inaccessible.  Although this is concealed prior to the development of consciousness, once 
consciousness comes on-line the module’s porous boundaries becomes apparent.  E.g., the beliefs 
generated by the module during dreams should be seen as passed along to consciousness.  I return to 
the issue of the degree and nature of encapsulation nd inaccessibility in wish-fulfilment when 
considering its less basic forms below.  It is worth noting, however, that Freud himself emphasizes that 
there is considerable “communication between the two systems,” Ucs. and Pcs. (the preconscious).  He 
writes, the Ucs. “is accessible to the impressions of life”; it “constantly influences the Pcs., and is 




This conceivability (indeed, the scientific possibility) of such a wish-fulfilling 
module, I submit, should call into question the legitimacy of the normativist 
constraints that Davidson places on the possession of propositional content.  For in 
the first place, such a module, in which we find a regular tendency for a propositional 
wish that p to produce a sensory wish-fulfilling experience and  propositional belief 
that p, embodies what to all appearances is an irrational competence and, therefore, 
conflicts with Davidson’s Competence Principle.22  Moreover, such a regular 
divergence within a single mental compartment from standards of ideal rational 
rationality fairly clearly conflicts with Davidson’s Compartment Principle as well, 
since that divergence is owing to the module’s internal operations and not the external 
influence of some other mental compartment.23  Again, corresponding to Freud’s 
view that the processes of the id precede the development of the ego, I suggest that 
one can envision the wish-fulfilling module as developing prior to those systems 
which embody in the individual logical, reality-oriented patterns of thought.  Prior to 
the development of those latter systems, the wish-fulfilling module would largely 
exhaust the individual’s capacities for propositional thought and reasoning.  In such a 
mind, irrational processes would clearly predominate and, therefore, the mind itself 
would appear to violate Davidson’s Threshold Principle.  Thus, despite Davidson’s 
efforts to effect a rapprochement with Freudian theory (Davidson 2004c), at its core 
                                                
22 There are a few complexities here, however, such as whether the module is better seen as ar tional 
and not ir rational, and if the latter, whether it violates a ‘b sic’ principle of irrationality (cf. p. 106ff.).  
I address these matters below. 
23 A noteworthy feature of the argument against the Competence Principle is that it appeals to a module 
embodying processes of wish-fulfilment which Freud regards as universal and non-pathological.  One 
is perhaps inclined to regard pathological processes typically as matters not of competence but of 
performance-error, of interference with normal function.  But this temptation does not gain a foothold 
in the case of the non-pathological processes that I ve described.  (Whether, however, pathological 




that theory must be seen as inimical—indeed, subversive—of a normativism like 
Davidson’s. 
More on Arguing Against the Threshold Principle 
However, I wish to linger a bit over the argument against the Threshold 
Principle.  The argument I have set out contrasts with another style of argument 
which can be made against that principle.  W. E. Cooper (1980) advances an 
argument against Davidsonian charity based not on a scientific hypothesis but an 
imaginative thought-experiment (which he credits to Gilbert Harman).24  He asks us 
to envision an individual, Napoleon, whose initially true belief-sets about cats and 
dogs gradually degrade, as from one day to the next, one of his beliefs about cats 
migrates to his belief-set about dogs and vice versa.  Ultimately, he is left with 
nothing but false beliefs about cats and dogs.  Both Cooper and Harman hold that 
normativists like Davidson and Quine, with their commitment to maximizing charity, 
must hold that the reference of ‘cat’ and ‘dog’ areexchanged just past the middle of 
the envisioned process.  Thus, such charity can seem to rule out the possibility of a 
quite conceivable form of madness and so, Cooper concludes, should be rejected: “I 
do insist . . . that there could be such people whom we could recognize as being mad.  
And it would seem to count against a theory if it ruled out a priori this possibility” 
(1980, 39).25  More generally, perhaps one can envision the truth of an individual’s 
entire belief-set and the rational coherence among their propositional attitudes and 
                                                
24 In fact, Cooper takes the argument to undercut not just charity but materialism generally which he 
unwarrantedly takes to require charity.  
25 Cooper’s argument levels specifically at maximizing charity, but he plainly holds that normativism 
rules out madness altogether (“there could be no madness” [1980, 39]).  That conclusion, however, is 
much stronger than what his thought-experiment supports.  At least some of the gap between his 
conclusion and this stronger claim can perhaps be filled by modifying his argument and re-directing it 




behavior as gradually degrading over time, so much so that any arbitrary degree of 
falsity/irrationality would  eventually be surpassed.  If such ‘madness’ is a coherent 
possibility, then it can be taken as an argument against Davidson’s Threshold 
Principle.  This sort of argument against the Thresold Principle is in an important 
respect the converse of that which I am emphasizing: whereas the latter begins with a 
state of predominant irrationality that subsequently yields to a state in which 
rationality predominates, the former begins with a state of predominant rationality 
that descends into irrationality.   I shall refer to these two sorts of arguments as 
developmental and degenerative, respectively.  Although it is the developmental 
argument that I am urging against normativism, I shall consider the degenerative style 
of argument as well at a few points in the sequel.    
With respect to the developmental argument, perhaps one may entertain 
doubts about the possibility of the id-module existing before other, more rational 
systems have come on-line.  Indeed, Cavell expresses doubt that wishes can occur 
“prior to the formation of some beliefs and a considerable knowledge of reality.”  
“Concepts, and a knowledge of reality,” she maintains, are “as necessary a 
constituent” of desire as belief (1993, 166-67).  In support, she appeals to a supposed 
conceptual connection between the concepts of desire and belief: “. . . the concepts 
presuppose each other.  To desire that p is to be predisposed to act in a way that 
would bring p about, if one’s relevant beliefs about the world were true and there 
were no conflicting desires” (1993, 166-67).  But whatever one thinks of this alleged 




requires “considerable knowledge of reality.”26  The phrase ‘relevant beliefs’, 
presumably, means something like ‘any beliefs one has about available means to the 
attainment of ‘p’.  But unless the latter phrase is interpreted with existential import, 
Cavell’s alleged conceptual truth does not entail that desire requires any beliefs at all, 
let alone “considerable knowledge of reality.”27 
Of course, it must be conceded to Cavell that concepts are a necessary 
constituent of desires, and one may wonder how the id, prior to the mind’s serious 
engagement with external reality, could come by the stock of concepts that figure in 
the unconscious wishes implicated in primary process.  But the ready response is to 
deny the empiricist trend of the query: psychological theorists of recent decades have 
become comfortable with nativism with respect to both concepts (e.g., Fodor’s LOT) 
and beliefs (e.g., Chomskyean grammar), especially in modular contexts like the 
present one.  Indeed, as the following passage illustrates, such nativism is eminently 
Freudian: “The content of the Ucs. may be compared with an aboriginal population in 
the mind.  If inherited mental formations exist in the human being . . . these constitute 
the nucleus of the Ucs.” (Freud 1915, 195).  There seem to be nothing amiss, then, in 
viewing the id-module as coming stocked with its own proprietary set of concepts 
                                                
26 Whether Cavell’s claim of the functional interdepend nce of belief and desire tells against the 
possibility of beliefs playing a part in the action-remote id-module is a separate matter, which I 
consider subsequently. 
27 Additionally, I note that even if large number of beliefs were required there would be a further step
involved in concluding that they must be veridical.  Note, further, that my reconstruction of primary 
process represented by the id-module do s involve at least some beliefs, namely, those arising in the 
course of hallucinatory wish-fulfilling processes it elf.  However, I do not follow Cavell in taking 




pertaining to instinctual needs, etc.28  So, I conclude, the bruited objections to the 
developmental argument fail. 
Other Objections to My Argument 
Other doubts, however, might be entertained with respect to my argument 
against the Competence and Compartment Principles.  In the present section, I shall 
set out and attempt to rebut several possible objections. 
Unconscious Sensation 
First, I want briefly to address what might occur to one as an objection to the 
very possibility of wish-fulfilment.  The potential problem arises from the fact that 
Freud conceives of infantile hallucinatory wish-fulfilment as unconscious.29  Whereas 
dreams are conscious (or preconscious—that is, “capable of becoming conscious” 
[Freud 1915, 173]), the quasi-sensory experiences involved in infantile hallucinatory 
wish-fulfilment (and the pleasurable feeling of sati f ction to which they give rise) 
occur even before the infant develops a capacity for consciousness, in Freud’s view.  
One might bridle at the possibility of unconscious imaginings, let alone unconscious 
pleasure. 
But the existence of unconscious perception at leashas become part of the 
stock-in-trade of mainstream cognitive psychology;30 and if unconscious perceptions 
are a coherent possibility, then it is difficult to see how unconscious imaginings, 
states rather like perceptions only produced indogen usly, are not.  One might draw 
                                                
28 That is not to say that the id operates only with such concepts.  Since its encapsulation is by no 
means complete on Freud’s conception, as the psyche develops, its fund of concepts will be 
correspondingly enriched.    
29 Gardner (1993, 267n32) recognizes that “unconsciou imagining” may “seem problematic,” but he 
does not suggest a solution other than to hint that developmentally early imaginings may differ from 
later, more sophisticated ones. 




the line, however, at the existence of unconscious pleasure: Is pleasure not inherently 
qualitative and, therefore, essentially conscious?  But if so, one acceptable response 
might be simply to suggest a slightly truncated structure for wish-fulfilment (at least 
of the infantile sort).  In terms of Gardner’s picture (see p. 166 above), this would 
mean omitting the feeling of satisfaction, (4), so that the wish-fulfilling 
representation, (3), leads directly to the termination of the wish, (5).  Although this 
diverges from Freud’s conception of such wish-fulfilment somewhat, I am not 
necessarily committed to defending every aspect of Freud’s characterization of 
primary process.  
But I am more inclined to defend a place for unconsious pleasure in wish-
fulfilment.  Indeed, in recent years many philosophers of mind have been attracted to 
a view of pain (and pleasure, presumably) that readily ccommodates the possibility 
of unconscious pleasure.  Without getting too deeply mired in the bog of theories of 
consciousness, one can say that on the present view a distinction is made between 
qualitative states like sensations, pain, and pleasur , and the qualia they possess when 
conscious.  On this view, the essence of such qualitative states is their distinctive 
intentional content rather than any particular associated conscious feel.31  Just what 
the nature of that distinctive content might be, and what is additionally required for 
such states to become conscious (and perhaps possess a quale), are questions which 
receive a variety of different answers from adherents of the view.32  But when that 
additional element is lacking from particular episodes of such states, they will be 
                                                
31 In fact, the view is sometimes wedded to a sceptism about qualia.  See, e.g., Rey (1997, 301-04). 
32 Peter Carruthers, e.g., following Michael Tye, takes pain to be a “perceived secondary quality of the 
body,” which is phenomenally conscious only insofar as it becomes the non-inferential object of 




unconscious.  Moreover, the same sorts of considerat on that argue acceptance of 
unconscious perception can be marshaled in support of unconscious pain and 
pleasure.  If the evidence supports the existence of states which, though unavailable 
to consciousness, substantially resemble conscious pain and pleasure with respect to 
their role in the psychic economy, then a good case n be made for viewing them as 
unconscious twins of their conscious counterparts.33  So much by way of rendering 
the part played by unconscious pleasure in wish-fulfilment innocuous. 
Is Basic Wish-Fulfilment Irrational? 
A different potential problem for my argument is that one might wonder if the 
competence represented by basic wish-fulfilment is genuinely irrational.  For, in the 
first place, inasmuch as wish-fulfilling processes appear rather efficient means for 
meeting needs of reducing psychic tensions, they may—prima facie—present an air 
of practical rationality.  However, this appearance is deceptive.  Perhaps it can be 
granted that mechanisms of wish-fulfilment manifest efficient, adaptive design.  But 
to concede that is not to concede the phenomenon any relevant sort of rationality.34  
Indeed, because basic forms of wish-fulfilment as here rendered are automatic 
processes, in no wise to be construed as actions either overt or mental on the part of 
their bearer, they fall outside the sphere of practic l rationality altogether.35 
                                                
33 On this point, cf. Carruthers (2004). 
34 At best it would support the rationality of some hypothetical designer who has the aim of 
constructing efficient, adaptive creatures.  But the only relevant rationality is that of the bearer of the 
wish-fulfilling processes him-/herself. 
35 That is not to deny that the generation of beliefs (and other mental states) might sometimes possess 
the character of an intentional action and so fall within the scope of practical rationality (cf. the model 
of self-deception in Rey [1988], e.g.).  Rather, it is simply to say the generation of beliefs (and 
hallucinatory experiences) in basic wish-fulfilment, on the Freudian conception reflected in the id-




Of course, it might be possible—although textual support would be lacking—
to offer a reconstruction of basic Freudian wish-fulfilment on which it turns out to be 
a species of intentional action: On such a reading, the id could be seen simply as 
electing to vividly imagine desired states-of-affairs when the real satisfaction of the 
relevant desires is barred.  Basic wish-fulfilment would then be evaluable with 
respect to its practical rationality and might even plausibly turn out to be normatively 
rational.  Indeed, it would be hard to find anything to reproach in such imaginative 
episodes when the infant (and perhaps even the young child) possesses virtually no 
capacity to engage in actions that might result in the genuine satisfaction of its real-
world desires!36  But the suggested account of basic wish-fulfilment, although 
possibly of some interest in its own right, is simply not that which I am propounding 
for the purpose of making my anti-normativism argument.37  Instead, I have offered 
as an empirical hypothesis an account on which wish-fulfilment dispenses with the 
character of intentional action and, thus, is not subject to evaluation by standards of 
practical rationality.  On the present account, the problem wish-fulfilling processes 
pose for normativism rests, rather, on the breach of t eoretical rationality they appear 
to commit. 
But can the question perhaps be raised whether they do, in fact, violate canons 
of theoretical rationality?  It is instructive, I think, at this point to compare basic wish-
fulfilment with the sort of wishful thinking (WT, see p. 167 above) in which wishes 
                                                
36 I am not implying that phantasizing must be irrational for the older child or adult.  However, for 
them, unlike the infant, serious question can at lest arise whether, on given occasions, their time might 
be better spent in other activities. 
37 Nor, as noted, does it appear particularly Freudian.  It will be seen, however, that Freud plainly 
assigns at least some role to intentional action in the generation of characteristic Freudian phenomena 




immediately give rise to beliefs of identical propositional content without the 
interposition of any sort of hallucinatory experienc .  The theoretical irrationality of 
WT, in which beliefs are formed wholly at the prompting of wishes, is, I think, 
immediately apparent.  However, when a hallucinatory experience is interpolated 
between wish and belief, the situation may appear rlevantly different.  For whereas 
the beliefs in WT clearly lack warrant, the beliefs in WF (wish-fulfilment) might 
seem to derive justification from the quasi-sensory experiences which precede their 
formation.38  Certainly, in ordinary waking, conscious life, weregularly form what 
look like warranted beliefs on the basis of our sensory experiences.  Might the beliefs 
in WF, though false, at least derive warrant from the quasi-sensory experiences that 
give rise to them and, therefore, count as rational?39 
The problem with this line of thought is, I think, twofold.  First, it 
oversimplifies what conscious beliefs formed on the basis of sensory experiences 
require for warrant.  The presence of a sensory (or quasi-sensory) experience with a 
certain content does not always suffice to confer warrant on the corresponding 
perceptual judgments.  Additionally, there may, for example, be constraints 
concerning how those judgments cohere with one’s background beliefs.40  To see this, 
suppose someone knowingly ingests LSD and hallucinates that there is a gorilla on 
                                                
38 At the very least, in the case of WF as opposed to WT there is what looks like a reason for one’s 
belief, and perhaps a good one? 
39 Here and in the sequel I cease to distinguish betwe n epistemic and rational probity.  In fact, I am 
inclined to think that epistemology is properly submed under theoretical rationality.  Against this 
view would perhaps count the fact that coherence among propositional attitudes (and behavior) is so 
often cited as the essence of rationality.  For taking that as the hallmark of rationality would exclude 
epistemology from the purview of rationality, at least insofar as it concerns the formation of individual 
attitudes (beliefs) solely on the basis of non-attitudes (esp. sensation) or altogether without evidence 
but reliably (as seems to apply, e.g., on the Chomskyean account of innate tacit linguistic knowledge).  
In the present context, the issue is in any case moot, since my discussion of Chapter Two leaves no 
doubt that Davidson intends his charity-principles to concern the adherence to epistemic and rational 
norms indifferently. 




their shoulder.  If they form the belief that there is a gorilla on their shoulder in those 
circumstances, then plainly their belief would lack warrant, precisely because it 
would fail to cohere with relevant background beliefs (about the effects of LSD, the 
likelihood of encountering a gorilla on the loose, etc.).  But on the account sketched, 
wish-fulfilling beliefs are formed quite automatically on the basis of hallucinatory 
experiences, entirely without regard to coherence with background beliefs.  So where 
these beliefs are formed against a background of beliefs with which they do not 
adequately cohere, they may similarly lack epistemic warrant. 
“Fine,” someone might object, “but the id-module does not clearly possess a 
fund of background beliefs that might raise problems of coherence in the formation of 
beliefs by the module.”  Perhaps, but this objection focuses too narrowly on the id-
module itself.  One form of basic wish-fulfilment, that constituted by undistorted 
dreaming, takes place in the presence of reality-orented secondary process.  So there 
will be abundant relevant background beliefs in the cognitive system considered as a 
whole.  That those beliefs reside largely or wholly utside the id-module itself does 
not necessarily mean that they are irrelevant to processes of belief-formation within 
the id itself.  As has been frequently noted, standards of ideal rationality41 actually 
seem to require that in processes of practical and theoretical reasoning any and all 
relevant information held within the cognitive system as a whole be brought to bear.  
As Lisa Bortolotti observes, one reason a belief “might fail to be rational” is that it “is 
compartmentalized, that is, it does not cohere withother beliefs that belong to the 
                                                





same system and with the rest of the subject’s behaviour” (2005, 199).42  To the 
extent that dreaming wish-fulfilment flouts this normative requirement, its 
irrationality (on Davidson’s very high standard) seems assured.  It represents an 
irrational competence that should call into question Davidson’s Competence 
Principle.43 
However, some reservations may yet exist with respect to the ‘developmental’ 
argument that I am pressing against the Threshold Principle.  For that argument 
requires envisioning the existence of the id-module prior to the development of 
reality-oriented belief-formation.  But prior to that development, there will be no 
beliefs lodged in the broader system that the id-moule will be required to consult in 
the course of generating its beliefs.  In that case, the considerations which seemed to 
count against the rationality of dreaming wish-fulfilment appear to lapse with respect 
to the unconscious wish-fulfilment that is supposed to precede it developmentally.  
But then the developmental argument cannot get off the ground. 
There is a fairly straightforward response to these r rvations, however.  
Granted, such unconscious wish-fulfilment will not c unt as irrational in virtue of 
those considerations that tell specifically with resp ct to the developmentally later 
                                                
42 Granted, this point would lapse with respect to a polycentric normativism.  But Davidson’s 
normativism—the version at which my argument largely l vels—is uncompromisingly monocentric 
(see p. 105, n. 139 above for the monocentric-polycentric distinction).   
43 A slight complication is that, as I discussed in Ch. 3, Davidson formulates his Competence Principle 
specifically with respect to ‘basic’ principles of rationality.  Are the principles violated by the id-
module basic ones in the relevant sense?  This question perhaps admits of no answer, since, as 
discussed, it is difficult to formulate an acceptable sense of ‘basic’ in the context of Davidson’s 
philosophy.  In any case, the principles violated appear to be major rational principles.  If a 
Davidsonian should care to deny their status as ‘basic’, I simply challenge him/her to do so in a way 




dreaming wish-fulfilment.44  But unconscious wish-fulfilment would still seem to be 
irrational, namely, because the beliefs that are fomed in the course of it are massively 
unreliable.  Judged by the standards of externalist-reliabilist epistemology—which 
has acquired something of the status of orthodoxy in recent decades45—the belief-
forming mechanism embodied in WF appears to fail miserably!46 
Of course, it might be objected that the mechanism consisting in forming 
beliefs based on what seems to be the case (unless there is reason not to), although 
resulting in abundant false beliefs in the case of wish-fulfilment, functions quite 
reliably for human beings when assessed with respect to their overall epistemic 
performance and, therefore, can bestow epistemic warrant even in the case of wish-
fulfilment.  This objection, however, assumes that t e mechanism embodied in wish-
fulfilment is the same one exhibited in conscious belief-formation.  But, on its face, 
the former appears much more rigid in its operation; it seems to lack the qualified 
character (indicated by the phrase‘unless there is r a on not to’ above) that its 
conscious counterpart possesses.  Indeed, there is no compelling reason to suppose 
that the id-module, even if stocked with background beliefs, would have to be 
sensitive to them in the way that conscious perceptual belief is sensitive to salient 
                                                
44 It might be possible, however, to envision the cognitive system as congenitally stocked with various 
theories about the world (a folk physics, folk biology, etc.).  Given the tendency of wishes to neglect 
real-world constraints,  there would be a non-negligible possibility that beliefs formed by the id would 
conflict with such innate theories.  In that case, th  id could be convicted of irrationality for failing to 
check for consistency even prior to the development of secondary process.  It must be conceded, 
however, that taking this argumentative tack would come at the cost of somewhat weakening the force 
of the developmental argument: To the extent that such innate theories are themselves consistent, both 
individually and collectively, they would seem to reduce the proportion of irrationality in the cognitive 
system overall.  The id’s irrational operation would no longer be the sole factor to consider in judging 
whether the level of rationality of the system falls below that enshrined in the Threshold Principle.  So 
I shall not press this tack. 
45 See Goldman (1979) for a defense of externalist-reliabilist epistemology. 
46 Indeed, aside from mechanisms that mimic reliable on s but—in a final fit of absurdity—reverse the 




background beliefs.47  So the assumption that wish-fulfilment is just a pecial case of 
the conscious mechanism is unjustified. 
Moreover, even if it were one and the same mechanism at issue in both wish-
fulfilment and conscious perceptual judgment, a case can be made that beliefs formed 
through processes of wish-fulfilment are still less than epistemically virtuous.  For 
suppose that by chance an odd belief or two formed by an infant’s wish-fulfilling 
module turned out to be true.  One would hardly be entitled to attribute knowledge to 
the infant on the grounds that the beliefs in question are true and formed by a reliable 
mechanism.  Thus, it appears to follow that the beliefs in question, indeed all infantile 
wish-fulfilling beliefs, lack justification.  Since ven infantile wish-fulfilment falls 
short of epistemological-rational probity, the developmental argument against the 
Threshold Principle can stand. 
Is Basic Wish-Fulfilment Arational? 
However, an opponent of my arguments may have one mor trick up his 
sleeve.  He might try insisting, not on the ir rationality of the processes on which the 
arguments are based, but on their arationality, their exemption from evaluation by 
rational standards altogether.48  But it is not clear on what basis a case for the 
arationality of those processes can be successfully made.  The matter is complicated 
                                                
47 In fact, as I noted above (p. 170, n. 21), the id for Freud is not fully encapsulated.  After secondary 
process begins to arise, Freud appears to see some contents as making their way from consciousness to 
unconscious.  Though basic wish-fulfilment continues to operate (in the dreaming form, specifically), 
there is no indication that Freud sees wish-fulfilment as suddenly qualified in its operation by any 
sensitivity to background belief.  
48 Of course, in Ch. 3 I addressed an argument that sought to exclude modular processes from the 
scope of normativism because they are supposedly non-inferential (and, thus, not rationality-




by the lack of an agreed-upon criterion of rationality-evaluability.49  Of course, there 
are clear cases of rationality-evaluability (conscious decision-making and inference) 
and its lack (brute physical processes), but where b tween those extremes should one 
draw the dividing line?  Of course, the line should be placed somewhere within the 
sphere of the mental, but perhaps the most straightforward suggestion—that 
rationality-evaluability is coterminous with the pro ositional attitudes—appears not 
wholly adequate, if only because the attitude of ntertaining a thought seems exempt 
from assessment as to its rationality.  But leaving this general question aside, what 
can be said for viewing processes like those of the id-module as arational? 
 There is, of course, a resemblance between wish-fulfilment and ordinary 
episodes of phantasy, and since the latter escape rational assessment, perhaps one 
might be tempted to think the former does as well.  But that judgment ignores that 
wish-fulfilment on the present account differs from phantasy in involving belief in the 
states of affairs which are imagistically depicted.50  The presence of beliefs would 
seem to bring wish-fulfilment into the ambit of rational assessment.51  Perhaps, 
however, there is some pull towards saying that such beliefs, largely insulated from 
the wider stream of inference, decision-making, and ction, should be viewed as 
harmlessly arational, not as noxiously irrational.  But it is not clear that such 
innocuousness would remove the beliefs from rational assessibility.  Rather, it would 
                                                
49 The question does not even seem to have garnered much attention.  The very fact that I have had to 
coin the term ‘rationality-evaluable’ (on the analogy of ‘truth-evaluable’, which has some currency) to 
pick out one of the two important senses of the ambiguous ‘rational’, points up this lack of attention. 
50 Peter Carruthers (2006) presents an account which does implicate beliefs (or, at least, “belief-like” 
attitudes) in conscious phantasy, but the relevant attitudes are unconscious.  On such an account, a 
question of the rationality-evaluability of phantasy arises, just as it does in the case of wish-fulfilment.  
51 Of course, one can resist this conclusion by denying that wish-fulfilment can (or should) be seen as 
involving beliefs or, indeed, propositional attitudes altogether.  I consider this argumentative strategy 




merely undercut the practical point of such assessmnt.52  If wish-fulfilment involves 
belief, then that allows for their assessment by ration l canons of reliability, 
coherence, etc.  What could plausibly exempt them fro  that assessment?  Moreover, 
the beliefs involved even seem to permit of a kind of reason-explanation couched in 
terms of the hallucinatory experiences that precede them: a comes to believe p
because of his/her experience, where ‘because’ is understood as introducing a 
justificatory reason, not a purely explanatory one.  And where there is reason-
explanation, of course, there is rationality-evaluability. 
Nor is it clear that the proponent of normativism ultimately gains much by 
denying the rationality-evaluability of wish-fulfilment, at least if the phenomenon is 
taken to involve any sort of propositional attitude at all.  For the reasons which I have 
enumerated in Ch. 3, the restriction of the scope of normativism to a proper subset of 
propositional attitudes is highly problematic.  The only half-way plausible maneuver 
available to a normativist (cf. p. 68 above) would be to hold that attribution of 
attitudes occurs in two phases, an initial round in which rationality-evaluable attitudes 
(and, especially, decision-theoretic ones) are attribu ed, and a second round, parasitic 
on the first, in which other attitudes are ascribed.53  But the adherent of the parasitic 
strategy, then, confronts a dilemma.  Either she can m intain that those attitudes are 
rationality-evaluable, in which case their irrationality tells against the Threshold 
Principle, or she can view them as parasitic on ration lity-evaluable attitudes.  But in 
the latter case, the parasitic strategy breaks down.  For prior to the development of the 
                                                
52 Thus, though dreams, it appears, are not commonly assessed with respect to their rationality, this 
could simply be due to the lack of practical point in doing so.  The attitudes involved in dreams are 
largely insulated from inference and action. 




logical, reality-oriented processes of the ego, there will exist only those attitudes 
bound up with the id-module itself and, thus, no rationality-evaluable attitudes on 
whose basis the arational attitudes of the id can be attributed!  So the scenario 
contained in the developmental argument, which on one characterization tells against 
Davidson’s Threshold Principle, on another characteization tells equally against the 
parasitic strategy.  Again, to the extent that wish-fulfilment involves propositional 
attitudes at all, there appears no way for the normativist to resist the force of my 
arguments against that position. 
But, as mentioned, Gardner’s account of basic wish-fulfilment (on which mine 
is largely based) differs from mine precisely in denying a place for propositional 
attitudes within that phenomenon.  Accordingly, I shall consider what Gardner says 
on behalf of his characterization of wish-fulfilment and whether an alternative one 
which finds a place for propositional content can be defended. 
A Place for Propositional Attitudes? 
 One quick argumentative route to the conclusion that wish-fulfilment—if a 
coherent phenomenon at all—must involve propositional content is simply to deny 
the possibility of non-propositional content.  Adopting such a view might mean, for 
example, modifying Gardner’s account of wish-fulfilment so as to interpret not only 
psychoanalytic wishes, but even the quasi-sensory experiences they cause as 
propositional (see, e.g., Rey 1997, 237-63).  But though the view that all content is 
propositional has its defenders, I prefer not to stake my defense of a role for 
propositional content in wish-fulfilment substantially on this controversial premise.54 
                                                
54 Moreover, it’s not clear that this approach by itself uffices to yield a conflict with Davidsonian 




     As noted above (p. 166), Gardner holds that it is unnecessary to introduce 
belief into basic forms of wish-fulfilment because, h  thinks, the non-propositional 
sensory experience involved in them, (3), suffices to explain the latter phases of wish-
fulfilment, namely, the feeling of satisfaction, (4), and termination of wish, (5).  
Moreover, Gardner implies that belief could not enter into infantile wish-fulfilment 
and dreaming because infantile mentality and sleep ar  conditions “where there is 
insulation from belief” (1993, 125).  The suggestion s that, on the one hand, belief as 
a mental state has yet to develop in the young infant and, on the other, does not—at 
least at the outset—enter into mental activity during sleep. 
 Now Richard Wollheim offers a reconstruction of wish-fulfilment that differs 
from Gardner’s in one important respect, namely, in seeing belief as an integral part 
of the phenomenon (Gardner 1993, 129-31; Wollheim 1979).  As Gardner points out, 
for imaginings such as occur in wish-fulfilment to be “effective in gratifying or 
providing ‘pseudo-satisfaction’ for a desire [i.e., wish],” Wollheim holds that one 
must believe that what one imagines is the case (1993, 129).  So Wollheim’s view 
about what is required to explain the feeling of satisf ction and termination of wish in 
wish-fulfilment differs from Gardner’s.55  But we are all familiar with how a vivid 
fantasy (say, of an ice-cream cone on a sweltering day) affords pleasure and is able, at 
least temporarily, to alleviate an imperious desire (e.g., for relief from heat or thirst).  
It is able to do this without any obvious contribution from belief, inasmuch as one 
                                                                                                                                 
fulfilling representation would seem to have a subjective content.  That such attitudes should be caused 
directly by wishes does not seem to violate rational norms. 
55 Marcia Cavell’s account of wish-fulfilment in (Cavell 1986, 495-507) derives largely from 
Wollheim’s and agrees with his in seeing an attitude like belief as playing a role.  She terms this 




does not mistake the product of one’s imagination for reality.56  So why not similarly 
for wish-fulfilment?  Thus, despite Wollheim, Gardner seems vindicated in holding 
that there is no a priori reason to introduce belief into wish-fulfilment. 
 But at least with respect to dreaming, there may be a posteriori reason of a 
rudimentary sort for accommodating belief in wish-fulfilment.  First, there is the 
phenomenology of dreams: when one remembers one’ dream of standing at a 
precipice fearing that one will fall over it, one sems to remember having believed 
that one was standing at a precipice.  Moreover, draming frequently involves the 
experience of a variety of—sometimes quite strong—emotions (consider, for 
example, the emotions which linger after waking up after a sad dream or nightmare).  
Further, these emotions are at least often sensitive to the content of dreams in a way 
that seems to exhibit the same sort of rationality that waking emotions typically do.  
For example, the fear one experiences while dreaming of standing at a precipice 
seems commensurate to the situation of so standing.  To make sense of this sort of 
emotional rationality in dreaming seems to require assuming that emotions 
experienced while dreaming are responses to propositional beliefs in dreaming, just as 
waking emotions are responses to waking beliefs.57  So the familiar sort of dream 
would seem to involve beliefs.  Thus, Gardner’s claim that in sleep “there is 
insulation from belief” appears untenable.  The upshot is that perhaps infantile 
hallucinatory wish-fulfilment need not involve belief, but to the extent that the 
undistorted dreams of young children at all resembl those of adults, then, the form of 
                                                
56 But do recall (see. p. 184 , n. 50 above) that at least one view about the processes involved in such
conscious fantasies makes a place for unconscious “belief-like” states in explaining how such fantasies 
afford pleasure. 




wish-fulfilment that they constitute would involve b lief.  Moreover, there seems no 
obvious conceptual bar to the possibility of either form of wish-fulfilment potentially 
including beliefs.  Indeed, there seems no a priori reason even to rule out 
consideration of these forms of wish-fulfilment (pro ositional content and all) as 
serious empirical hypotheses.   
As for the wishes involved in wish-fulfilment, as mentioned earlier, Gardner 
denies that they are ordinary wishes or desires, and, indeed, that they are 
propositional attitudes at all.58  In essence, he seems to argue that they are not 
ordinary desires by pointing to their different functional role.  Whereas ordinary 
desires are disposed to give rise to actions which aim to realize those desires’ 
conditions of satisfaction, psychoanalytic wishes are disposed to cause sensory 
experiences which represent those wishes’ objects as existing:59  “Psychoanalytic 
wishes,” he writes, “are necessarily engaged in the process of wish-fulfilment . . . 
which is not true of ordinary, conscious wishes” (1993, 126). 
                                                
58 Cavell (1986) agrees with Gardner that psychoanalytic wishes are not ordinary wishes, although she 
does apparently regard them as propositional attitudes.  
59 Some care, however, needs to be exercised with respect to the terms ‘wish’ and ‘desire’.  How clear 
is it, say, that ordinary wishes, as opposed to desires, are disposed to give rise to actions?  At first sight 
at least, wishes do not appear to be decision-theoretically engaged in the way that desires typically 
seem to be.  In his argument, Gardner does not drawa clear distinction between these sorts of attitudes.  
But there are certainly differences in the ways ‘wish’ and ‘desire’ are used in everyday speech, which 
suggests that what is true of the one sort of attitude cannot automatically be assumed to be true of the 
other.  Thus, as Marcia Cavell observes, it is a “gr mmatical fact” that wishing, unlike desire, “can be 
counterfactual” (1993, 166); that is, one can wish—but not desire—for things one knows not to be the 
case.  Cavell, however, seems to take this as evidence, not that wishes are wholly distinct from desir, 
but that they are a species of desire.  She writes, “Wi hes are typically desires upon which we might 
like to act but know we can or will not” (1993, 248n4).  (Interestingly, Davidson himself repudiates 
such efforts to reduce kinds of propositional attitudes in this way—cf. p. 67 above.)  Whatever can be 
said for this view, perhaps it explains Gardner’s failure to clearly distinguish between wish and desire: 
If wishes are just desires we know we cannot act on, hen they too could plausibly be seen as entailing 
a disposition to action, but one that perceived circumstances prevent from being engaged.  (I assess 
Gardner’s assertion that there is a functional difference between ordinary desires/wishes and 





As for psychoanalytic wishes being pre-propositional, regrettably, Gardner 
provides no real defense of this claim.  He merely invokes a distinction, which he has 
drawn earlier in connection with emotions.  In that e rlier discussion, he distinguishes 
between emotions which have particulars and those which have states of affairs as 
their formal objects: The objects of the former “are given by noun-phrases (‘X hates 
a’),” whereas those of the latter “by propositional expressions (‘X hates its being the 
case that a is F’)” (1993, 96).  Citing the Ratman’s supposed unconscious hatred of 
his father as an example, Gardner characterizes the former sort of emotion as “cruder” 
in form and, therefore, “unconditional,” in that its non-propositional character 
precludes it from being responsive to justification or its absence (1993, 97).  By 
making such a distinction credible with respect to emotions, he plainly hopes to 
render an analogous distinction between ordinary propositional wishes and 
psychoanalytic pre-propositional wishes plausible as well. 
Whatever one thinks of pre-propositional content in ge eral, the first thing to 
note by way of response to Gardner is that emotions and wishes are not the sorts of 
things to which pre-propositional content is commonly attributed.  Usually, such 
content is appealed to in connection with perception and mental imagery, where what 
is intended is content that is altogether non-conceptual.  In the case of emotions and 
wishes, however, Gardner seems to intend a form of content which, while non-
propositional, is conceptual in character, although of a logically simpler sort than 




conceptual content, we are justified in demanding of Gardner that he make a strong 
case for the theoretical indispensability of this use.60 
Overall, though there appear to be some grounds for rec gnizing a category of 
emotions with non-propositional content, the case seems weaker with respect to 
wishes or desires.  Let us first consider emotions.  Unless one endorses a cognitive 
theory of emotions on which emotions are just certain kinds of beliefs, the appearance 
that emotions can have non-propositional content is ot so easily explained away.  
With an emotion like fear, it may be possible to construe a sentence like ‘I fear Bin 
Laden’ in a given context as a mere pragmatic substit te for some longer sentence 
with a propositional object like ‘I fear that Bin Laden could succeed in a terrorist 
plot’.  Or perhaps one could propose a semantics on which a sentence like ‘I fear Bin 
Laden’ possesses a hidden logical form involving reference to some rather diffuse 
propositional content like that Bin Laden will do harm to me or mine.61  However, 
sentences containing verbs like ‘love’ and ‘hate’, which refer to emotionally-tinged 
attitudes, seem to resist this kind of paraphrase.  What suitable propositional content 
can one substitute for the object in a sentence like ‘I love Greta Garbo’?  Perhaps it 
will be possible to provide some sort of dispositional analysis of such sentences; 
perhaps, in fact, emotionally-tinged attitudes likeove and hate may turn out to be 
dispositions to have a certain kind(s) of (non-dispositional) emotion towards an 
individual or thing.  But until the project of providing such analyses meets with 
                                                
60 Granted, virtually every psychologist is committed o the existence of concepts.  But this 
commitment falls far short of Gardner’s notion that there are mental states whose intentional contents 
are bare concepts.   




success, the notion that some kinds of affective state  have non-propositional content 
must be taken seriously.62   
Even if there is a case to be made that some emotions have pre-propositional 
content, the case with respect to wishes appears weaker.  Any sentence with a desire 
verb taking a noun-phrase as its direct object seem to permit paraphrase with a 
sentence whose object is propositional.  For example, “The baby wants its bottle” is 
perhaps short for  “The baby wants to have its bottle,” which latter fails of having a 
propositional expression as object only because English rammar requires—
approximately—that the subject of an object-clause be omitted when it would 
coincide with the subject of the sentence.  Indeed, one fairly robust theory of the 
semantics of verbs like ‘wants’ (and even many emotion-verbs) interprets them as 
covertly embedding clausal complements as part of their logical form. 
In general, there is a question of how to account for he semantics of what are 
called ‘intensional transitive verbs’ (ITVs), verbs like ‘desire’, ‘fear’, and ‘look for’ 
which, though—in at least some of their uses—taking noun phrases rather than 
clauses as their objects, create contexts which exhibit some or all of the typical marks 
of intensionality, namely, “substitution-resistance, the availability of unspecific 
readings, and existence-neutrality” (Forbes 2009).  Thus, for example, the verb ‘looks 
for’ creates a context that resists substitution of co-referential expressions salva 
veritate and in which nouns and noun phrases carry no existent al commitment.  
Again, in that context, quantified noun phrases permit of both specific and unspecific 
                                                
62 Note, however, that Gardner’s claim that the lack of propositional content must render these 
affective states “unconditional” and unresponsive to justification is untenable.  The best candidates for 
such states, love and hate, are—at least typically—as much grounded in reasons as any other sort of 




readings: ‘I am looking for a wrench’ could mean eith r ‘There is some particular 
wrench which I am looking for’ or ‘I am looking for a wrench, but none in particular’.  
With respect to propositional-attitude verbs, there is an account of such phenomena 
available in terms of scope: a specific reading corresponds to a quantified noun clause 
having wide scope relative to the main verb and an unspecific reading to its having 
narrow scope.  Similarly, an account of substitution-resistance and existence-
neutrality might be framed in terms of the distinctve behavior of nouns and noun 
phrases when they occur in the scope of verbs.  This has prompted some to try to 
explain the analogous phenomena with respect to ITVs in terms of scope as well.  But 
since in standard first-order syntax quantified noun phrases require an open sentence 
as scope and, at first sight, suitable open sentences seem lacking for quantified noun 
phrases that appear as the objects of ITVs, some are dr wn to a view 
(‘propositionalism’) on which ITVs covertly embed clausal complements.  These 
complements provide the required scope for the quantified noun phrases.63  The 
possibility of such a propositionalist account for desire verbs (and, even many 
emotion verbs64) significantly undercuts any support Gardner hopes to gain from 
linguistic idiom in making the case for a special ctegory of pre-propositional desires 
or wishes.       
Moreover, even if there is (or could conceivably be) some sort of wish with 
pre-propositional content, it is doubtful that Freudian wish-fulfilment ought to be 
                                                
63 Thus, for example, Forbes (2009, 7) presents the following as one propositionalist analysis of the 
sentence ‘Lois is looking for an extraterrestrial’: Lois is looking in order to make true the propositi n 
that an extraterrestrial is such that she herself finds it. 
64 Though Forbes holds that a strong case for propositionalism can be made with respect to desire 
verbs, he cites various considerations that seem to count against propositionalism with respect to 




interpreted as limited to such wishes for at least two reasons.  First, Freud accords an 
important place not just to libidinal instincts but also to ego-instincts in his 
psychology.  Although the former might with—at least initial—plausibility appear to 
be directed at some particular object (or sort of object) which affords sexual pleasure 
broadly construed, the ego-instincts (for self-prese vation and self-assertion in various 
forms) pretty clearly aim at states-of-affairs.65  One seems forced to adopt the 
propositional idiom in formulating the wishes arising from such instincts.  Further, in 
discussing children’s undistorted dreams, Freud emphasizes that aside from the 
child’s pressing biological needs (hunger, thirst, etc.), the major source of the child’s 
dreams are desires that have remained unfulfilled during the previous day: “A child’s 
dream,” he writes, “is a reaction to an experience of the previous day, which has left 
behind it a regret, a longing, a wish that has not been dealt with.  The dream produces 
a direct, undisguised fulfillment of that wish” (1916-17, 128).  A wish “to go on the 
lake” which Freud cites shortly thereafter as “instigating” a dream evidently 
illustrates this source of dreams (1916-17, 129).  But such ordinary wishes clearly 
have states-of-affairs as objects and, thus, further undercut Gardner’s claim that the 
wishes implicated in wish-fulfilment are pre-propositional for Freud.66  Accordingly, 
I feel that we can confidently assume that such wishes are propositional.67 
                                                
65 Thus, Freud (1916-17, 225) gives an example of a dre ming wish-fulfilment, albeit in an adult, 
which he maintains involves gratification of egoistic as well as libidinal wishes.  He writes that a 
woman’s dream of going to the theatre is a disguised wish-fulfilment in which “a satisfaction of her 
scopophilia was mixed with a satisfaction of her egoistic competitive sense”, the latter particularly 
because her presence in the theatre symbolizes her beating her rivals to the marriage-altar. 
66 The claim is not necessarily that such ordinary desires receive wish-fulfilment altogether directly: 
left-over desires could give rise to wishes with the same propositional content which, in turn, produce 
the wish-fulfilling representations. 
67 Even if a good case could be made out that some of the relevant wishes are pre-propositional, 
Freudian theory itself seems to require that some be propositional; and, in any case, there seems no 




But, ultimately, it is not imperative that I insist on a place for propositional 
wishes in wish-fulfilment.  It suffices that beliefs be implicated in that phenomenon.  
For the irrationality of the id-module resides in the fact that beliefs are formed within 
it by an unreliable mechanism and without due regard to coherence with other beliefs 
within the cognitive system.  The instigating wishe merely serve to explain those 
irrational beliefs; they do not strictly play a part in constituting the module’s 
irrationality.  It appears, then, that pre-propositi nal ‘wishes’ could take over the 
causal/explanatory role without detriment to my argument.  Nor does Gardner adduce 
any considerations which militate against the phenomenon’s including beliefs.68 
Functional Role 
But there remains Gardner’s point that the wishes which receive wish-
fulfilment cannot be ordinary desires inasmuch as they have a different functional 
role.  Moreover, perhaps a similar point could be made with respect to the ‘beliefs’ 
that I have suggested must be supposed to be involved in dreaming wish-fulfilment 
inasmuch they would not have typical causal origins or exert influence on (overt) 
action.  If both of these points are accepted, the result is a phenomenon comprising 
propositional attitudes but of an unfamiliar sort.  Just this, in fact, is the picture of 
wish-fulfilment that Marcia Cavell presents in (1986) (cf. p. 187, n. 55 above).  There 
she argues that the lack of action-engagement the propositional attitudes in wish-
fulfilment exhibit precludes them from counting as ordinary desires, wishes, or 
beliefs.  Instead, she characterizes these attitudes as ‘proto-desire’ and ‘proto-belief’.  
                                                
68 Gardner’s only comment in this regard (noted above, p. 166) is that beliefs are not required in an 




Would this impact the conflict between dreaming wish-fulfilment and Davidsonian 
Charity for which I have argued? 
Well, first, it is not altogether clear that Gardner’s sort of appeal to differing 
functional role establishes that the attitudes in wish-fulfilment cannot be the familiar 
ones.  As mentioned, Gardner implicitly seems to assume that ordinary wishes are 
just desires accompanied by the belief that the objct of one’s desire is not (readily) 
attainable.  This view possesses a certain plausibility, and if true, it would mean that 
Freudian wishes cannot just be ordinary wishes (appropriate desire-belief pairs) since 
the id cannot easily be supposed to possess such reality-based beliefs prior to the 
development of secondary process.  But this view of ordinary wishes requires 
defense, of course.  As noted, the decision-theoretic engagement of ordinary wishes 
cannot simply be assumed.  If they in fact lack it, then much of the supposed 
functional difference between ordinary wishes and Freudian wishes disappears.  
Moreover, it is not a given that ordinary wishes do not equally give rise to imagistic 
representations of the wishes’ satisfaction (if not the corresponding beliefs, as in my 
account of wish-fulfilment), although such imagery would certainly be more subject 
to voluntary control than that bound up in Freudian wish-fulfilment.  In that case, the 
supposed functional difference between ordinary and Freudian wishes might seem to 
lapse altogether. 
Moreover, Gardner’s appeal seems to rest on a particular view of the 
semantics of mental vocabulary which Georges Rey calls ‘a priori functionalism’ 
(Rey 1997, 186-87).  This is a variety of functionalism which takes the specification 




knowable a priori.  It contrasts with what Rey terms ‘psychofunctionalism’, which 
views mental states as natural kinds whose causal roles are scientific essences to be 
discovered a posteriori (1997, 187-89).  On this latter view, in advance of 
investigation, it seems possible that the best psychological theory could turn out to be 
one where one and the same kind of mental state (wishes, say) could have a dual life, 
as it were, sometimes exhibiting the familiar causal rel tions of wishes, sometimes 
those of the desiderative element in wish-fulfilment.  More precisely, it might belong 
to the causal role of wishes, say, to behave in famili r ways in one set of 
circumstances (when conscious, e.g.) and in unfamili r ways in a different set of 
circumstances (when unconscious, etc.).  If psychofunctionalism is the correct view 
of the semantics of mental terms, then, psychoanalytic wishes and beliefs could turn 
out to be just the ordinary ones, despite any prima facie functional differences 
between them and their familiar counterparts. 
Again, it is not a given that beliefs, wishes, or even desires, will turn out to 
have the sort of essential relations to outward action that both Gardner and Cavell 
take for granted in arguing for the distinctness of ordinary attitudes from Freudian 
ones.  Georges Rey describes an approach to functionalism, ‘molecular 
functionalism’, which allows that particular kinds of mental states might be defined 
without reference to action (1997, 194-96).  On a more standard ‘holistic’ 
functionalism, mental states are typically defined all at once with respect to their 
functional role in a network of causal relations encompassing all kinds of mental 
states, as well as behaviors, physiological states, e c.  But molecular functionalism 




with those clusters themselves organized hierarchically within cognitive systems.  As 
Rey points out, one advantage of this sort of functio alism is that it accommodates 
the intuition that a system could lack some familiar kind(s) of mental state and still 
count as possessing a mind.69  More pertinently, as Rey observes, “it finally affords 
us the possibility of completely freeing the identification of a psychological state 
from any tight connection with behavior.  It’s perfectly open to the molecularist to 
suppose . . . that few (if any) of the states of subsystems of the mind are actually 
defined in terms of actual behavior” (1997, 195).  But in that case one cannot rely, as 
Gardner and Cavell do, on psychoanalytic attitudes’ apparent lack of a (direct) link to 
overt action to argue their distinctness from ordinary beliefs, wishes, and desires.  
Indeed, the defining functional features of these state  could turn out to be entirely 
internal.  
But even if they are better construed as distinct types of attitudes, this would 
not automatically cancel the irrationality of dreaming wish-fulfilment comprising 
such merely belief-like and wish-like propositional attitudes.  Although matters are a 
bit murky at this point, it is not implausible to think that any attitudes with the 
respective directions of fit of wishes and beliefs in erted into the structure of mental 
states constitutive of wish-fulfilment would yield an irrational structure.  So we do 
not necessarily need to resist Gardner’s and Cavell’s claims that the states involved 
are novel types to sustain the conflict between wish-fulfilment and Davidsonian 
Charity. 
                                                
69 Thus, Rey writes, “e.g. people who can’t feel pain, or psychopaths who don’t form the usual 
personal attachments, can surely have beliefs and desires and other perceptions” (1997, 194).  As Rey 
points out, if states are hierarchically organized, those at the top of the hierarchy could drop out while 




But this makes Cavell’s stance towards wish-fulfilment in (1986) somewhat 
puzzling.  Cavell’s philosophy of mind is that of a committed Davidsonian.70  
Moreover, in her article she offers her account of wish-fulfilment not just as an 
interpretation of Freud but as account of what she plainly takes to be a real 
phenomenon (1986, 496).  But, as I have suggested, ev n on her own interpretation 
that phenomenon fundamentally conflicts with Davidsonian Charity!  Moreover, her 
account evidences a willingness to countenance the at ribution of certain kinds of 
propositional attitudes even to infants, which flies n the face of Davidson’s exclusion 
of infants from that form of intentionality.  Perhaps Cavell thinks she avoids conflict 
with Davidson because she takes him to limit the scope of his interpretavism (and 
Charity) to just familiar propositional attitudes.  But as I suggested above (p. 68), he 
apparently takes himself to be offering a general account of propositional attitudes.  
Granted, Cavell can escape conflict by narrowing the scope of Davidsonian 
interpretavism.  But, as I have argued in Ch. 3, diminishing the ambitions of that 
theory entails a corresponding diminishment of its in erest—and plausibility.71  In 
fact, one might expect a Davidsonian like Cavell to opt for a view of wish-fulfilment 
like Gardner’s which denies that basic forms of it involve propositional content at all.  
But, of course, as I have argued, this tack itself—ultimately—fails to dissipate the 
conflict with Davidsonian Charity. 
                                                
70 Although Wittgenstein has also influenced her thinking (cf. Cavell 1993). 
71 As I pointed out, it seems unlikely that there should be two entirely disjoint constitutive bases for 
propositional content.  And to the extent that some suitable non-interpretavist basis would need to be 
sought for the unfamiliar propositional attitudes, Davidsonians would face the—perhaps recalcitrant—
problem of explaining why that basis is unsuited to serve for the familiar propositional attitudes as 
well.  So a limitation of the scope of interpretavism such as Cavell seems to require renders it 




In sum, my argument against Davidsonian normativism, based on the 
scientific possibility of a module embodying process  of basic Freudian wish-
fulfilment, withstands a number of objections that might possibly be raised against it.  
This argument should itself suffice to raise substantial doubt about the propriety of 
normativist claims that typical charity principles constitute a priori constraints on 
mental agency.  However, in the following chapter I widen out my argument to take 
in non-basic forms of Freudian wish-fulfilment as well as some other characteristic 




Chapter Five: An Argument From General Freudian 
Phenomena 
Introduction 
   Although my argument thus far has focused only o basic forms of wish-
fulfilment, it is interesting to consider whether an nalogue of my argument can be 
run with respect to a broader array of Freudian phenomena.  Whether it can or not 
will depend on just how those phenomena are to be und rstood.  Accordingly, I 
consider which of several possible accounts of those phenomena appears to be 
Freud’s own, and whether when so interpreted, the relevant phenomena put pressure 
on normativist principles.  My focus shall be largely, though not exclusively, on the 
various less basic forms of wish-fulfilment which according to Freud develop 
subsequently to the infantile forms previously described.  Key interpretative questions 
which I address include the following: whether Freudian phenomena possess an act-
like character, that is, whether at bottom they are actions, or the causal consequences 
of actions, performed by the unconscious; and in precisely what sense neurotic 
symptoms, parapraxes, etc., constitute wish-fulfilments for Freud. 
Freudian Phenomena 
Roughly, the psychological phenomena at the heart of Freudian theory divide 
into two classes: (1) defense mechanisms such as repression and resistance that 




fulfilment, both basic and non-basic, that arise as outlets for defended-against 
contents.1 
Defense Mechanisms 
Of the defense mechanisms, repression is primary.  Through it, wishes which 
are unacceptable to consciousness because they conflict with the moral standards 
incorporated into the superego are consigned by the ego to the unconscious.  
Moreover, memories of traumatic experiences or memories which are merely 
associated with traumatic experiences (and, therefore, run the risk of evoking 
traumatic memories) are subject to repression.  Resistance, in turn, occurs when the 
ego instigates behaviors that serve to fend off forces that threaten to raise repressed 
contents to consciousness.  In particular, a patient in treatment may act precisely so as 
to sabotage that very treatment.2  How repression and, especially, resistance might 
operate in detail will occupy us subsequently. 
Characterizing Forms of Wish-Fulfilment 
Adequately characterizing the various forms of wish-fulfilment requires some 
length.  Aside from infantile hallucinatory wish-fulfilment and the undistorted dreams 
of young children, Freud counts as forms of wish-fulfilment such varied phenomena 
as the distorted dreams of older children and adults, parapraxes, jokes, and neurotic 
symptoms like the bodily manifestations of conversion-hysteria and the obsessive 
                                                
1 Strictly, because the various dreamwork processes erve a censoring function, they should be 
reckoned among defense mechanisms.  But because of th ir central role in non-basic wish-fulfilments, 
I treat them under the latter heading. 
The classification given is rough partly because Freud describes some phenomena involving wishes 
that more resemble straightforward satisfactions than wish-fulfilments.  Thus, for example, as I suggest 
below, Freud sees the unconscious as sometimes helping itself to realistic means in order to achieve its 
ends. 
2 So described, the irrationality of such resistance appears patent.  But I postpone consideration of the 




thoughts and symptomatic acts of obsessive-compulsion.  What is peculiar to these 
forms of wish-fulfilment is that, in some sense, they wear a disguise. 
Freud famously wrote that “dreams are the royal road t  the unconscious,” by 
which he meant that an appreciation of the distinctive contents and modes of 
operation of the unconscious is most readily gleaned via consideration of the 
character of dreams.  And it is with respect to dreams that Freud expounds in greatest 
detail the nature of disguised wish-fulfilments.  As the child grows, the infantile 
wishes of the id become unacceptable to consciousness and are subject to the 
repressing forces of the ego and superego.  Accordingly, the possibility of a 
straightforward satisfaction for them through action or even of an undisguised 
‘gratification’ of them through dreaming wish-fulfilment is closed off to them.  
Hence, according to Freud, they find their way to aless direct expression: “. . . we can 
say of an infantile dream that it is the open fulfilment of a permitted wish, and of an 
ordinary distorted dream that it is the disguised fulfilment of a repressed wish . . .” 
(1916-17, 217).  This disguise is effected through the processes collectively known as 
the ‘dreamwork’.  The dreamwork consists of the various processes by which the 
wishes instigating dreams in adults (the dream’s ‘latent content’) are rendered 
unrecognizable in the dream-imagery which expresses them (‘manifest content’).  
These processes most centrally include condensation nd displacement, whose 
operation (cf. p. 164 above) Freud sees as a characteristic feature of the id. 
By ‘condensation’, Freud understands “the fact thate manifest dream has a 
smaller content than the latent one, and is thus an abbreviated translation of it” (1916-




in common” are “combined and fused into a single unity i  the manifest dream” 
(ibid.).  Thus, for example, “different people” in the latent content may in the 
manifest content be “condensed into a single one.”  As Freud notes, such fusion 
makes the original sources unrecognizable (thereby s rving the function of dream-
censorship), rather in the way that taking “several photographs on the same plate” 
makes the resulting image “blurred and vague” (1916-17, 172).  By ‘displacement’, 
Freud understands the process in which “a latent elm nt is replaced not by a 
component part of itself but by something more remote” and, secondly, “the psychical 
accent is shifted from an important element on to an ther which is unimportant, so 
that the dream appears differently centred and strange” (1916-17, 174).  With respect 
to the former, the item replacing the latent element (or elements—cf. condensation) 
will be one that bears some sort of similarity or other associative connection, however 
tenuous, with the replaced item.3  The creations of the dreamwork, then, rendered 
unrecognizable in their import by such processes, are able to escape the repressing 
forces of ego and superego and enter consciousness u disturbed. 
The pattern which Freud describes with respect to dreams, of course, he 
claims to discern in a number of other psychic phenomena as well.  Thus, a neurotic 
symptom (or at least particular features of it) is supposed to be a manifestation of 
latent unconscious thoughts, though the link is rendered unrecognizable through the 
distorting influence of dreamwork-like processes.  Thus, for example, Freud describes 
an obsessive-compulsive patient, a woman of about thirty, who, Freud writes, 
                                                
3 In some instances, the replacing element will be drawn from a relatively stable stock of “symbols,” 
the common inheritance of humanity (or a culture, at le st); in others, they will constitute more private 
associations.  In either case, however, it is essential that the “meaning” of the replacing element be 
opaque to consciousness.  Indeed, the link between replacing and replaced element may be so remote 




“performed (among others) the following remarkable obsessional action many 
times a day.  She ran from her room into another neighbouring one, took up a 
particular position there beside a table that stood in the middle [with a 
prominent stain on its tablecloth], rang the bell for her housemaid, sent her on 
some indifferent errand or let her go without one, and then ran back into her 
own room.”  (1916-17, 261) 
 
Freud connects the symptomatic act to an incident on the woman’s wedding-night 
about ten year’s prior.  Her husband had been impotent, but not wishing to be 
ashamed before the chambermaid when she made the bed, he had poured ink on the 
sheet, “but not on the exact place where a stain would have been appropriate” (262).  
On Freud’s interpretation, the woman’s symptomatic ct essentially repeats the 
traumatic scene, only in such a way as to correct it: in the obsessional action, “the 
stain is in the right place,” and, thus, “she was also correcting the other thing, which 
had been so distressing that night . . . his [i.e., h r husband’s] impotence” (262-63).  
“[I]n the manner of a dream,” the symptomatic act represents as fulfilled an 
unconscious wish on the part of the woman that her husband had not been impotent.  
As in a dream, the origins of the act in the woman’s traumatic memory and 
unconscious wish, to which it bears such significant analogies, is concealed by the 
distorting influence of the dreamwork.  By displacement, elements of the memory and 
wish are replaced with items with which they are associatively or symbolically 
connected, for example, the bed with the table (the latt r being, according to Freud, a 
regular symbol for the former) (262).4  Most crucially, Freud maintains, “This 
symptom was fundamentally a wish-fulfilment, just like a dream . . .” (299).  Similar 
remarks apply to less pathological phenomena such as jokes and parapraxes. 
                                                
4 The concept of displacement constitutes something of a genus for Freud.  In fact, Freud identifies a 
number of more specific processes by which unconsciu  contents are rendered unrecognizable in 




A Clinical Portrait 
To get a fuller appreciation of Freudian phenomena, however, it will be 
helpful to describe in a little detail the clinical picture presented to Freud by a case of 
a nineteen-year old girl suffering from a combination of agoraphobia and obsessional 
neurosis (1916-17, 264-69).  In his description of the case, Freud mentions that she 
had become very irritable, especially towards her mother, depressed, given to 
indecision and doubts, and unable to cross wide streets by herself.  But Freud dwells 
particularly on a “sleep-ceremonial” the girl had developed, to the consternation of 
her parents.  On the pretext that she needed quiet, sh  required that all clocks in her 
bedroom be stopped or removed, and that all flower-posts and vases be collected so 
they would not disturb her sleep by falling over and breaking.  She herself admitted 
how feeble a justification her need for quiet provided for these measures.  Moreover, 
that she required the door to the hallway between her room and her parents’ to remain 
open altogether contradicted her alleged motive.  Other aspects of her sleep-ritual 
concerned her bed.  She demanded that her pillows nt touch the bedstead, and that 
the smaller topmost pillow form a diamond against that below.  On this pillow, her 
head had to be placed along the center-line of the diamond.  Moreover, she would 
take pains to collect the feathers of her eiderdown at one end before placing it on her 
bed; but then she would immediately smooth out the feathers that had so 
accumulated.  While performing these rituals, she would be assailed by doubts that 
she had done them successfully and be forced to repeat them.  As a result, an hour or 
two would pass in which she remained awake and kept h r parents from sleeping as 
well.  Freud’s initial efforts to interpret the patient’s symptoms were met with 




were always rejected with a decided ‘no’ or accepted with contemptuous doubt” 
(266).  Gradually, however, the girl came to wholly accept Freud’s interpretations 
and, in proportion as she did, her symptoms disappered. 
 Freud interprets the girl’s removal of clocks to ensure her sleep thus: The girl 
had been disturbed by repeatedly having been awakened with a throbbing in her 
clitoris from sexual excitement.  When the symbolic relationship between ticking 
clock and throbbing clitoris is seen, then her insistence upon removing the clocks is 
recognizable as an expression of her fear of being so awakened.  Her precautions with 
regard to flower-pots and vases is partly explained through the fact that “flower-pots 
and vases, like all vessels” are “female symbols” (267).  Moreover, free-association 
to the ritual led the girl to recall an incident in which she had cut herself on a vase and 
bled profusely, which memory led her, in turn, to recall her anxiety at a later date that 
“on her wedding-night she would not bleed and would thus fail to show that she was a 
virgin” (267).  Thus, Freud interprets her “precautions against vases being broken” as 
“a repudiation of the whole complex concerned with v rginity and bleeding at the first 
intercourse—a repudiation equally of the fear of bleeding and of the contrary fear of 
not bleeding” (267). 
 As for the patient’s rule that pillow and headboard not touch: the girl admits 
that the pillow had the meaning of a woman for her,the headboard that of a man.  So 
Freud interprets the rule as a means “by magic” to keep her mother and father apart, 
that is, from having sex.  This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that she 
remembered as a child having achieved this aim more directly.  First, she had 




(an arrangement preserved in her sleep-ceremony).  Later, she would be permitted to 
lie between her parents in their bed, and even to take the place of her mother when 
she grew too big to be comfortably accommodated between them. 
 The patient’s gathering of feathers in the eiderdown (like pillows, a female 
symbol) represents her mother as pregnant, while the subsequent smoothing of it out 
Freud interprets in terms of the girl’s long-standing fear of her mother becoming 
pregnant with a little competitor to herself, as it were.  As for her placing her head 
along the center-line of the diamond formed by small pillow atop large pillow: The 
small pillow stands for the daughter, the large pillow for the mother.  The diamond 
serves as a universal symbol of female genitalia; the head, of the penis.  So this aspect 
of the ritual represents her “playing the man and replacing the male organ by her 
head” (268). 
While noting that several distinct phantasies underlie the girl’s symptoms, 
Freud finds their “nodal point” in the girl’s erotic attachment to her father: In short, 
the girl was suffering from an Elektra complex.  He speculates, further, that this may 
explain the girl’s hostility towards her mother.  I shall recur to the particulars of this 
case and Freud’s reading of them in the sequel.5 
Interpretative Issues 
Various interpretative issues arise when one consider  Freudian phenomena 
like those exhibited in the preceding case.  In the present section, I consider these 
issues in detail. 
                                                





Probably the most fundamental question is what role Freud assigns to 
intention in the production of these phenomena.  As several commentators point out 
(see, e.g., [Gardner 1994] and [Smith 1999]), there is a reading of Freud that views 
such manifestations on the model of the practical syllogism.  On this view, a 
symptom, say, is an intentional action; it is performed for an (unconscious) reason, 
namely, because one (unconsciously) desires p and believes that the symptom is a 
means to achieve p. Following Smith, I shall refer to this view as ‘intentionalism’. 6  
In fact, adherents of intentionalism might be tempted to see any or all stages of the 
process by which on Freud’s account symptoms, etc., are produced and sustained in 
such terms: (1) the generation of symptoms and other utward manifestations, (2) the 
generation of wish-fulfilling imagery and dreams, (3) the repressions which consign 
wishes (and other unacceptable contents) to the unconscious and, thereby, preclude 
their straightforward satisfaction, and (4) the resistance which wards off forces that 
threaten to bring those unconscious contents to consci usness. 
The intentionalist reading of Freud has sometimes found favor among those 
committed to a hermeneuticist approach to the mind (e.g., Flew [1956] and Toulmin 
[1954]).  The advantage of this reading for the hermeneuticist, of course, is that it 
assimilates the pattern of psychoanalytic explanatio  to the rationalizing pattern 
which they see as at the heart of folk psychology, and, thus, it supports the 
                                                
6 Intentionalism as here understood requires unconscious reasons which rationalize symptoms, 
parapraxes, etc.  Many will hold that symptomatic acts, like the obsessive-compulsive’s rituals, permit 
reason-explanation in terms of an agent’s conscious desires and beliefs.  Elektra, for example, justifies 
some of her rituals in terms of her desire not to be awakened during the night.  Perhaps she would 
justify others simply in terms of an intrinsic desir  to perform them.  It cannot merely be taken for 
granted that explanations of her acts in such terms are not genuine reason-explanations of them.  
(Whether they are or not raises complex issues that I explore below [see p. 217, n. 17].)  But if they are 
genuine reason-explanations, they are not the sort of unconscious reason an intentionalist account of 




methodological and ontological subsumption of psychoanalysis under folk 
psychology.  Particularly relevant is the variety of intentionalism encouraged by 
Davidson’s reading of Freud (Davidson 2004c) which sees symptoms (qua species of 
irrationality)7 as the effect of interacting compartments. Though Davidson conceives 
of the interaction itself as brute causal (cf. p. 114 above), effects within one 
compartment relate logically to their distal causes (beliefs and desires) in another 
compartment as actions do to the reasons that rationalize them.  So a Davidsonian 
reading of Freud can be seen as a kind of intentionalism.  
Was Freud an intentionalist?  It is difficult to judge with any confidence the 
precise extent of Freud’s application of the rationalizing pattern of explanation.  
Cavell (1993, 180), for example, emphasizes that Freud’s “last revisionary work on 
repression and related matters—Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926)—builds 
squarely on a reason-explanation model.”  But even earlier there are unmistakable 
intentionalist elements in Freud’s theory.  Thus, Freud describes the case of a middle-
aged woman suffering from delusions of jealousy.  One day she divulges to her 
housemaid that “The most dreadful thing that could happen to me would be if I were 
to learn that my dear husband was having an affair . . .” (1916-17, 249).  The next day 
she received a note in which her husband was accused of having an affair with a girl 
whom the maid hated.  Although the woman immediately saw through the ruse, from 
that day forward her confidence in her husband’s fielity was shaken, despite the fact 
that she had no good reason whatsoever to suspect her husband.  Freud interprets the 
                                                
7 In fact, whether and how symptoms, etc., should be seen as irrational requires careful consideration.  
In principle, an intentionalist reading of Freud might seem to open up the possibility of a hyper-
rational interpretation of Freud on which Freudian phenomena actually turn out, not just rationalizable, 




woman’s delusion of jealousy so: Unconsciously, the woman is in love with her son-
in-law, a fact which occasions considerable guilt in the woman.  To assuage this guilt, 
she contrives by means of the housemaid to obtain evidence, however flimsy, to 
support a delusional belief in her husband’s infidelity.  On Freud’s reading, then, the 
woman’s initial revelation of her fear to the housemaid must be seen on the model of 
the practical syllogism: she unconsciously desires to obtain evidence of her husband’s 
infidelity and undertakes a means to its attainment.8    
Another clear illustration of Freudian intentionalism arises in connection with 
the tablecloth-lady (see p. 204ff. above).  Freud interprets the symptoms she exhibits 
(including her ritual involving the tablecloth) thus: “By means of her symptoms she 
continued to carry on her dealings with her husband.  We learnt to understand the 
voices that pleaded for him, that excused him, that put him on a pedestal and that 
lamented his loss” (1916-17, 273).  In particular, Freud writes, “Although she was 
young and desirable to other men, she had taken every pr caution, real and imaginary 
(magical), to remain faithful to him.”  The ‘real’ precautions referred to include the 
fact that “[s]he did not show herself to strangers and she neglected her personal 
appearance . . . .”  Here again one see means straightforwardly employed for the 
attainment of a desired end on the model of the practical syllogism.9 
                                                
8 This is not to say that it would be impossible in principle to hypothesize some non-intentionalistic 
mechanism responsible for the woman’s behavior.  But, as in th s case, where the intentionalist reading 
appears most natural and Freud gives no indication of repudiating it, I think it can safely be ascribed to 
him. 
Note, by the way, that it is only the woman’s revelation of her fear to the housemaid that I am 
addressing here.  I do not consider, for example, whether Freud would explain the woman’s delusion 
of jealousy itself intentionalistically.  Nor do I consider such questions as why an unconscious senseof 
guilt should require relief, why producing the delusion demands that evidence be manufactured, or 
how such flimsy evidence forms a sufficient basis on which to rest the delusion. 
9 Perhaps one can also see the aspect of Elektra’s sleep-ritual (p. 206ff. above) whereby she insists that




But there is another, somewhat more complicated featur  of the case of the 
tablecloth-lady that seem to fit the intentionalistic pattern as well.  In particular, Freud 
maintains that “the deepest secret of her illness wa  that by means of it she protected 
her husband from malicious gossip, justified her separation from him and enabled 
him to lead a comfortable separate life” (263).  Freud’s point is that the woman, 
although “struggling with an intention to obtain a legal divorce” because of her 
husband’s impotence, uses the illness itself to provide her husband a reason to 
separate from her in a way that allows him to save f c .  Moreover, with respect to 
Elektra, Freud writes, “We . . . may suspect that se had become so ill in order not to 
have to marry and in order to remain with her father” (273).  In each case, Freud 
posits a clear means-end relation between the patient’s illness and a supposedly 
desired end. 
Such intentionalism necessarily complicates the picture of the causation of the 
symptoms of illness.  I shall turn to the question shortly how Freud conceives of the 
causation of symptoms in detail.  But this much is clear: by and large he construes 
them as wish-fulfilments.  Thus, as we have seen, Freud offers interpretations of the 
rituals of the tablecloth-lady and of Elektra that view them as substitute-satisfactions 
for unconscious wishes or desires.  So, for example, Elektra’s insistence that her 
pillow not touch the headboard should be seen as a wi h-fulfilment of her desire to 
keep her parents apart.  But inasmuch as Freud sees an intention to remain with her 
father behind her illness as a whole, that intention must also becomes part of the 
                                                                                                                                 
her supposed aim of preventing her parents from having sex.  A complication in this case, however, is 
the fact that Freud links this aspect of her ritual o her having feigned fear as a young child so that the 
door between nursery and parents’ room would remain open.  The associative connection with the 
earlier behavior may suggest that the later ritual has more the character of a symbolic, wish-fulfilling 




causal story of her symptom.  So the intentionalism Freud posits with respect to the 
illness as a whole would seem to entail at least a me sure of intentionalism with 
respect to symptoms themselves.10 
Anti-Intentionalism 
Yet many more-recent commentators interpret Freud’s account of symptoms 
and other wish-fulfilments non-intentionalistically.  Thus, for example, Gardner 
writes that “the true form of psychoanalytic explanation makes a clean break with 
practical reasoning” (1994, 497).   Again, endorsing ‘anti-intentionalism’, Smith 
interprets parapraxes, symptoms, etc., as mere “manifestations of wishes,” whereby 
he intends “a mode of causation less constrained by the content of the wish than the 
conclusion of a practical syllogism involving the wish as a premise” (1999, 173).11  
Aside from the views of commentators, there’s the fact that the trend of Freud’s 
discussion of the dream-work is to see it as possessing the character of process not 
action; and with respect to symptoms specifically, he writes, “. . . dealing with a 
conflict by forming symptoms is after all an automatic process . . .” (1916-17, 385).12 
Moreover, problems arise when one tries to fit sympto -formation, etc., into 
the mold of the practical syllogism.  It requires attributing to the unconscious truly 
bizarre beliefs to the effect either that a given symptom constitutes the attainment of 
                                                
10 Things quickly become murky when one asks how the causal contributions of the two desires relate, 
the desire behind the illness as a whole and the desire behind the symptom as wish-fulfilment.  Do they 
over-determine the symptom?  Do they both enter intntionalistically into a process of practical-
reasoning that simultaneously seeks to “kill two birds with one stone,” produce an illness and afford 
substitute-satisfaction?  Or does the intention to produce illness merely avail itself of non-
intentionalistic wish-fulfilling psychic mechanisms in order to achieve its end, as if it were turning on 
machines?  This last model of the production of sympto s especially rather interestingly combines 
intentionalist and non-intentionalist elements.  Yet another model might see the intention as taking 
over responsibility for the symptoms when the automatic mechanisms that initially generated them 
begin, for whatever reason, to give out. 
11 Compare also Cavell (2002) on defense mechanisms: “Repression, along with more specific defense 
mechanisms like displacement, consists of purposive, quasi-automatic, nonintentional mental acts.” 
12 In this context, it is worth noting the existence of efforts to model such processes in non-




an object of (libidinal) wish or serves as a means to its attainment.  Thus, in 
connection with Freud’s view of paranoia as a disguised wish-fulfilment for 
homosexual desires, Adolph Grünbaum writes, 
In the psychoanalytic explanation of a paranoiac’s delusional conduct, can the 
afflicted agent be warrantedly held to have “reasons” for his/her behavior such 
that he/she unconsciously believes it to be a means of attaining the fulfillment 
of his/her homosexual longings?  Can the paranoiac be warrantedly said to 
have unconsciously intended his delusional persecutory thoughts and 
comportment to accomplish his erotic objectives?  (Grünbaum 1984, 76-77) 
 
The point Grünbaum highlights is not that it is impossible that the 
unconscious might possess such bizarre means-end beliefs, but merely that one would 
need strong evidence to attribute such beliefs.  However, as Gardner notes, an 
intentionalistic account confronts a major explanatory burden: “Where do such 
irrational desires and beliefs come from, and why are they not integrated into, and so 
dissolved away by rational mental functioning?” (1994, 497). 
Nonetheless, even with respect to wish-fulfilling symptoms, Freud sometimes 
uses what might appear an intentionalistic idiom.  Thus, of Elektra’s requirement that 
her pillow not touch the headboard, Freud writes, “she wanted—by magic, we must 
interpolate—to keep the man and woman apart—that is, to eparate her parents from 
each other, not to allow them to have sexual intercourse” (1916-17, 267).  Again, 
Freud writes of the tablecloth-lady that “she had tken every precaution, real and 
imaginary (magical), to remain faithful” to her husband (273).  Taken at face value, 




headboard as a magical or imaginary means to achieve th  end of separating her 
parents.13 
Because the actions undertaken are not realistic means to the desired ends, 
Freud qualifies them as ‘magical’ or ‘imaginary’.  But question arises as to what these 
adjectives signify in this context.  Whatever else magic as it has been practiced in 
various cultures includes, presumably it involves b liefs that particular actions are 
effective for achieving specific ends that appear unfo nded from a scientific or 
broadly naturalistic standpoint.  So perhaps Freud can actually be taken as attributing 
to Elektra the absurd belief that keeping her pillow and headboard apart is a means to 
separate her parents.14  Accordingly, it is worth considering in some detail just what 
intentionalist account of symptoms and other wish-fulfilments might be suggested by 
Freud’s phraseology. 
Magical Intentionalism 
First, we can quickly reject as un-Freudian certain possible intentionalist 
accounts of wish-fulfilments because they do not do justice to the magical aspect on 
which Freud appears to lay emphasis.  Thus, one could envision that the unconscious, 
prevented from seeking satisfaction for a libidinal wish unacceptable to 
consciousness, simply chooses to engage in some activity as a pleasurable, second-
best substitute for the activity which would fully satisfy its wish, just as someone 
unable, say, to realize their dream of playing professional sports might find some 
compensation in competing on an amateur level.  Of course, such an account 
                                                
13 Moreover, perhaps the separation itself could, in tur , be seen as a means to the further end of 
preventing her parents from having sex. 
14 However, I shall consider below whether Freud might not allow the possibility that the girl, in the 
very act of separating the pillow and headboard, actually believes that she is directly separating her 
parents, in view of the symbolic identifications she has made between those items and her father and 
mother.  If so, then the form of magic that is most analogous to Freud’s view of symptoms, etc., may 




confronts the question how symptoms, etc., which are at most symbolically or 
associatively connected with libidinal wishes are able to serve as pleasurable, second-
best substitutes for the true objects of one’s desire.15  But leaving that question aside, 
such an account simply fails to do justice the facttha  wish-fulfilments for Freud 
clearly lack the character of realistic satisfactions f desires, even of desires for things 
chosen as second-best substitutes for more ultimate objects of desire.16 
 More in keeping with Freud’s phraseology is an account which sees wish-
fulfilments as chosen as “magical” means to desired ends.  Of course, as I noted, 
many recent commentators reject the intentionalistic reading of Freud which requires 
attributing to the unconscious bizarre beliefs thata given symptom constitutes the 
attainment of a (libidinal) wish or serves as a means to its attainment.  Can Elektra, 
for example, really believe that by separating her pillow from the headboard she is 
preventing them from having sex?  However, recall that Freud describes her as taking 
the pillow to have the meaning of a woman, the headbo rd that of a man.  Perhaps 
what looks like a merely symbolic relation is actually something stronger: maybe the 
girl can be literally seen as unconsciously identifying the pillow with her mother and 
the headboard with her father.  In that case, she would possess unconscious belief (or 
belief-like) states with the contents pillow = mother and headboard = father.  In the 
presence of such identities, separating the pillow and headboard constitutes separating 
her parents, and so separating the pillow and headboar  will appear a serviceable 
                                                
15 Can the unconscious, for example, be supposed to chose hysterical paralysis as a substitute for direct 
satisfaction of an Oedipal desire? 
16 Granted, I have suggested that Freud views the unconscious as sometimes reaching for realistic 





means to the end of preventing them from having sex.  The girl’s symptomatic act, 
then, can perhaps be viewed as performed on the modl of the practical syllogism.17,18  
Where would the odd identity-beliefs come from?  Perhaps they could be seen 
as spontaneously generated by the id itself through association, insofar as they do not 
represent fixed, innate symbolic relationships.  The ego would then be called upon to 
prevent the id from expressing contents unacceptable to conscious sensitivities.  
Censorship would be exercised by the ego as to which contents are fit to be expressed 
as symptoms, etc.  Alternatively, suitable identity-beliefs could be seen as introduced 
by the censorship itself: Only those fit to generat symptoms, etc., sufficiently 
unobjectionable to conscious sensitivities need be introduced into the id.  Granted, 
                                                
17 There are some complex questions about agency bound up with intentionalism.  In performing her 
symptomatic act, the girl seems to have both a consci u  intention that makes no reference to her 
parents and a conscious desire-belief pair that does.  The question arises then which is her genuine 
intention in acting.  Both ‘intentions’ would seem to have the appropriate logical relations to her action 
so as to rationalize it.  Does the girl have two intentions in performing the act?  Do the two intentio s 
taken together constitute a compound intention of some sort?  Perhaps the simplest picture of the 
situation is to see the conscious intention as the girl’s genuine intention in performing the act: the 
contribution of the unconscious desire-belief pair would be limited to its part in producing the 
conscious intention.  The story might go like this: The girl unconsciously wishes to separate her 
parents to keep them from having sex and believes that she can do so by separating pillow and 
headboard.  So she unconsciously decides to implant the relevant desire into her consciousness.  In that 
case, there would be an unconscious intention upstream of the girl’s action but it would not be her 
intention in performing the action (in principle, however, even this element of unconscious intention 
might lapse from the account: the conscious intention to separate pillow and headboard could be 
viewed as a mere causal consequence of an unconscious desire to do so).  Alternatively, though, it 
might be possible to see the unconscious intention as the girl’s real intention in performing the action, 
with the conscious ‘intention’ as a mere epiphenomenon or confabulation.  For example, the model of 
agency bound up in Rey’s account of akrasia (see p. 117, n. 19 above) sees action quite generally as 
determined by one’s unconscious beliefs and preferenc s (one’s ‘central’ attitudes), with conscious 
beliefs and desires demoted to the status of mere ‘avowed’ attitudes.  What holds of actions in general, 
would apply in particular to symptomatic acts like th  girl’s.  I am not in a position to judge that any 
one of the variants of intentionalism just canvassed i  more plausibly Freudian than the others.  
However, such details as those that divide the different versions may, as I discuss below, bear on 
whether and how wish-fulfilments turn out to be irrational. 
18 Perhaps it is not inapt to say that on the present account the id is susceptible to confusions between 
symbols and the things they symbolize.  As a result, it can lead to an individual’s behaving towards 
symbols as if they were their referents.  It is tempting to suppose that voodoo involves a similar sort of 
confusion.  Note, further, that Freud asserts that “Words were originally magic . . .” (1916-17, 17).  
Apparently, he identifies a primitive tendency to confuse symbols and things symbolized in a way that 




however one fills in the details, the resulting intentionalistic account may look 
extravagant.  But as Freud himself suggests, neurotic symptoms are themselves often 
quite strange and may call for surprising explanatory hypotheses (1916-17, 268-69). 
Intentionalism Applied to Arational Acts 
It is interesting to consider whether something like the intentionalistic account 
of Freudian phenomena I have limned could apply, mutatis mutandis, to what are 
sometimes referred to as ‘arational’ (or ‘expressive’) actions, which bear some 
resemblance to symptomatic actions.  Arational actions are supposed to be intentional 
actions that are not done for a reason, at least not one that involves the agent’s 
viewing the action as good in some respect(s), and which are typically explained 
through the agent’s being in the grip of some (strong) emotion (Hursthouse 1991).  
For example, an individual’s jumping for joy appears to be an intentional act that 
could well be performed without the individual’s believing that the jumping 
subserves some further aim or exhibits any particular good-making qualities at all.  
Everyday explanation of the act would confine itself typically to citing the agent’s 
strong feeling at the time: “I was so happy I just had to jump.”19 
What is interesting in the present context about such arational actions20 is that 
they often exhibit something like the symbolic or associative identifications that mark 
Freudian symptomatic acts (and other Freudian phenom a).  For they often involve 
behavior directed towards items symbolic of, or associated with, the person (or thing) 
that is the object of one’s emotion.  Thus, for example, someone enraged with an 
                                                
19 Or more fundamentally, an explanation could simply appeal to the agent’s desire to jump: “She just 
wanted to jump.”  Reference to emotion, I think, could be seen as an indirect explanation of the action: 
it explains the desire that directly explains the action. 
20 The designation of such acts as ‘arational’ is Hursthouse’s.  Her choice of this designation seems 
intended merely to highlight that such acts lack a lassical rationalizing explanation in terms of a 
belief-desire pair.  Ultimately, she avoids committing herself to the view that they lack reason-




individual may destroy “her picture, letters or presents from her, awards from her, 
books or poems about her; the chair she was wont to si in, locks of her hair, 
recordings [of] ‘our’ song, etc.” (Hursthouse 1991, 58).  In such a case, it is tempting 
to suppose that one acts on such objects because it is impossible or imprudent to act 
on the object of one’s emotion itself.  So perhaps there is some plausibility in seeing 
an individual’s destruction of a picture of his cheating wife, say, as a causal 
consequence of a desire to destroy the woman herself which is denied real 
satisfaction.  Locating a desire behind the act in addition to the emotion felt begins to 
enlarge the analogy with Freudian symptomatic acts. 
Of course, a big difference between such arational acts and symptomatic acts 
would be that in the former case there would be no reason to suppose that the relevant 
desire is unconscious, even temporarily.  In many instances, for prudential reasons 
there may be a suppression of direct a tion towards the object of one’s emotion and 
desire, but there need be no suppression, let alone repr ssion, of the emotion and 
desire themselves.  So it is difficult to tell a story that explains arational acts precisely 
along the lines of the account of Freudian wish-fulfilments I have just described.  The 
processes and acts the account refers to cannot, along with the pivotal desire, simply 
be transposed into consciousness with any plausibility.  Certainly, the agent in 
performing an arational act has no awareness of actually forming an intention to, say, 
do violence to his cheating wife, let alone through tearing up her picture! 
However, the fact that the pivotal desire is conscious does not necessarily 
preclude a role of the unconscious in generating arational acts.  One way to 




and central attitudes.  On Rey’s account, one’s conscious desire to harm one’s 
cheating wife would amount to a mere avowed attitude, whereas the central attitudes 
genuinely responsible for one’s (non-verbal) actions would remain subconscious, 
even if some of them, in effect, amount to unconscious twins of one’s conscious 
attitudes.  Thus, corresponding to one’s avowed desire to harm one’s cheating wife 
could very well be a central desire with the same content.  Accordingly, the 
possibility opens up of that central desire’s combining with one’s unconscious, 
central beliefs in intentionalistic fashion to produce arational acts on the model of the 
practical syllogism.  By analogy with the suggested intentionalistic account of 
Freudian phenomena above, one would simply need to suppose that a central belief 
arises temporarily whose content is p cture = wife. 
So it is possible to envision an account of at least some arational acts—
namely, those with a seeming symbolic or associative character—that corresponds 
fairly closely to the intentionalistic account of Freudian phenomena.21  The possibility 
of explaining arational acts in this way should reinforce one’s impression of the 
potential value of the intentionalistic account of Freudian phenomena itself as an 
explanatory hypothesis.22  Greater clarity on the matter of intentionalism, however, 
will be possible after addressing another question important for the interpretation of 
                                                
21 I largely leave to one side the question how categori s of arational acts that do not obviously partake 
of a symbolic character might be explained.  However, I note that Hursthouse mentions a category of 
arational acts that are “explained by anger with inan mate objects” and consist in “doing things that 
might make sense if the things were animate,” for example, “kicking doors that refuse to shut and cars 
that refuse to start” (1991, 58).  Once one allows the possibility of central beliefs as odd as those 
embodying symbolic identifications, one is unlikely to bridle at the possibility of (temporary) animistic 
central beliefs as well. 
22 The possibility of explaining some arational acts in this way belies Hursthouse’s assertion (1991, 
63n6) that “the fascinatingly symbolic nature of many of the examples of arational action” does not 
“yield anything helpful” in reconciling such acts with the standard picture of intentional acts as 
permitting explanation in terms of belief-desire pairs.  On the account just sketched, at least a subset of 




Freud’s view of symptoms, parapraxes, distorted dreams, etc.: Precisely in what sense 
does Freud take them to be wish-fulfilments? 
The Nature of Wish-Fulfilments 
In asking in what sense these phenomena are ‘wish-fulfilments’, the problem 
is not that which Freud himself raises with respect to distorted dreams, namely, that 
the existence of anxiety-dreams, in view of the cons ious displeasure they occasion, 
seems to run counter to Freud’s claim that all dreams re wish-fulfilments.  Freud 
solves this problem by consigning the wishes such dreams ‘fulfill’ and the pleasure 
they afford to the unconscious.23  Rather, the problem that I want to highlight is more 
general, attaching to pleasant and unpleasant dreams alike, as well as neurotic 
symptoms, etc.  Insofar as all these phenomena exhibit t e distorting influence of 
dreamwork-processes, it is difficult to understand in what sense they can ‘fulfill’ 
wishes from whose contents they will typically starkly diverge.  The difficulty is 
brought out by re-considering Wollheim’s account of he essence of wish-fulfilment 
(cf. p. 166, n. 12 above).  Wollheim distinguishes b tween satisfaction and 
‘gratification’ (ostensibly, ‘fulfilment’ in Freud’s sense) of a desire so: 
my desire that p is satisfied iff p 
my desire that p is gratified iff it is for me as if p (Wollheim 1979, 47) 
                                                
23  “No doubt,” Freud writes, “a wish-fulfilment must bring pleasure; but the question then arises ‘To 
whom?’.”   Freud answers his own query: “a dreamer in his relation to his dream-wishes can only be 




But at first sight at least, it is difficult to see in what sense my dream that q involves 
(is?) a state of affairs in which ‘it is for me as if p’, where q and p—owing to the 
dreamwork—are very different contents.24 
Now one interpretation of how symptoms, etc., can be wish-fulfilments, I 
think, can be quickly dismissed.  As I noted, Freud stresses the plasticity of wishful 
impulses within primary process.  He writes of the ‘mobility of cathexes’ whereby 
one libidinal wish within the id can surrender its intensity to another.  This possibility, 
Freud maintains, explains how frustrated impulses need not always lead to illness: “if 
the satisfaction of one” of the sexual instincts “is frustrated by reality, the satisfaction 
of another can afford complete compensation” (1916-17, 345).  Moreover, Freud 
thinks that within certain limits, sexual instincts “exhibit a large capacity for changing 
their object,” a capacity which is notably evinced in the phenomenon of sublimation, 
where a (genetically related) aim is substituted that is no longer even explicitly sexual 
and, because socially approved, can be openly indulge .  This may suggest that in 
non-basic wish-fulfilment the wish-fulfilling element consists in satisfaction of a 
descendant of an initial repressed libidinal wish.25  So, for example, the woman’s 
imperious desire to summon her maid to view the stained tablecloth might be seen as 
a causal descendant of an inadmissible wish that itself permits of straightforward 
satisfaction.  
However, Freud emphasizes that the possibilities for uch substitution are 
decidedly circumcised (uh . . . I mean circumscribed!), and that it is precisely in cases 
                                                
24 Similarly, with respect to neurotic symptoms, etc.  In what sense, is it for the woman summoning her 
housemaid to the table with the stained tablecloth as if she were her former husband giving proof of his 
potency to their former chambermaid?  Or in what sense is it for a patient with a hysterical paralysis as 
if he is satisfying some unconscious libidinal wish?  




of pathology where such protections, particularly, in view of “libidinal fixations” 
(346), are least availing.  So it would be a mistake to view neurotic symptoms, etc., 
on the model of sublimations as relatively straightforward satisfactions of substitute-
desires.26  Freud stresses that “symptoms offer nothing real in the way of satisfaction” 
(301) and, as noted above, Freud asserts that “an ordi ary distorted dream,” for 
example, “is the disguised fulfilment of a repressed wish” (217).  He does not 
maintain that it is the open fulfilment of a derivative of such a wish.27   
Freud’s view, rather, appears to be that there is a layer of hallucinatory 
gratification underlying the less basic sorts of wish-fulfilment.  This emerges from a 
telling passage in which Freud compares symptom-foration to dream-formation.  
With respect to the latter, he observes, “The dream proper, which has been completed 
in the unconscious and is the fulfilment of an unconscious wishful phantasy, is 
brought up against a portion of (pre)conscious activity which exercises the office of 
censorship and which, when it has been indemnified, p rmits the formation of the 
manifest dream as a compromise” (359-60)  Thus, Freud evidently takes the notion of 
latent dream quite seriously, as an unconscious hallucinatory precursor to manifest 
dream.  What is more, he posits the existence of a hallucinatory experience (like the 
latent dream) to which neurotic symptoms bear much the same relation as manifest 
                                                
26 There may be a place for desires that are derivative of the unconscious in symptomatic acts (like the 
woman’s above) which constitute an individual’s conscious motivations in performing the act (cf.p. 
217, n. 17).  But such acts will not be wish-fulfilments for Freud because they satisfy these superficial 
desires.  And, in any case, such desires do not have any obvious role in symptoms (e.g., hysterical 
paralyses) which lack an act-like character. 
27 Because of their distinctive character, then, sublimations escape the rough classification of Freudian 
phenomena presented above into defense mechanisms and wish-fulfilments.  Note, further, the contrast 
between Freud’s account of sublimation and the variety of intentionalism that regards symptoms, etc., 
as selected as pleasurable, second-best substitutes for he objects of one’s unconscious wishes (p. 215).  
Freud’s account of sublimations is not intentionalist since it makes no reference to unconscious choice 
or agency.  Moreover, whereas in sublimation one’s initial unconscious wish is dissolved or 
transformed into a conscious successor, on the relevant intentionalism the initial unconscious wishes 




dream to latent dream: “the symptom emerges as a many-times-distorted derivative of 
the unconscious libidinal wish-fulfilment” (360).  So the puzzle I raised as to in what 
sense symptoms, etc., constitute wish-fulfilments appe rs at least partly answered 
inasmuch as on Freud’s account their genesis lies in unconscious hallucinatory wish-
fulfilment.  This connects them with the sort of ‘gratification’, the ‘as if’-experience, 
that Wollheim identifies as central to wish-fulfilment. 
But it leaves unanswered in what sense symptoms, etc., are themselves wish-
fulfilments—rather than mere causal consequences of them—as Freud insists that 
they are.28  One intriguing idea how symptoms, etc., might be assigned a more 
significant role within the less basic forms of wish-fulfilment comes from considering 
whether an account of pretend-play that Carruthers (2006) has developed, 
incorporating elements of Damasio’s theory of practic l reasoning and motivation 
(Damasio 1994), can be adapted to fit key cases of wish-fulfilment.  Though this 
approach, I think, ultimately fails to yield a satifactory gloss on Freud’s view of 
symptoms, etc., as wish-fulfilments, it is worth considering, nonetheless, for the 
illumination it sheds on that view, and because the resultant theory, although not 
following Freud to the letter, represents a potentially valuable account of symptoms, 
etc., that retains much of the spirit of Freud’s account. 
Wish-Fulfilments as Pretend-Play? 
In the present context, what is interesting about Carruthers’ account of 
pretend-play is that it attributes something of a wish-fulfilling function to children’s 
pretence, and this raises the question whether the neurotic’s symptomatic acts (and 
                                                
28 For example, he writes, “the symptoms serve for the patients’ sexual satisfaction; they are a 
substitute for satisfaction of this kind, which the patients are without in their lives” (1916-17, 299).  He 
certainly seems to mean by this more than just that the symptoms are side-effects of a process in which 




perhaps other characteristically Freudian phenomena) might be seen as wish-fulfilling 
along broadly similar lines.  On Carruthers’ account, a child’s episode of, say, 
pretending to talk to Grandma on the telephone while using a banana as a prop is 
interpreted by her unconscious, belief-generating modules as an episode of talking to 
Grandma on the telephone.  Her (unconscious) represntation of herself as talking to 
her Grandma, in turn, is taken as input by her emotional systems, which leads to 
emotional rewards much like those which would ensue from the actual event.  As 
Carruthers writes, “by representing what she is doing as talking to Grandma she is 
able to generate many of the same feelings and positive emotions as would be derived 
from the real thing.  Although she isn’t [consciously] fooled by her pretence into 
thinking that she is actually talking to Grandma, her emotional systems are so fooled, 
and respond accordingly” (2006, 297).29 
In Carruthers’ terminology, “the child’s enactment of talking to Grandma 
quasi-satisfies her actual desire to talk to Grandma” (ibid.).  Such quasi-satisfaction 
seems to correspond in all essentials to the sort of ‘as if’-experience (‘gratification’) 
which Wollheim identifies as central to Freudian wish-fulfilment.30  Accordingly, the 
                                                
29 On Carruthers’ view, it is only the girl’s emotional systems which are fooled into thinking that she is 
actually talking to Grandma.  Other systems represent h r as doing so only in a distinctive 
suppositional fashion. 
30 Carruthers is aware that his account requires some elaboration in order to serve as a general account 
of childrens’ pretend-play.  Thus, for example, he describes a case where a child pretends he is a dead 
cat, not because this promises to quasi-satisfy any desire he can plausibly be supposed to have, but 
because he anticipates that the display will amuse his audience (2006, 298).  Again, a child may 
pleasurably pretend that his father is a monster, although such a state-of-affairs, if real, would occasion 
nothing but horror.  Adapting an idea advanced by some aestheticians, Carruthers tentatively suggests 
that the child’s pleasure in such a case may derive from his ability to control his emotional response: 
“For at any moment, by reminding himself that this is only a game, and that no one is really going to 
hurt him, he can close down the pretend inputs to his emotion systems, hence shutting down or 
modulating their response.  And this might (in a different way) be pleasurable” (2006, 299).  Here the 
presence of a background belief that the pretended state-of-affairs is not real is essential to the ability 




question arises whether a symptomatic act, say, though strictly a doing of x, might 
similarly give rise to an unconscious representation that one is doing y, which, fed to 
one’s emotional systems, may lead to emotional rewards (unconscious pleasure) 
because one has a desire that y.  Undoubtedly, there are significant differences 
between Carruthers’ account of pretend-play and this account of less basic wish-
fulfilment—including the fact that in the case of wish-fulfilment the relevant desire 
(or wish) is unconscious—but the latter would retain the general structure of the 
former.31  Again, the merit of such an account would be thatit ssigns to the 
symptoms themselves an ctive role in the gratification of unconscious wishes, in a 
way that might warrant seeing them—as Freud evidently does—as themselves wish-
fulfilments.32 
However, an account of this sort might seem to confront problems as an 
account of non-basic Freudian wish-fulfilment.  In the first place, it requires 
attributing a large degree of confusion to the uncons ious in its interpretations of 
symptomatic acts.  Even a case like that of the tablecloth-lady—which on its face 
looks favorable to the present account in view of the analogy between the 
symptomatic act itself and what, according to Freud, it represents—presents 
difficulties.  For the account to work, the lady’s unconscious must be seriously 
mistaken about such things as the time at which her action occurs, who she is 
                                                                                                                                 
militates against the supposition that the child’s emotional systems are privy to an u conscious belief-
like representation that p.
31 Presumably, in the case of wish-fulfilment, elaborations like those—mentioned in the previous 
note—required to deal with children’s pretend-play in full generality will be unnecessary.  The 
pretence involved will uniformly serve the purpose of quasi-satisfying unconscious desires. 
32 It is worth noting as well that Carruthers’ account of pretend-play, more or less as initially 
formulated, might also serve as an explanation of ‘arational acts’ that partake of a symbolic character.  





summoning to see the tablecloth, what sort of object the tablecloth is, and even who 
the agent of the action is, since on Freud’s reading her symptomatic act represents her 
husband’s own display of his potency!  Furthermore, the feasibility of such an 
account appears even less in—typically Freudian—cases where the dreamwork avails 
itself of merely verbal, punning associative links between latent contents and their 
conscious representatives.  So, for example, in his account of the Ratman (1909, 188-
89), Freud describes how “[o]ne day while he was on ummer holidays the idea 
suddenly occurred to him that he was too fat [German ‘dick’] and that he must make 
himself slimmer.”  Subsequently, he developed the practice of leaving the table before 
dessert and running up the mountainside in the hot summer sun.  This symptomatic 
act is explained when it is revealed that the woman whom he loves had appeared at 
the same resort at which he was staying in the company of her cousin Richard, 
thereby evoking his jealousy.  So Freud interprets the Ratman’s compulsion to lose 
weight as a veiled fulfilment of the desire “to kill this Dick.”  That the dreamwork, 
according to Freud, makes use of such remote, “purely external associations” as the 
verbal one between Richard and fatness renders the degr e of analogy between 
symptomatic act and what it represents exceedingly slight.  It might seem farfetched 
indeed to view the Ratman’s unconscious as so confused that it interprets his efforts 
to lose weight as attempts to kill said Richard! 
A way beyond this impasse, however, may be suggested by considering 
Carruthers’ account of pretend-play in a little more detail.  Carruthers himself must 
confront the question how the mind-reading system co es to interpret a child’s 




issue becomes particularly acute when one considers that a child’s pretend-play 
includes episodes in which they pretend to be someone other than themselves (an 
astronaut, say), maybe even living at another time (lik a cowboy). 
Now in his account (2006, 299-300), Carruthers assigns the central role to a 
mind-reading system which, taking the non-conceptual perceptual input generated by 
the child’s pretend-play as input, yields a conceptual interpretation of that act as 
output.  Aware of the appearance of a mismatch betwe n the input and the required 
output, Carruthers suggests that the mind-reading system will be assisted in bridging 
this gulf by visual and verbal imagery evoked in the course of the pretence.33  Thus, 
as a child pretends to talk to her Grandma, she will generate imagery of her Grandma 
and telephones as well of the “words uttered or mentally rehearsed” during the 
episode (2006, 300).  Perhaps, abetted by this information, the mind-reading system 
will be able to conjure up the required interpretation. 
Carruthers mentions but rejects an account which assign  the mind-reading 
system “privileged access to the contents of the child’s own intentions/action 
schemata that generate and guide her movements” (2006, 3 0).  Carruthers is 
committed to a view of self-knowledge which, like Ryle’s, largely assimilates first-
person and third-person meta-cognition (see, e.g., Carruthers [2009b]; Ryle [1949]).  
On this view, one infers one’s own mental states (and ctions), just as one does 
another individual’s, primarily on the basis of overt behavioral and contextual cues.  
Although Carruthers departs from Ryle in permitting the mind-reading system direct 
                                                
33 Carruthers note, further, “Like all other belief-generating systems, it [i.e., the mind-reading system] 
will be receiving its perceptual inputs ‘tagged’ for the pretend or suppositional status of the action.  So 
this will be a crucial cue for the mind-reading system, telling it to set to work to interpret the perc ived 




access to content of an imagistic character, for various reasons he regards an 
architecture that credits mind-reading with access to intentions and other 
propositional attitudes as unlikely.  However, in the present context—the adaption of 
Carruthers’ model to symptoms, etc.—the sorts of empirical considerations that 
Carruthers would cite do not carry quite the same weight.  Accordingly, an account of 
non-basic wish-fulfilment inspired by Carruther’s account of pretend-play could posit 
a link, not between conscious intentions and mind-reader, but between unconscious 
intentions and mind-reading system.  In that case, perhaps the typically quite large 
discrepancy between the content of the symptomatic ac  and its meaning, as it were, 
could be satisfactorily bridged.34   
However, it’s not clear how far this idea can be pushed as an interpretation of 
non-basic Freudian wish-fulfilment.  As noted, part of he appeal of the present 
account is that it seems to assign symptoms, etc., a causal role in the gratification of 
unconscious wishes.  But it seems implausible that the Ratman’s mind-reading 
system, even supplied the content of his unconsciou wish to kill Richard, can conjure 
up an ‘as-if’ experience corresponding to the content of that wish from the perceptual 
input generated by his weight-losing efforts.  The mismatch between input and output 
appears too great.  Indeed, even in cases where the discr pancy is considerably less—
ones more like Carruthers’ example of a child using a banana to pretend to talk to her 
                                                
34 Could the sorts of cues that Carruthers highlights—visual and verbal imagery, etc.— even be 
supposed to be available?  Freudian theory’s commiten  to unconscious sensory imagery is 
fundamental; but it may a bit much to suggest that t e thought processes of the unconscious are carried 
out to the regular accompaniment of verbal imagery.  Granted, verbal associations, slips of the tongue, 
etc., loom large in Freud’s view of the operation of the unconscious, but to admit that falls far short of 
crediting the unconscious with a kind of mental sub-vocalization.  So, apart from the considerations 
mentioned in the text, it may be necessary to assign the mind-reader direct access to unconscious 




Grandma—I am doubtful that the account can deliver anything phenomenally like an 
‘as if’ experience. 
Carruthers’ view of perception lays great weight on the role of 
conceptualization.  And it is true that, in a case lik  that of Wittgenstein’s famous 
duck-rabbit (Wittgenstein 1958, 194), whether one perceives the figure as a duck or 
as a rabbit has much to do with the concepts that are activated while viewing it.  
Indeed, it even seems possible to determine one’s perce tion by imposing one or the 
other concept on the figure in a top-down fashion.  However, one would think that the 
part played by conceptualization in perception has its limits.  Thus, though one can 
choose whether to perceive Wittgenstein’s figure as ither a duck or as a rabbit (by 
imposing the relevant concept), one cannot plausibly choose to perceive it as, say, a 
spider or starfish.35  Presumably, this is because in such a case suitable non-
conceptual sensory input is lacking.  So, similarly, on the present account it is a 
stretch to hold that—at some unconscious level—it is for Elektra as if she were 
separating her parents in separating pillow from headboard .36  Nonetheless, because a 
representation is delivered to her emotional systems with the content s parating 
mother and father, her desire may count as being gratified, albeit in a non-
phenomenal manner: her emotional systems can be suppo ed to respond with pleasure 
to the information that the desired state is realized.  So although the present account 
                                                
35 To be sure, there is a sense in which one can see x as y where these items furnish utterly discrepant 
sensory input.  Thus, for example, one can imagine an acting student given the exercise of seeing a 
coffee mug as a dagger.  However, ‘seeing as’ in that sense just amounts to ‘pretending that x is y’.  On 
Carruthers’ account of pretend-play (and similarly with respect to its Freudian application) the child 
sees the banana s a telephone in this sense, but her mind-reading system is supposed to see her as 
talking to Grandma in a more literal, quasi-perceptual sense.  It is this latter sense that is at issue in the 
present discussion. 





of symptoms does fail to find room for one key element of Freudian wish-fulfilment, 
a robust ‘as if’ experience, it does correspond to Freudian theory in some other 
respects.   
It may be a weakness of the present account, however—at least as a 
reconstruction of Freudian theory—that it would notobviously permit application to 
every class of phenomena which Freud regards as wish-fulfilling.  Perhaps besides 
symptomatic acts the account could apply to distorted dreams, at least insofar as their 
manifest content represents the dreamer performing some action.  The dream-imagery 
could conceivably be fed to the unconscious and thereby become available for 
(re-)interpretation by it.  However, the current account would not seem to permit 
application at all to symptoms which lack an act-like character, for example, 
hysterical paralyses.  For the account limits the rol of unconscious interpretation to 
the assignment of content to consciously performed actions; such inert states as 
paralyses would seem to escape its scope.37 
The Pretence Account vs. Magic Intentionalism 
At this point, it is worth comparing and contrasting the model of wish-
fulfilment suggested by Carruthers’ account of pretend-play with the magic 
intentionalism that also seemed to correspond in some respects with Freud’s 
pronouncements about wish-fulfilments.  In the first place, the former account would 
                                                
37 Of course, on an intentionalist reading such manifestations as hysterical paralyses are actions (or at 
least the effects of actions).  However, even on an intentionalist construction, they would seem to fall 
out of the scope of the present account, since outwardly they appear to lack the character of actions 
(indeed, for defensive purposes, it is crucial thatey appear to lack that character).  So they would not 
seem to provide the right sort of perceptual input to a mind-reading module. 
Ultimately, however, I wish to leave open the possibility that the present account (or a modification of 
it) might be able to accommodate even manifestations that lack an explicit act-like character.  Indeed, 
if the mind-reader performs its interpretative work more on the basis of accessed intentions than 
perceptual inputs, symptoms’ lacking an explicit act-like character may pose no insuperable barrier to 




count as a form of intentionalism as well, since it would attribute the genesis of wish-
fulfilments to unconscious intentions.  But the content of the relevant intentions 
would differ from those of magic intentionalism.  They would not be intentions to 
actually realize unconscious wishes but, rather, intentions t  pretend that one is doing 
so: Elektra’s episodes of separating pillow and headbo rd, for example, would be 
explained by an intention to simulate separating mother from father.  Moreover, as a 
result, the account would seem to require complicating the structure of the 
unconscious.  Whereas on magic intentionalism it is, ultimately, the same 
unconscious that both generates wish-fulfilling manifestations and interprets them as 
realizing one’s unconscious wish, on the pretence ac ount there would, it appears, 
need to be a split between the unconscious module or compartment generating the 
pretence and the unconscious compartment that receives the interpretation of the 
pretence.  Otherwise it is hard to see how the unconsci us would in any sense be 
‘fooled’ by the pretence as required by the account. 
Note, further, that in certain respects magic intentionalism more satisfactorily 
accords with Freud’s characterization of non-basic wish-fulfilment.  On magic 
intentionalism, the unconscious contents from which symptoms spring include odd 
identity beliefs, such as pillow = mother and headboard = father.  So whereas the 
pretend-play account had some trouble explaining how t e unconscious could be so 
confused as to interpret symptomatic acts like Elektra’s as satisfying unconscious 
wishes, magic intentionalism provides a straightforward explanation.  Since Elektra is 
supposed to have these odd identity beliefs, she can a tually be held to experience her 




have the sort of ‘as if’ experience that appears to be central to Freud’s understanding 
of wish-fulfilment.38  Magic intentionalism, then, assigns a role to sympto s, etc., on 
which they can clearly count as wish-fulfilments themselves: they will be judged by 
the unconscious as satisfying its wishes and, therefore, can plausibly contribute to the 
wishes’ quiescence. 
However, though magic intentionalism yields a fairly satisfactory sense in 
which—at least some—symptoms, etc., might be seen as wish-fulfilments, it fails to 
do justice to the fact that Freud actually seems to locate the crucial element of 
gratification (the ‘as if’-experience) before the symptoms, etc., in the causal chain, 
not after it as does the present account.  As noted (p. 223 above), Freud appears to see 
unconscious hallucinatory wish-fulfilment as antecedent to both distorted dreams and 
symptoms, etc.  In fact, the less basic forms of wish-fulfilment apparently presuppose 
the infantile hallucinatory form, with symptoms, etc., merely constituting an extra 
link inserted in the chain leading from wish through ‘as if’-experience to the wish’s 
quiescence.  This circumstance, in fact, may push in t e direction of a non-
intentionalist reading of wish-fulfilments. 
The Anti-Intentionalist Reading of Wish-Fulfilment 
David Livingstone Smith explicitly recognizes the dpendence of less basic 
forms of wish-fulfilment like symptomatic acts and parapraxes on the basic, 
hallucinatory form (Smith, 174-6).  Discussing a parapraxis in which Freud forgets to 
send his proofs of his pamphlet “On Dreams”—according to Freud’s self-
interpretation, as a result of a wish that the work not be published—Smith offers the 
                                                
38 Even the Ratman can perhaps be supposed to experience his efforts to lose weight as killing Dick 
(see p. 227 above).  For the identificatory beliefs magic intentionalism refers to could concern actions 
just as well as other categories.  Thus, the Ratman could be supposed to have the belief trimming = 




following account:  “(1) Freud wishes not to have ‘On dreams’ published (W1), (2) W1 
conflicts with his [conscious] wish to have ‘On dreams’ published (W2), (3) Freud 
repudiates W1, (4) Freud unconsciously represents W1 as fulfilled and (5) this brings 
about Freud’s forgetting the proofs” (1999, 175-76).  Essentially, on Smith’s account, 
then, a frustrated wish leads to hallucinatory wish-fulfilment and, in turn, some sort of 
manifestation like a parapraxis or symptom. 
But such an account does leave it somewhat puzzling in what sense 
symptoms, etc., are themselves wish-fulfilments.  There is no easy answer to this 
question.  Perhaps it suffices if they can be assigned some role in bringing about the 
quiescence of the wishes which instigate them.  Butit is left unclear how a 
symptomatic act, say, can lead to the quiescence of the wish that gave rise to it.39   
The account of symptoms, etc., based in Carruther’s account of pretend-play had the 
merit of attempting to explain how in terms of interv ning mechanisms: symptomatic 
act gives rise to an ‘as if’-experience which, in turn, leads to the wish’s quiescence 
(where this latter mechanism, though unconscious, is essentially a familiar one—we 
all know that imaginative episodes can lead to the qui scence of desires).40  And 
magic intentionalism makes a similar appeal to sympto s’ role in generating ‘as if’-
                                                
39 Of course, there is much else that remains unexplained on Smith’s sort of account of wish-
fulfilments.  With respect to basic wish-fulfilment itself, Freud notes that he gives no account of a 
central element of the dream-work, namely, “the transformation of thoughts into a hallucinatory 
experience” (1916-17, 213).  Moreover, specifically with respect to the less basic forms of wish-
fulfilment, as Smith points out, there is the problem of explaining how hallucinatory wish-fulfilments 
give rise to such manifestations as parapraxes and ymptoms (1999, 176).  Of course, Freud’s appeal to 
dream-work processes like condensation and displacement goes some way towards filling this gap, but 
not quite the whole distance.  For example, there is the difficulty of explaining what Freud calls “the 
choice of neurosis,” that is, of explaining just what pathology (or other manifestation) will result in a 
given case.  Again, there is a question why such outward manifestations are required at all: Why does 
the underlying hallucinatory wish-fulfilment not suffice to appease the relevant unconscious wishes? 
40 Of course, I have raised some doubt that the pretend-play account can actually accommodate an ‘as 
if’ experience.  But, even so, the account grants symptoms the sort of causal role in producing 




experiences.  But why on an account like Smith’s should the Ratman’s compulsive 
exercise, say, (temporarily) still his wish to kill his perceived rival Richard?  Freud, 
however, fairly clearly takes the symptoms, etc., to have this role.  And perhaps their 
possession of this role is ultimately enough to warrant Freud’s view of such 
manifestations as wish-fulfilments. 
Intentionalism or Anti-Intentionalism? 
So where are we left in settling the issue between intentionalism and anti-
intentionalism in the interpretation of Freud?  With respect to wish-fulfilling 
phenomena, the weight of evidence seems to be somewhat on the side of anti-
intentionalism.  Magic intentionalism is supported by some of Freud’s phraseology41 
and the fact that it provides a clear sense in which symptoms, etc., would be wish-
fulfilling.  However, that Freud apparently locates he crucial ‘as if’-experience 
before symptoms, etc., in the causal chain provides strong support for a non-
intentionalist reading, as does his insistence on the close analogy between symptom- 
and dream-formation: Freud seems to regard both sympto  and manifest dream as 
generated from latent content by non-intentionalist dream-work mechanisms.42  
Moreover, as with the pretence-account (see p. 231 and n. 37), there may be some 
strain even in applying magic intentionalism to manifestations besides symptomatic 
acts.  Recall Grünbaum’s query: “Can the paranoiac be warrantedly said to have 
unconsciously intended his delusional persecutory thoughts and comportment to 
accomplish his erotic objectives?”  (1984, 76-77).  More particularly, what identity 
beliefs can the paranoiac be held to have such that he ctually sees the very fact of his 
                                                
41 The absence of any such phraseology supporting the pret nd-play variety of intentionalism, by 
contrast, casts doubt on it as a strict interpretation of Freudian theory.  However, the account may 
retain interest as a charitable reconstruction of (parts of) Freudian theory. 




having persecutory thoughts as realizing the states aimed at by the homosexual 
desires supposed to underlie his illness?43  Accordingly, even the potential sphere of 
application of magic intentionalism may be confined to symptomatic acts.44 
 However, as I noted above (p. 210ff.), there are clear intentionalist elements in 
Freud’s theory.  Moreover, it is likely that Freud conceives of the operation of 
repression and resistance on the intentionalist model.  Certainly, the sort of flexible 
behaviors that Freud thinks patients exhibit so as to sabotage their treatment and keep 
unsavory contents unconscious suggest the kind of means-end reasoning associated 
with intentional action.45  Indeed, Freud sometimes views the very generation of a 
patient’s illness as a whole on the intentionalist pattern, a fact which brings the wish-
fulfilling symptoms bound up in the illness partly into the ambit of intentionalism 
(see p. 212 above).  It is possible, in fact, that Freud quite generally sees non-basic 
wish-fulfilling phenomena as non-intentionalist mechanisms which are activated in 
the service of intentions of one sort or another.  Though, ultimately, there is no very 
strong textual support for attributing this view to Freud, it cannot be altogether ruled 
out that he sees wish-fulfilments as activated precisely with the intention of affording 
pleasure, or at least reducing in some measure the displeasure occasioned by the 
                                                
43 Perhaps one could hold that where—as in this case—th  symptoms are contentful states, the 
unconscious could see its desires as satisfied becaus , in virtue of possessing suitable identity beliefs, it 
is able to decode the content of those states by sustit ting identicals for identicals.  But any such 
account would diverge from magic intentionalism, which sees the symptom itself (not its content) as 
furnishing the unconscious a seeming satisfaction of its desires.  Moreover, this model apparently can 
be applied only to belief-like states such as delusions, not phobias, say, let alone to states such as 
hysterical paralyses which altogether lack content. 
44 Perhaps it would be possible to read Freud as intent onalist with respect to symptomatic acts, non-
intentionalist with respect to other wish-fulfilling phenomena.  Note that the textual evidence that 
supports magic intentionalism comes from passages wh re Freud treats of symptomatic acts 
specifically. 
45 Perhaps too the fact that Freud charges the (unconscious) ego with the execution of the defensive 
processes of repression and resistance supports an intentionalist reading of them.  For at least with 




frustration of unconscious wishes.46  This variant of intentionalism, which I shall refer 
to as hedonistic intentionalism, has the merit of doing justice in some measure to the 
fact that Freud’s theory seems to incorporate both intentionalist and non-intentionalist 
elements.  Accordingly, I accord it considerable att ntion below.47 
Ultimately, however, I shall take no definitive stand as to the precise extent of 
intentionalism in Freud’s theory.  Rather, I shall t ke into account both intentionalist 
and non-intentionalist readings in considering the degree of irrationality bound up in 
Freudian phenomena and its possible implications for normativist constraints. 
Implications for Normativism 
Immediate Difficulties for Normativism 
Overall, there exists little consensus about what rational norms there are.  And 
any clarity that exists about how to assess rationality when the mind is seen as a 
unified field of mental states evaporates when, as on the Freudian model, it is viewed 
as fundamentally divided.  Should, for example, each mental compartment be viewed 
as separate for the purposes of rational assessment?  Or should such assessment be 
made primarily with respect to the person as a whole?  On the former view, the mere 
presence of inconsistent beliefs in a person, for example, will not count as irrational 
provided that those beliefs are spread around internally consistent mental 
compartments.  Davidson’s view, however, is clearly that inconsistency across 
compartments negatively impacts an individual’s rationality (see p. 120 above), and, 
                                                
46 The idea would be that the whole process leading from unconscious wish to hallucinatory 
gratification to outward manifestation would be inte tionally initiated.  This would contrast with basic 
wish-fulfilment which I have presented as an entirely automatic process. 
47 The pretend-play account too can fairly readily put into a hedonistic mold, if the pretence is seen as 
undertaken for the sake of affording pleasure or reducing displeasure (though in Carruthers’ original 
treatment of pretend-play the motivational story is more complicated).  Consequently, most of the 




generally, he appears to take the view that rationality- (and charity-) standards apply 
in the first instance to persons, not their mental parts.  Inasmuch as Davidson is the 
chief target of my anti-normativist argument, perhaps it will acceptable for me to take 
for granted his view of the matter and show that Freudian phenomena challenge 
charity principles on his own conception of rationality. 
However, certain immediate difficulties for normativism fall out of that 
conception.  Davidson himself explicitly embraces a Principle of Total Evidence, 
“which counsels an agent to accept the hypothesis supported by the totality of 
evidence he or she has” (2004b, 190).  Moreover, prsumably Davidson would accept 
an extension of this principle to the sphere of practic l-reasoning along such lines as 
the following: an agent should choose that action which is supported by the totality of 
his or her desires (and relevant background beliefs).48  However, in the nature of the 
case, compartmentalization such as one finds in Freud r nders (abundant) beliefs and 
desires unavailable to conscious processes of theoretical and practical reasoning.49  So 
a Freudian architecture virtually ensures abundant violation of Davidson’s 
Principle;50  and if one interprets that principle strongly so a  to require that all 
potentially relevant beliefs or desires be actually canvassed in processes of reasoning, 
then the Freudian architecture entails the regular violation of the Principle in all 
processes of conscious reasoning.51 52  On either reading, then, Freudian theory 
                                                
48 I shall interpret the Principle of Total Evidence broadly so as to encompass both theoretical and 
practical reasoning. 
49 Conversely, conscious beliefs and desires may be rendered unavailable to unconscious processes of 
reasoning. 
50 In fact, the problem discussed here arises for virtually any modular model of central processes. 
51 Without the stipulation that potentially relevant at itudes be actually canvassed, perhaps a cognitive 
system could mostly observe the principle if it turned out that unconscious beliefs and desires, though 
relevant to inference and choice, rarely tipped the scales against inferences and choices supported by 




appears to challenge Davidson’s Competence Principle.  For it difficult to see a 
system that is constructed so as to permit abundant (or regular) violations of a rational 
norm as embodying that norm as part of its competenc .  Moreover, the consequent 
irrationality cannot be easily seen as fitting the pattern required by Davidson’s 
Compartment Principle.  For the irrationality will not be owing to the active 
interference of one mental compartment with another, but merely to the inability of, 
say, the conscious compartment to access the statescontained within unconscious 
compartment(s).  To view this state of affairs as interference with the conscious 
compartment on the part of the unconscious one(s) would strain both the spirit and the 
letter of Davidson’s Compartment Principle.  
Consider, further, what additionally seems to follow n the strong reading of 
the Principle of Total Evidence.  Given Freud’s model, all conscious (and even 
unconscious) non-deductive inference and possibly all practical-reasoning will be 
rendered procedurally irrational through the failure to consult the totality of 
potentially relevant beliefs and desires in the cognitive system.  Though Davidson’s 
Threshold Principle is none too sharply formulated, he level of procedural 
irrationality dictated by a compartmental model like Freud’s must cast substantial 
doubt on any Threshold Principle that, like Davidson’ , requires that minds meet a 
high standard of overall rationality.  This impression is only strengthened when one 
factors in the substantial statal irrationality likely to result from regular violation of 
the Principle of Total Evidence.  Presumably, many beliefs will be formed and many 
actions taken which are irrational when judged in the light of the entirety of relevant 
                                                                                                                                 
52 I shall suggest below Freud holds that unconscious processes of reasoning are similarly blind to 




beliefs and desires possessed by the cognitive systm.53  In such circumstances, it 
becomes dubious to insist that the rationality in acognitive system must greatly 
outweigh the irrationality.  In short, the very structure of the mind on the Freudian 
model, then, already renders Davidsonian normativist pr nciples suspect. 
The Problems Considered in Greater Detail 
But it is illuminating to consider a bit more concretely how Freudian 
phenomena aside from basic wish-fulfilments put pressure on normativist principles.  
First, note that the issue between intentionalism and non-intentionalism proves 
somewhat less significant in assessing the matter than one might have initially 
supposed.  A non-intentionalist reading of central F eudian phenomena of wish-
fulfilment does diminish the domain in which phenomena can be assessed with 
respect to their practical rationality or irrationality: Symptoms and other 
manifestations will be seen as generated by processes to which practical-rational 
norms simply do not apply.  However, where the products of these processes are 
beliefs or emotions (as in delusions and phobias), they can still be assessed for their 
rational coherence with one’s other attitudes; and the mechanisms which produce the 
beliefs can be assessed by epistemic standards of reliability.    Moreover, in any 
case—as I suggested above—it is simply not plausible to deny an important place to 
intentionalism in Freud’s theory: Even if wish-fulfilments can perhaps be interpreted 
non-intentionalistically, other elements of his theory, for example, repression and 
defense, should not.  So there will be at least some place for assessments of practical 
rationality in considering the operations of the Frudian unconscious. 
                                                
53 A particularly crass illustration consists in cases where, say, conscious beliefs are permitted to form





But consider the non-intentionalist reading of wish-fulfilments for a moment.  
Because on this account, the less basic forms of wish-fulfilment will include an 
undercurrent of basic, hallucinatory wish-fulfilment, the irrationality that attaches to 
the latter will attach to the former as well.54  Accordingly, it appears that my 
argument against the Competence and Compartment Principles in the preceding 
chapter can also be made with the less basic forms f wish-fulfilment, if only because 
they include the basic form: they embody the same irrational competence as the basic 
form, in which the element of irrationality is owing to the id’s internal operation, not 
interference by some other compartment of the mind.55  Of course, there will be 
differences in the operation of wish-fulfilment subequent to infancy.  Because of the 
development of secondary process and the attendant expansion of opportunities for 
realistic satisfaction of one’s desires, wish-fulfilment will be engaged with respect to 
a narrower set of desires, chiefly those consigned to the unconscious through 
repression.  But when such desires are present, substitute-satisfaction will  be sought 
for them.  And Freud’s view is that such desires are universally present, even in those 
not suffering from mental illness (hence his phrase “th  psychopathology of everyday 
life”).  In particular, during sleep, according to Freud, repressed desires find a wish-
fulfilling outlet in the (distorted) dreams of normal and abnormal individuals alike.  
So wish-fulfilment remains a regular process even byond infancy.  Consequently, in 
                                                
54 I take for granted in the present discussion that basic wish-fulfilment is ir rational rather than 
arational.  See esp. p. 183ff above for defense of this assumption. 
55 The same points should hold on a hedonistic-intentionalist view of non-basic wish-fulfilments as 
well.  For even if the sequence leading from unconsious wish to hallucinatory gratification (and, 
ultimately, to outward manifestation) is intentionally initiated (see p. 237, n.. 46 above), the 
hallucinations can be supposed to regularly give ris to corresponding irrational beliefs that one’s 
wishes have been satisfied; and even the causal link between unconscious wish and hallucination can 




view of its undercurrent of hallucinatory wish-fulfilment and the resultant 
irrationality, non-basic wish-fulfilment challenges charity principles just as does the 
infantile form. 
Less clear, however, is whether the added element of irrationality introduced 
by non-basic wish-fulfilments bears at all significantly on the Competence and 
Compartment Principles.  Indeed, the irrationality bound up in neurotic symptoms, 
etc., on the Freudian conception seems, on its face, to fit the Davidsonian model 
expressed in the Compartment Principle fairly closely: irrational thoughts and 
behavior in one compartment of the mind (the ego) are produced by non-reason 
causal interference from another compartment (the id).  Moreover, unlike the 
irrationality in basic wish-fulfilment, the outwardly irrational manifestations 
embodied in neurotic symptoms, etc., do not clearly reflect irrational competencies.  
Though there seems no principled reason that psychopat logies cannot be matters of 
competence rather than performance-error,56 Freud is not sufficiently specific with 
respect to the aetiology of particular psychopathologies (and less basic wish-
fulfilments generally) to allow one definitely to see them as reflecting ceteris paribus 
regularities of some sort.57  Again, the very fact that they represent divergences from 
a norm is prima facie reason not to seem them as reflecting competencies pending 
countervailing evidence.  In any case, Davidson’s Competence Principle confronts no 
                                                
56 Perhaps the simplest way to make this possibility vivid is to envision a sub-population of human 
beings who are wired or programmed, as it were, in such a way as to regularly exhibit some pattern of 
deviant thought or behavior. 
57 To be clear: For Freud there is a ceteris paribus regularity that repressed desires will issue in some 
form of non-basic wish-fulfilment or other.  But this falls short of an irrational competence.  Indeed, 
the wish-fulfilling manifestations—as in the case of hysterical paralysis—need not even be rationality-
evaluable.  What one seems to need for an irrational competence, rather, are regularities linking 
particular kinds of repressed contents with particular kinds of irrational manifestations—and Freud 




clear threat from the sorts of irrationality attaching distinctively to the less basic wish-
fulfilments.58 
Magic Intentionalism Again 
Turning specifically to intentionalist accounts of Freudian phenomena, we see 
that additional potential sources of irrationality are created.  Magic intentionalism, at 
the very least, introduces a significant element of theoretical irrationality into the 
Freudian unconscious.  On the account, odd identity beliefs will be produced by (or 
introduced into) the id without being grounded in other belief(-like) states that could 
provide rational warrant for them; and, of course, th  mechanisms responsible for 
their production can lay no claim to reliability. 
Moreover, if one recognizes categories of conceptual tr th and falsehood at 
all, surely many of the identities contemplated by the present account will be prime 
exemplars of the latter.  Take, for example, the belief(-like) state that a pillow is one’s 
mother.  Conceptual incoherence may be lurking just below the surface.59    However, 
even if one rejects conceptual truths and falsehoods, the introduction of such 
identities into the id would seem to render its contents logically inconsistent, at least 
to the extent that the id is supposed to partake of any significant portion of the 
realistic beliefs possessed by consciousness.  So, for example, the belief that a pillow 
is one’s mother introduced into a set of beliefs including the realistic beliefs that 
                                                
58 This general conclusion, however, may require some qualification with respect to dreams, which in 
Freud’s view are generated as distorted wish-fulfilments from the latent content embodied in the 
underlying hallucinatory wish-fulfilment.  For, to all appearances, in dreaming we temporarily come to 
accept altogether bizarre suppositions, even though those suppositions appear utterly senseless from 
the standpoint of other information possessed by our c gnitive system (information which is likely to 
be accessed in other moments or episodes of dreaming).  The regularity with which in dreaming such 
irrational suppositions are entertained perhaps doessuggest an irrational competence.  
59 Or better still: Consider a man’s belief that his genitals are identical to the number three (generated 




pillows are inanimate and that one’s mother is animte forms a set of beliefs with 
logically inconsistent contents.  In any case, an odd identity belief that a pillow is 
one’s mother will straightforwardly clash with one’s conscious belief that she is not.  
So the cognitive system as a whole will be mired in logical inconsistency.  Again, if 
these odd identity-beliefs are seen as spontaneously generated by the id itself, then the 
theoretical irrationality associated with them will not be generated according to the 
model encapsulated in the Compartment Principle—reason once more to doubt the 
claim of that normativist principle to the status of necessary truth. 
The magic-intentionalist model evinces practical irrationality inasmuch as the 
symptomatic acts which are produced according to it will, presumably, typically 
possess an akratic character.  Accordingly, the resultant actions will generally violate 
the Principle of Total Evidence.  Indeed, they will always violate the Principle in its 
strong form if in forming the relevant intentions involved the id routinely fails to 
consult possibly pertinent desires and information elsewhere in the cognitive system, 
in particular, within the conscious mind.60  This failure itself, since not owing to 
extra-compartmental interference, would also represent a violation of the 
Compartment Principle. 
Perhaps one will harbor doubt with respect to magic intentionalism whether it 
is really possible to harbor beliefs as odd as those the account contemplates.  It is 
worth considering, though, how easily we entertain similarly bizarre hypotheses in 
the context of fiction and mythology: people being turned into frogs or even 
                                                
60 There would seem to be a failure, on the one hand, to weigh conscious desires and interests in 
selecting a course of action, and a neglect of consci u ly held beliefs in assessing whether such actions 





inanimate objects like mountains, rivers or what not; and, of course, these 
mythologies represent(ed) actual beliefs in their cultures of origin.  Moreover, all 
manner of equally bizarre beliefs seem appropriately attributable to those suffering 
from psychotic delusions.  Why should it not be possible, then, that some part of the 
neurotic (or maybe even the normal individual) is prone to similarly extravagant 
beliefs?  Indeed, as noted above (p. 243, n. 58) magic intentionalism does not ascribe 
to the id much more in the way of surprising properties than seems to be involved in 
perfectly run-of-the-mill dreaming.  So the account appears a coherent hypothesis that 
should not be ruled out of court.61  Accordingly, the violations of charity principles 
bound up in it represent genuine problems for normativism. 
                                                
61 Doubt with respect to magic intentionalism may arise from another quarter, however: (1) If one 
unconsciously identifies pillow and mother, why does one treat the pillow as one’s mother only in a 
very narrow range of behaviors?  Why does one not, for example, invite it to Sunday brunch?  And, 
(2), if by chance the pillow begins to lose its stuffing, is it for the id as if the same fate has befall n the 
mother?  By way of response to (1), however, it suffices to observe that the id may harbor only very 
few mother-involving desires.  Elektra’s id, for example, may contain only (or chiefly) the desire to 
separate her mother from her father, resulting in her separating pillow and headboard.  Other desires 
involving her mother would be conscious ones and, therefore, not suitably positioned to combine with 
the id’s odd identity-beliefs in practical reasoning.  With respect to (2), it is difficult to see how magic 
intentionalism can easily escape the implication that e id sees whatever happens to the pillow as 
equally happening to the mother.  If so, this would seem to make the id emotionally hostage to the fate 
of the pillow, which might appear to detract somewhat from the id’s function of affording unconscious 
pleasure.  Perhaps, though, one can suppose the id’s attention is confined solely to whatever is relevant 
to achieving its immediate narrow purposes. 
At least this much force, however, must be conceded to the first objection: Magic intentionalism 
requires that the id be viewed as a separate center of agency (or influence on agency) from the 
mainstream of an individual’s agency and practical re soning.  Thus, if one takes the view that action 
primarily emanates from one’s unconscious central atitudes—as opposed to one’s conscious avowed 
attitudes (see p. 117, n. 19 above)—one must see the id as a distinct influence on the agency associated 
with one’s central attitudes, not as incorporated within it.  In the same way, it seems one would need to 
distinguish the source of realistic Freudian intentionalistic behaviors from the source of magic-
intentionalistic ones (viz., the id).  So some complexity in one’s conception of the structure of the 
unconscious would be required—beyond that already dictated by the need to distinguish unconscious 
ego (the repressing force) from the id (the locus of repressed contents). 
For a reading of Freud that, in essence, ascribes to him the distinction between central and avowed 
attitudes see Smith (1999, 162-66, esp. n163). Specifically, Smith introduces the distinction in 
explicating Freud’s view of the akrasia bound up in symptomatic acts. 
Note, further, the fact that at least some irrationality can in principle be explained via the discrepancy 
between avowed and central attitudes, rather than trough compartmental interference, casts further 
doubt on Davidson’s Compartment Principle (though, of course, on magic intentionalism the central 





Whereas on magical intentionalism—with its actions ba ed in bizarre identity 
beliefs—the irrationality of Freudian phenomena is fa rly patent, on the hedonistic-
intentionalist picture at first sight they offer some semblance of rationality.  Is it not 
rational, say, for the id to seek some pleasurable gratification of wishes whose direct 
satisfaction is unavailable to it?  Indeed, when interpreted on the hedonistic-
intentionalistic picture, Freud can seem to present a picture of the mind as hyper-
rational: not only do phenomena thought to be irrational (de usions, phobias, 
symptomatic acts, etc.) all receive coherent rationl explanations but phenomena 
otherwise held to be altogether beyond the pale of rational assessment (hysterical 
symptoms, parapraxes, etc.) are brought within its scope.  But the appearance of 
rationality is deceptive.  To see this, consider once more how hedonistic 
intentionalism views Freudian phenomena. 
Fundamentally, we have repression, resistance, and wish-fulfilling processes 
to consider.  On hedonistic intentionalism, traumatic memories and unacceptable 
desires are consigned to the unconscious in order to prevent the pain which they 
would occasion the conscious mind.  Once unconsciou, resistance contrives 
expedients in order to neutralize forces—such as the therapist’s probing—that 
threaten to raise those untoward contents to consciu ness.  Moreover, a wish-
fulfilling substitute-satisfaction or gratification is sought for the unconscious wishes 
in order to diminish the pain of frustrated desire and afford some pleasure to the 
unconscious mind.  In essence, a process is intentionally initiated that leads from 




manifestation, and, ultimately, the wish’s relative quiescence.  Is this unconscious 
pursuit of pleasure and pain-reduction not the very picture of rationality? 
However, consider the theoretical (ir-)rationality bound up in this organization 
of the psyche.  In the first place, the present reading does nothing to cancel the 
element of theoretical irrationality bound up in obsessive beliefs and other delusions, 
which are induced without proper regard to available evidence.62  Moreover, there 
appears to be theoretical irrationality bound up in repression and resistance.63 
Now repression of memories and the beliefs they involve does not quite seem 
to fit the usual understanding of self-deception, on which—roughly—“self-deception 
consists in getting yourself to believe one thing i order to avoid facing what you 
know to be the truth” (Gardner 1993, 16).64  Repression, rather, consists in the 
removal of contents like beliefs from consciousness, not i the inducing of them.  Yet 
it too is a motivated phenomenon and perhaps irration l in several respects.  First, it 
creates what might appear to be a kind of rational incoherence, the simultaneous 
presence of a belief that p to the unconscious and its absence to consciousness. 
Perhaps a conscious-unconscious split is irrational by its very nature when it comes to 
                                                
62 The illusory beliefs arising in episodes of dreaming can count as further instances of theoretical 
irrationality, as can phobias if understood as on a cognitive theory of emotion.  
63 My remarks focus mainly on repression.  However, sveral of the points apply, mutatis mutandis, to 
resistance as well.  
64 By contrast, resistance seems to operate in part precisely through self-deception.  Thus, for example, 
Freud describes ‘intellectual resistance’, whereby patients induce in themselves doubts about the 
legitimacy of psychoanalytic theory and technique in order to escape the therapist’s interpretations of 
their own case (1916-17, 289).  However, Freud remaks, “The patient’s resistance is of very many 
sorts, extremely subtle . . . and it exhibits protean changes in the forms in which it manifests itself ” 
(287).  For instance, Freud describes that in women resistance often exploits an erotic transference 
toward their doctor: “their jealousy . . . and their xasperation at their inevitable rejection . . . are bound 
to have a damaging effect on their personal understanding with the doctor . . .” (290-91).  The 




belief. 65  Second, at the very least, repression is likely to result in straightforward 
rational incoherence between conscious and unconscious, in that the conscious, 
deprived of relevant autobiographical memories, will often form beliefs that run 
counter to the unconsciously entertained beliefs.66  So repression, even if not 
theoretically irrational itself, seems to (causally) contribute to irrational states-of-
affairs.  But, arguably, undertaking to do what canbe expected to result in 
theoretically irrational states-of-affairs itself represents a form of theoretical 
irrationality.67, 68  Moreover, it is repression that in large part produces the conditions 
responsible for the regular violation of the Principle of Total Evidence: by consigning 
beliefs to the unconscious, it ensures that the mind will fail to take into account some 
portion of potentially relevant beliefs in its conscious reasoning and will thereby fall 
afoul of Competence and Compartment Principles (see pp. 238-39 above)—further 
grounds perhaps for seeing repression itself as irrtional. 
Bear in mind, further, that Freud holds that such repression takes place on a 
massive scale.  In particular, Freud holds that as the child enters ‘latency’ around its 
sixth year (a period of relative sexual dormancy), “The majority of experiences and 
mental impulses before the start of the latency period now fall victim to infantile 
amnesia—the forgetting . . . which veils our earliest youth to us and makes us 
strangers to it.”  Freud remarks, “It is impossible to avoid a suspicion that the 
                                                
65 For the most part, I am agnostic about the irrationality of this and the other features of repression 
catalogued here.  I merely wish to broach the possibility of their irrationality. 
66 Of course, the conscious will sometimes be abetted in forming these contrary beliefs by processes of 
self-deception, but those processes are distinct from the repression which precedes them. 
67 I am assuming here that the repressing ‘agency’ can expect the irrational consequences of its 
undertakings.  But even if it cannot, it is plausible to attribute to the cognitive system as a whole 
beliefs which would entail the likelihood of those irrational consequences occurring. 
68 Similarly, perhaps resistance is theoretically irrat onal—among other reasons—because it consists in 




beginnings of sexual life which are included in that period have provided the motive 
for its being forgotten—that this forgetting, in fact, is an outcome of repression” 
(1916-17, 326).  Repression, then, operates on a large scale for Freud, in which case 
the amount of irrationality associated with it could turn out to be very considerable 
indeed.69 
Granted the theoretical irrationality of Freudian phenomena on the hedonistic-
intentionalist model, what of their practical rationality?  Do they not at least well 
serve the practical interests of the individual?  After all, the hedonistic-intentionalist 
model sees the behaviors resulting in breaches of the retical rationality as undertaken 
precisely with the purpose of sparing the individual pain and affording them pleasure.  
However, the view of Freudian phenomena as practically rational does not withstand 
scrutiny.  In the first place, by consigning beliefs and desires to the unconscious, 
repression renders them unavailable to conscious practical reasoning; that is, 
repression ensures that the practical analogue of the Principle of Total Evidence will 
be regularly violated.70 Such regular violation of a practical-rational norm seems a 
violation of the Competence and Compartment Principles; and, as before, repression’s 
rationality is itself perhaps called into question tself in view of its causal contribution 
to this state-of-affair.71 
                                                
69 I return to this point below in discussing the implications of hedonistic intentionalism for Davidson’s 
Threshold Principle. 
70 Note that even though the repressed desires will, presumably, tend to be ones that it would be 
imprudent to act on, neglecting to consult them in co scious processes of practical reasoning would 
still constitute violation of a strong Principle of Total Evidence.  Moreover, Freud himself takes the 
view that some repressed desires are of a kind that an individual would, in fact, be better off indulging 
(1910, 53-54).  In any case, there is clear irrationality in failing to consult all beliefs potentially 
relevant to practical reasoning, of which there are sure to be some among repressed contents. 
71 As above, resistance is implicated too by sustaining the states-of-affairs that result in such 
irrationality.  But perhaps question can be raised whether it is not sometimes practically rational to 




Indeed, on close inspection, the entire workings of the Freudian unconscious 
as pictured on the hedonistic-intentionalist model appear mired in irrationality.  For 
although repression, resistance, and wish-fulfilment ostensibly aim at the avoidance 
of pain and the pursuit of pleasure, it is highly doubtful that they must succeed in 
maximizing the well-being of the individual.  In fact, in cases of severe neuroticism—
where these phenomena are perhaps most active—they seem to fail egregiously.  
Consider, for example, the case of the middle-aged woman suffering from delusions 
of jealousy described above (pp. 210-11).  Freud writes of her that through her 
delusions she was “embittering her own life and the lives of her relatives,” that “her 
happiness had been destroyed,” and that her symptoms are “accompanied by intense 
subjective suffering and . . . threaten the communal life of a family” (1916-17, 248-
50).  In such circumstances, it is difficult to defend the rationality of the processes 
supporting her delusions. 
Granted, it is foreseeable, not actual, outcomes on which attributions of 
practical (ir-)rationality depend, and prior to an ill ess, and perhaps even at its onset, 
beliefs cannot with any certainty be ascribed to an individual that entail the 
inadvisability of engaging in the repressions, wish-fulfilments, etc., destined to 
produce and manifest a severe neurosis.72  Yet by the time a full-blown illness has 
wreaked havoc on one’s life, the individual as a whole would seem to possess 
information that does entail the foolishness of persisting in these pathogenic 
                                                                                                                                 
out that there are counterexamples to the principle that it is always irrational to do so, my subsequent 
discussion should make it clear that repression and resistance are not likely to constitute such 
exceptions.     
72 Even the individual versed in Freudian psychoanalytic theory is likely not to know the 
autobiographical particulars (the fixations, genetic predispositions, etc.) which, according to Freud, 
partly determine how repression and other Freudian processes will play out in their case!  (But, then 




activities, let alone in undermining through resistance every effort to undo the 
conditions supporting one’s neurosis.  Indeed, the psychoanalytic patient will often 
exhibit something like an akratic relation to their pathology: They will consciously 
deplore the machinations of their unconscious, judge that it would be best if it (and 
they) did not engage in them, but find themselves powerless to oppose them.73 
Of course, one may reasonably broach the possibility that the interests served 
by the Freudian phenomena, nonetheless, outweigh the ones against which those 
phenomena militate.  Perhaps, despite appearances, the pleasure and desire-
satisfaction afforded the patient through their illness (through wish-fulfilment, 
through escaping recognition of unsavory facts about oneself, etc.) is greater than that 
otherwise to be had.  Ultimately, it is not incumbent upon me to insist that it does not.  
For my argument, the mere scientific possibility that it does not suffices.  However, 
one does well to recall that wish-fulfilments afford no real desire-satisfaction, but 
merely serve the interests of reducing unconscious pain and promoting unconscious 
pleasure.  Furthermore, the hypothesis being entertain d becomes highly implausible 
when, as sometime happens, a patient’s condition is severe enough to drive them to 
the brink of suicide. 
All in all, on the hedonistic-intentionalistic model, the Freudian unconscious 
gives every appearance of being narrowly and inflexib y focused on the procurement 
of unconscious pleasure, with blithe neglect of the long-term, overall interests of the 
                                                
73 Of course, the condition described differs from ordinary akrasia in that the states constituting the 
condition are distributed among both conscious and unconscious compartments.  It is not obvious, 
though, that this bears on the condition’s irrationality. 
Note that the state of the neurotic not convinced of the truth of psychoanalytic theory and its 
applicability to their case will not so closely resemble akrasia, since, though they will judge that they 
would be better off without their illness, they will lack a judgment to the effect that they would be 
better off not to induce it in themselves (better off n t to repress the relevant pathogenic beliefs, r ist 




individual.  In a word, it appears practically irrational.  Moreover, if—as seems 
plausible—these features are assumed to be endemic to unconscious agency of the 
Freudian sort, then the Freudian unconscious seems to embody an irrational 
competence (contra Davidson’s Competence Principle); and since the irrationality 
involved is not owing to inter-compartmental interference, they represent a violation 
of Davidson’s Compartment Principle as well.74  It remains, however, to consider the 
bearing of the less basic manifestations of the Freudian unconscious on the Threshold 
Principle.  
Threshold Principle 
In the preceding chapter, it was argued that the Thr shold Principle is 
challenged by the possibility that irrational, purely wish-fulfilling processes might 
predominate prior to the development of secondary process.  However, the foregoing 
discussion suggests that Freudian theory, especially when interpreted on the 
hedonistic-intentionalistic model, implies that there is (or can be) a considerable 
amount of irrationality in the human being even subsequent to the development of 
the—ostensibly more rational—secondary process.  As I have emphasized, the 
divorce between conscious and unconscious processes a ures that most reasoning, 
both theoretical and practical, on the side of consiousness will be procedurally 
                                                
74 These conclusions could perhaps be resisted by urging that that unconscious agency functions quite 
differently in the case of the healthy and the sever ly ill.  However, that suggestion seems to run 
counter to Freud’s own conception of the matter.  Generally, the unconscious would seem to pursue a 
narrow agenda while remaining blind or indifferent to he individual’s long-term, overall interests.  
Though in the case of normal individuals this state-of-affairs may result in relatively favorable 
outcomes, even here the unconscious would exhibit procedural irrationality through failing to consult 





irrational when assessed by standards of ideal ration lity.75, 76  Again, at least with 
respect to its practical reasoning, the Freudian unconscious, in turn, appears to fall 
afoul of those same norms in virtue of its narrow pursuit of pleasure via wish-
fulfilment.  So Freud’s basic picture of the organizat on of the personality itself 
challenges the insistence on a high level of rationl ty as a necessary condition for 
agency. 
Furthermore, the total amount of irrationality of the cognitive system 
increases when one factors in the additional irration l processes Freud postulates.  
Even in the relatively healthy individual, there will be the beliefs formed irrationally 
on the basis of hallucinatory wish-fulfilment and dreaming; and there will be 
parapraxes and transferences.77  In the neurotic, added to this will be the assorted 
symptoms associated with their illness (symptomatic acts, delusions, phobias, etc.), as 
well as the irrational attempt to preserve the illness through resistance.  Just how 
abundant these (irrational) neurotic manifestations can become according to Freudian 
theory is illustrated in case-studies like that of he Ratman (1909).  So Freudian 
theory seems to contemplate the possibility of agents who very substantially fall short 
of the standard of rationality embodied in Davidson’  Threshold Principle. 
                                                
75 Freud, of course, did not contemplate the possibility of a distinctively cognitive unconscious.  
However, the incorporation of it into the Freudian picture would not appear to relieve the overall 
irrationality of the psyche on the Freudian picture.  For the processes of a purely cognitive unconsciu  
would, no less than conscious processes, presumably lack access to information contained within the 
dynamic unconscious and so equally fall afoul of the Principle of Total Evidence (of course, if the 
cognitive unconscious is itself modular and encapsulated, this only compounds the extent of violation 
of the Principle).      
76 Moreover, as noted, incoherencies between conscious and unconscious autobiographical beliefs are 
sure to develop, particularly as the result of infantile amnesia. 
77 Transference consists in the irrational redirection of unconsciously held emotional attitudes towards 
important figures in one’s childhood onto people encountered in one’s adult life (notably, one’s 
therapist, but others as well). 
Note that parapraxes seem not to represent mere violations of procedural rationality in the practical 





Indeed, perhaps Freudian theory even permits making a de enerative 
argument (cf. p. 172ff above) against Threshold Principles that set the standard of 
rationality lower than does Davidson’s.  For it appears possible to imagine an 
unfortunate individual who becomes progressively afflicted with more and more of 
the neuroses of which Freudian theory treats.  In fact, for any threshold of requisite 
rationality which a normativist might care to set, we seem able to imagine this 
individual eventually so severely afflicted with these conditions and their attendant 
irrationality that they can be supposed to have fall n below that threshold—without 
thereby ceasing to be agents or bearers of propositional attitudes.  So much the worse 
for the Threshold Principle.   
All in all, the scientific possibility of the truth of Freudian hypotheses 
canvassed in the present chapter seems to provide ampl  grounds to call into question 
the a priori status of the charity principles championed by normativists of Davidson’s 
stripe. 
Concluding Thoughts 
 The upshot of the arguments of the preceding chapters is that the possibility of 
irrational subsystems of the mind puts normativism under severe strain.  In Chapter 
Three, I presented the schema of an argument against normativism and proceeded in 
Chapters Four and Five to flesh out that schema with subsystems deriving from 
Freudian psychoanalytic theory.  However, it is worth noting that subsystems posited 





For example, contemporary theorists posit an unconsci u  subsystem78 of the 
mind (typically referred to as ‘System1’) dedicated o intuitive reasoning.  This 
system is supposed to operate according to ‘quick and dirty’ heuristics that render it 
systematically prone to fallacies of reasoning (see, e.g., Carruthers [2009a], 
Kahneman [2002], Evans and Over [1996]).  Since these divergences occur in virtue 
of the system’s normal internal operations—and not through the external influence of 
some other mental compartment—it would seem to violate both the Competence and 
Compartment Principles.  Moreover, inasmuch as many proponents of System1 
reasoning view it as “a more primitive system present without the slower [conscious] 
one in many animals” (Rey 2007, 76), it appears to cast doubt on the Threshold 
Principle as well.79 
However one fills out the argument-schema in detail, if done properly, the 
resulting argument should call into question both normativism and the hermeneutical 
conception of the mind insofar as it relies on normativism.  If we wish to do justice to 
psychological phenomena, we should look elsewhere than to a philosophy of mind 
that misconstrues its fundamental character and places insufficiently motivated, 
artificial constraints on psychological theorizing. 
                                                
78 Or collection of subsystems. 
79 This is because in the absence of the—arguably—more rational processes of the conscious system 
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